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Abstract
Local ordinances that restrict payday lending constitute an important strategy in the overall
attack on this problematic form of lending. In this report, made possible by the generous
support of Silicon Valley Community Foundation, we describe and analyze campaigns in three
locales that differ markedly in the opportunities and challenges faced by ordinance advocates.
The locales are Santa Clara and San Mateo counties in California (“Silicon Valley”); Dallas,
Denton, and Tarrant counties in Texas; and Salt Lake County in Utah. This report finds both
commonalities and important variations among these campaigns. While there is no single
recipe for a successful ordinance campaign, our comparative analysis suggests the following ten
lessons for payday lending opponents and other advocates of social reform via local action. The
lessons, in brief, are as follows:
Lesson #1: Form a strong broad‐based coalition and develop rules for its operation.
Lesson #2: Move beyond abstractions like “500% interest” or “debt traps” and gather stories
from actual borrowers about the effects of these loans on their lives. Seek the help of social
service providers who are part of your coalition in gathering these stories and empowering
borrowers to share them at public hearings.
Lesson #3: Seek financial support for campaigns if you can, but never assume that ample
financial resources are necessary for a successful campaign.
Lesson #4: Involve faith leaders in a meaningful and ongoing way early in any campaign.
Lesson #5: Cultivate strong working relationships with the press and create a detailed strategy
for working effectively and consistently with members of the local media.
Lesson #6: Identify and cultivate a member of the city council (or county board of supervisors)
who will serve as your campaign’s inside champion. In some instances, more than one
potential champion may be necessary when sensitive politics or rivalries make the choice of a
single champion problematic.
Lesson #7: Identify and schedule meetings with city decision makers well in advance of any key
votes. Be prepared in these meetings to present strong arguments in favor of any ordinance.
These arguments will depend on local politics. Under some conditions, the negative impact on
borrowers will be most persuasive; in others, the impact of payday lending on local economies,
crime, blight, and the general image of a particular city will the city will be most effective.

Lesson #8: Carefully prepare to respond to industry arguments, especially the argument that
there are no alternatives to payday loans. Develop a concrete list of payday alternatives that
can be shared with members of the public as well as policy makers early in any campaign.
Lesson #9: Once one ordinance passes, help other municipalities pass similar ordinances in
other cities.
Lesson #10: Use the power of your coalition to press for further state and federal payday loan
reform in partnership with the many organizations across the country that are seeking to curb
payday lending and other forms of high‐cost lending.

I. Executive Summary
The purpose of this report is to describe and assess campaigns to curb payday lending in three
localities: Salt Lake County, Utah; Dallas, Denton, and Tarrant counties in Texas; and Santa Clara
and San Mateo counties in California (“Silicon Valley”).1
This report builds on two previously published “how to” guides for individuals and organizations
wishing to address payday lending with the tools available to local governments. The report
adds breadth and depth to these guides by documenting several city‐specific campaigns from
start to finish. The report goes inside these campaigns through interviews with key leaders and
their allies.
The overall report consists of five major parts. This, the first part, summarizes the entire
project. We begin by arguing that local ordinances to restrict payday lending are part of a
larger social movement. We then describe the contributions of two previous efforts to
understand the components of successful ordinance campaigns. Next, we explain the
methodology used in this report. We then discuss five basic components of ordinance
campaigns and these components can vary, and we summarize the many impacts of ordinance
campaigns. Finally, we provide recommendations for future campaigns to enact local payday
ordinances and offer some concluding observations.
Behind this summary is a longer report with four additional sections. The first three sections
provide our detailed findings regarding the campaigns in Salt Lake, Silicon Valley, and Dallas.2
The final section describes the impacts these campaigns have had on subsequent legal action,
public opinion, the advocacy organizations themselves, and the individuals behind those
organizations. We hope these additional details will be of interest in municipalities across the
country where citizens wish to address payday lending and other issues through local
ordinances.

The New Fair Lending Movement
We conceive of the anti‐payday lending campaigns described in this report as part of a social
movement that we call the New Fair Lending Movement (NFLM). One could argue that what
we identify as a social movement is better understood as an alliance among organizations with
overlapping interests in a large number of financial products: credit cards, checking account
overdrafts, international remittances, payday and auto title loans, student loans, tax refund
anticipation loans, rent‐to‐own services, car loans, and mortgages. Moreover, the people and
organizations that constitute the NFLM as we identify it do not necessarily think of themselves
as belonging to a new and distinct social movement. We contend, however, that the term
“movement” is justified when individuals and organizations have worked together for more
1

than twenty years on a coherent set of issues and created durable mechanisms of
coordination.3
The NFLM is an extension of what might be called the “old” or “original” Fair Lending
Movement. This movement focused primarily on racial discrimination in housing markets and
the pernicious effects of segregation and redlining.4 Although this movement’s roots stretch
back to before World War II, it blossomed in the late 1960s and 1970s and was strongly
influenced by the Civil Rights Movement.5 The NAACP and the Leadership Conference on Civil
and Human Rights are venerable members of this movement (and continue to be important in
pursuing fair lending today). This movement’s major achievements include passage of the Fair
Housing Act in 1968, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act in 1974, the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act in 1975, and the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977.
The growth of the markets for subprime mortgages as well as payday, auto title, and tax refund
anticipation loans during the 1990s precipitated the New Fair Lending Movement.6 Although
communities of color are often targeted by these lenders, the NFLM views fair lending as a
challenge for a wider swath of the population than its predecessor movement. For example,
members of the armed services, regardless of race and ethnicity, often find themselves trapped
in high‐cost loans, even after an interest rate limit of 36% was set by 2006 federal legislation.
Senator Elizabeth Warren, perhaps the most prominent member of the NFLM, has attempted
to frame fair lending as a problem of the working class and the middle class.7 The NFLM goes
beyond an attack on racial discrimination to a more generic critique of products whose cost is
viewed as outrageous and whose structure virtually assures that loans blow up the budget of
borrowers (e.g., adjustable rate mortgages with no down payment and minimal underwriting).
Whereas the NFLM made some progress prior to the Financial Crisis that peaked in 2008, (e.g.,
North Carolina’s 1999 law limiting mortgage fees and banning prepayment penalties; the
federal Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003; Georgia’s 2004 ban on payday loans;
the Military Lending Act of 2006) most of the gains occurred after the economic meltdown. The
signal achievement of the new movement was the creation of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau as part of the Dodd‐Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
of 2010.8 Other victories at the federal level include passage of the Credit CARD Act in 2009
and the announcement by the Internal Revenue Service in 2010 that it would no longer
facilitate refund anticipation loans by providing tax preparers with a “debt indictor” showing
whether a filer owed back taxes or other debts.
The participants in the NFLM are far more varied than those in the original Fair Lending
Movement. Some organizations that take part in the NFLM, such as the National People’s
Action and Woodstock Institute, have their roots in the 1970s, and they retain a strong
emphasis on racial equality in mortgage lending. Others, such as the Center for Responsible
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Lending, and the National Community Reinvestment Coalition, are newer but grow out of the
same mortgage‐focused tradition. These organizations have, however, broadened their
concern beyond mortgages to other financial products that “strip wealth” in communities of
color.9 Other participants in the NFLM, including Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of
America, and National Consumer Law Center, have a long‐standing record of attention to fair
lending in both mortgage and non‐mortgage markets.
Interestingly, the NFLM has attracted the participation of organizations with little or no ties to
the original Fair Lending Movement: religious organizations, credit unions, social service
agencies, youth leadership groups, research centers, and community foundations. The
organizational breadth of the NFLM is exemplified in a recent letter to Richard Cordray, director
of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. The letter, which urged promulgation of a strong
payday lending rule, was signed by 762 civil rights, consumer, labor, faith, veterans, seniors,
business, and community organizations from all fifty states.10
The NFLM is largely decentralized, but there are three mechanisms for information sharing and
coordination. First, since 1999, there has been a listserv related to payday lending activity
around the country. It began with six participants and now has approximately four hundred
participants representing two hundred organizations.11 Second, beginning in 2004, there has
been an annual “summit” for activists interested in high‐cost credit issues. The summit takes
place in early December in Washington, DC, and it draws organizations from across the United
States. The meeting provides an opportunity to learn from peers about their efforts to
influence public policy at the local, state, and federal levels. (Both the listserv and summit have
been facilitated by the Consumer Federation of America.) Third, in 2009, Americans for
Financial Reform was established as a broad coalition to spur passage of the Dodd‐Frank Act, at
which it succeeded, but has continued to mobilize federal, state, and local organizations in the
pursuit of fairness to consumers and investors.12
Whether the local campaigns described in this report are considered part of a larger social
movement or part of a long‐term alliance among organizations from several existing social
movements, the anti‐payday loan campaigns we describe here are not isolated phenomena.
These three campaigns are embedded in a larger effort to curb payday (and other high‐cost
loans) in other localities as well as in state and federal fora. This larger payday loan reform
effort, in turn, is part of a still larger struggle for fair lending across a wide swath of financial
products. Thus, the campaigns documented in this report represent instances of powerful and
inspiring citizen engagement, the importance of which goes beyond the local ordinances they
helped enact.

3

Prior Action‐Oriented Reports
Two previous reports have made important contributions to understanding, at a practical level,
how local payday ordinances are enacted. The first of these reports, Controlling the Growth of
Payday Lending Through Local Ordinances and Resolutions, was published in 2007 when few
ordinances existed in California and Utah, and none in Texas.13 Many of the ordinances set
minimum distances between two payday lenders (or other high‐cost lenders) or between a
lender and homes, schools, churches, or other non‐commercial land uses. The authors—Kelly
Griffith of the Southwest Center for Economic Integrity in Arizona, Linda Hilton of the Coalition
of Religious Communities in Utah, and Lynn Drysdale of Jacksonville Area Legal Aid in Florida—
drew on their first‐hand experience to offer a guide for community consumer advocates and
government officials interested in curbing payday lenders in local communities and at the state
level. The authors provided general advice under headings such as “Learn all you can about
payday lenders in your area” and “Learn what system your city or town has in place for passing
ordinances.” The report’s most notable contribution was a detailed appendix that summarized
payday lending zoning ordinances state‐by‐state. The authors updated the appendix several
times, most recently in 2013.14 The various versions of this appendix have been cited and
reproduced numerous times by payday loan supporters and opponents alike.15
In 2013, Tim Lohrentz of the Insight Center for Community Economic Development produced a
second guide for people interested in passing municipal ordinances to limit payday lending.16
The report, Tools for Advocates of Limiting Payday Lending, provided more detailed advice.
Lohrentz drew on his own experience and the input of other California‐based advocates to
provide specific examples of how to conduct background research, create a campaign work
plan, build a coalition, and frame the issues in a way that will appeal to the general public and
policy makers. The report is most useful in detailing the steps needed to document the
number, location, density, and corporate headquarters of payday lenders in a particular
community, as well as the cost (annual percentage rates) of the loans. The report’s treatment
of campaign dynamics, including coalition building, gathering testimony from payday
borrowers, and issue framing, is more cursory.
Despite the indisputable value of these two reports, neither covers important subjects such as
generating campaign resources (human and financial), building favorable media coverage,
finding a champion within the city council and communicating with other city officials, or
defusing the arguments made by ordinance opponents. This report seeks to fill these gaps in
the understanding of how successful payday lending campaigns are waged at the local level.
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Report Methodology
Research Site Selection
There were approximately 160 local ordinances addressing payday lending at the end of 2013,
with at least one local payday ordinance in twenty‐five states.17 California had the most
ordinances (25), and several states had only one. Some ordinances complement strong state
restrictions on payday loans (e.g., Arizona, Oregon), while others function as a substitute for
them (e.g., Kansas, Wisconsin).18 The ordinances themselves vary in nature from short‐term
moratoria to limits on the location, number, density, appearance, and/or business practices of
payday lenders. Some ordinances refer only to payday lenders, while others encompass several
types of high‐cost, small‐dollar lenders (e.g., auto title loans). Some ordinances were the result
of a prolonged and uphill battle, while others passed quickly and easily. Each campaign,
however, constitutes its own story, with its own heroes/heroines and plot.
This study analyzes campaigns in three locations: Salt Lake County in Utah, Dallas, Denton, and
Tarrant counties in Texas, and the Silicon Valley counties of San Mateo and Santa Clara in
California. The ordinance campaigns in each location are important in their own right, but they
also serve as useful contrasts. Utah has some of the earliest ordinances in the United States
and the third most of any state, an unlikely distinction given Utah’s conservative political
environment. California has the second largest number of ordinances and also some of the
most stringent that can be devised using only standard zoning methods (e.g., separation
requirements and density limits). Texas has the most payday ordinances in the nation, but,
more important, most of these ordinances go beyond zoning restrictions. The Texas ordinances
of interest in this report regulate payday loans and the payday lending process (e.g., limiting the
amount of the loans to 20% of gross monthly income). Unlike liberal California, Texas is a
politically conservative state, making it an unlikely locale for some of the strongest local
ordinances in the country.
In sum, by focusing on Utah, California, and Texas, this report covers the three states with the
most local payday ordinances. In addition, the Salt Lake, Silicon Valley, and Dallas areas served
as the epicenter for local anti‐payday lending activity in their respective states. Despite these
similarities, the three locales analyzed in this report provide an instructive contrast in terms of
their political environments, their ordinance campaigns, as well as the nature of their
ordinances.
Data Sources
The findings of this study are based on two major sources of information: documentary
research and structured interviews. The documentary research included analysis of campaign
5

materials produced by the advocates in each location, reports and minutes generated by
planning commissions and city councils, press coverage of the ordinance campaigns, and the
ordinances themselves. The interviews were conducted with campaign participants in each of
the three research sites. The interviewees included advocates in non‐profit organizations as
well as government policy makers and reporters and editors at leading local newspapers. The
interviewees were recommended by a key informant in each location (Linda Hilton in Utah, Ann
Baddour in Texas, and Rafael Morales in California). These key informants provided interviews
as well.
The majority of the interviews were conducted in‐person and on‐site, with a few taking place by
phone. Similarly, the majority of interviews took place with a single interviewee, but some
interviews involved more than one interviewee at a time. Both researchers were present for all
of the interviews except two. In all, there were thirty‐two interviews: seven in Utah, thirteen in
Texas, and twelve in California.19 Interviews lasted 60‐90 minutes, were audio‐recorded, and
were later transcribed.20

Campaign Features
The dynamics of the payday ordinance campaigns analyzed for this report varied substantially
based on the individual and organizational actors, legal frameworks, and political opportunities
present in each locale. By examining these differences (as well as several important
commonalities), it is possible to appreciate the multiple pathways through which local payday
ordinances can be successfully pursued. In this section, we address five general features that
are common to but not uniform in all three of the campaigns we studied: (1) leader motivation,
(2) campaign resources and coalition building, (3) outside and inside politics, (4) addressing
opposition, and (5) policy diffusion.
Leader Motivation
There is a robust social science literature on the diffusion of public policies, but far less is
known about how policies originate.21 For example, once California legalized medical marijuana
in 1996 and the policy survived federal legal challenges, it was relatively easy for Oregon,
Maine, Nevada, Colorado, and Montana to follow suit in the next decade.22 The compelling
question is: how did California become the policy innovator? With respect to local payday
ordinances, there are similar questions about the policy innovators. How did these ordinances
first come about in the Salt Lake, Dallas, and Silicon Valley areas? Who provided the leadership
to overcome the force of policy inertia? Is each case of “policy entrepreneurship” idiosyncratic,
or are there commonalities?23
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We observed one or more policy entrepreneurs in each of our three study sites. While there
are others as well, these policy entrepreneurs included: Christopher Peterson and Linda Hilton
in Salt Lake County; Ann Baddour, Jerry Allen, Gerald Britt, Jr., and Kayce Strader in the Dallas
area; and Eleanor Clement Glass and Pat Krackov in the Silicon Valley. What sparked the
interest of these individuals in payday lending reform, and what sustained them as they
campaigned?
Exposure to the realities of payday lending served as the motivating force for most of the
campaign leaders we interviewed. Law professor Christopher L. Peterson of the University of
Utah had experienced these loans first‐hand. After finishing college and to earn money for
some foreign travel, Peterson worked as a telephone‐based debt collector for a company that
made payday, car title, and other loans to subprime borrowers. The young Peterson took the
job without knowing much about the payday loan industry, but perhaps should have been
tipped off when his boss described himself without shame as a “loan shark.” After a few
months of calling delinquent borrowers, Peterson could no longer stomach the job. The people
on the other end of the phone line, often weeping, described a pattern by which they paid
significantly more than they had borrowed yet could not seem to retire their debt. Peterson
saw that his company’s loans were making its customers worse off, and this lesson had a
profound effect on his subsequent activities as a law student and then legal scholar. Most
important for this report, it led him to suggest to his mother, a member of the city council of
West Valley City, the possibility of passing a zoning ordinance aimed at limiting the number of
payday lenders.24
One step removed from Peterson’s experience inside the payday industry was exposure to
payday borrowers in the context of social service agencies serving the poor. Whether Linda
Hilton at Utah’s Crossroads Urban Center, Christian Luna at Sacred Heart Community Service in
San Jose, or Katie Murray at the Wilshire Baptist Church in North Dallas, our interviewees were
activated by hearing the stories of payday customers, including exorbitant interest rates as well
as the pattern of extending (“rolling over”) loans over and over again without making a dent in
the loan balance. People working in social service agencies were angered further by the
realization that the financial assistance they gave to clients to settle a utility bill might be going
instead to a payday lender.
For other advocates we interviewed, second‐hand exposure to payday practices was sufficient
to mobilize them. Reverend Gerald Britt was familiar with social injustice, but he recalled the
radicalizing effect of reading the book, Broke, USA by Gary Rivlin in 2010, and writing a review
of it for the Dallas Morning News.25 Kayce Strader was appalled when she first heard about
payday lending at a 2012 conference on addressing problems of poverty from a Christian faith‐
based perspective. As Strader exited the conference session, she ran into her colleague Pat
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Smith in the hallway, and he thought she looked ill. Smith asked Strader if she was O.K. Strader
answered that she was, but she informed Smith that she knew what the two of them had to do
when they returned from the conference.26 Strader had become aware of a serious injustice,
and her Christian faith impelled her to act.
The process by which leaders of Silicon Valley Community Foundation (SVCF) became devoted
to addressing payday lending was far more systematic than Strader’s nearly accidental
encounter. SVCF’s prioritization of payday lending was the result of an intensive project of
obtaining input from members of its community—leaders of non‐profit organizations, members
of the public at large, government officials, and foundation donors.27 From an initial list of nine
topics that emerged from these community listening sessions, SVCF’s leaders selected five
areas of highest priority. One of these was “economic security,” and it encompassed anti‐
predatory lending advocacy.28
Finally, city council members such as Mike Guingona in Daly City, California and Jerry Allen in
Dallas, Texas were moved to action through a combination of devotion to their low‐income
constituents and exposure to the arguments of payday advocates. In Guingona’s case, he was
the first Filipino American elected to the city council of Daly City, and he was sensitive to the
problems of low‐income and minority citizens. When Guingona saw that young people of color
in his community—themselves shocked by discovering a payday lending machine in a local
casino—were willing to fight against payday lending, he felt compelled to mentor them in
pressuring the city council and conducting his own inside lobbying.
Dallas City Councilman Jerry Allen, too, felt a responsibility to represent the interests of his
economically diverse district. In the aftermath of the economic meltdown of 2008, Allen
became acutely interested in anti‐poverty measures. He was especially impressed by the goal
of the Anti‐Poverty Coalition of Greater Dallas to lift 250,000 families out of poverty within ten
years. As a former banker, he understood the importance of access to financial services, and he
became a champion for the “Bank on Dallas” program as a way of moving people away from
the expensive check cashers and payday lenders.
The pivotal moment in Allen’s antipathy for payday lending came on June 16, 2010, the day on
which the Bank on Dallas program was to be launched at a press conference held at City Hall.
The media attention Allen hoped to garner was stolen that morning when the Dallas City
Council presented an award to the payday lender ACE Cash Express for providing humanitarian
aid to the Red Cross to assist earthquake victims in Haiti. It was difficult for Allen to see ACE
being praised for its community outreach efforts via a proclamation of the Dallas City Council
when his program needed the attention. Allen felt the upstaging was deliberate. At that point,
it was “game on” as far as Allen was concerned.29
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In sum, exposure in various forms to the details and human impact of payday lending served as
the main galvanizing force for the advocates we interviewed. Exposure was a necessary
condition for leadership commitment, but it was typically part of a larger commitment to social
and economic justice. This commitment was sometimes secular, sometimes based on religious
faith. Either way the advocates we studied had a passion for reform that sustained them
beyond a single, initial victory. Most of them remained devoted to seeing local ordinances
spread to other communities and for these ordinances to be part of a larger effort to enact
state and federal policies.
Campaign Resources and Coalition Building
Resources are so crucial to the success of social movements that one of the leading sociological
perspectives on social movements is called “resource mobilization theory.” The essence of this
theory is that grievances and injustices are often insufficient to generate a social movement.
Rather, movement leaders and their organizations must be able to gather sufficient financial,
human, communication, and other resources to participate in the political process. McCarthy
and Zald, two of the pioneers of resource mobilization theory, noted that social movements are
not limited to obtaining resources from the people who stand to benefit directly from
movement actions; resources may come from “conscience adherents” and “conscience
constituencies” composed of people and organizations motivated more by ethics than
economics.30 These conscience constituencies might include idealistic or affluent individuals as
well as “private foundations, social welfare institutions, the mass media, universities,
governmental agencies, and even business corporations.”31 If older theories of social
movements helped explain broad‐based and even violent forms of collective behavior such as
the French or Chinese Revolution, resource mobilization theory attempted to explain more
institutional and reformist movements such as the environmental, consumer, women’s, or anti‐
Vietnam War movements.
The campaigns to pass local anti‐payday lending ordinances in the Dallas and Silicon Valley
areas were well‐resourced but in very different ways. In Dallas, Denton, and Arlington, Texas,
coalitions composed of social service agencies, religious organizations, and anti‐poverty
organizations mobilized mostly in‐kind resources in the form of personnel time. For example,
Stephanie Mace, director of public policy for the United Way of Metropolitan Dallas, devoted a
large portion of her time during the final months of 2010 and the first half of 2011 serving on
the steering committee of the Anti‐Poverty Coalition of Greater Dallas. Other organizations,
including CitySquare, AARP, the Industrial Areas Foundation, and the Jewish Community
Relations Council, lent some of their key leaders to the ordinance effort. Members of these
organizations drew upon prior knowledge of each other to build a coalition that crossed lines of
income and race. Similar coalitions, although smaller and less broad‐based, were instrumental
9

in the passage of ordinances in other Dallas‐area cities. The overall lesson to be drawn from
the Dallas‐area experience is that a successful campaign can emerge organically from a
coalition of local organizations dedicated to social justice and relying primarily on a shared
workload rather than abundant financial resources.
In Silicon Valley, a community foundation catalyzed the participants in a series of local
campaigns that might not have occurred without the foundation’s active role and generous
financial support. Based on an intense community consultation process, Silicon Valley
Community Foundation (SVCF) identified local payday lending ordinances as a priority for
action. From there, SVCF used its grantmaking process to intensify the activities of
organizations that were already engaged in payday lending reform (e.g., California
Reinvestment Coalition) and, equally important, bring new organizations into the arena (e.g.,
Youth Leadership Institute; Law Foundation of Silicon Valley). In Santa Clara County, SVCF
funded an explicit effort to create the Coalition Against Payday Predators (CAPP). Between
2009 and 2015, SVCF provided more than a million dollars to the Law Foundation of Silicon
Valley, partly to support CAPP.32 In neighboring San Mateo County, SVCF made grants to
individual organizations without attempting to build a formal coalition, but the San Mateo
grantees were in frequent contact with each other, often facilitated by meetings and
conference calls convened by the Foundation.
SVCF’s funding not only stimulated formal and informal coalitions; it deepened the capacity of
the participating organizations. For example, SVCF held training sessions for its grantees. It
also provided funding for public opinion research on payday lending and focus group research
on ways to most effectively deliver anti‐payday messages to members of the public and to
policy makers.33 SVCF also provided funding to the Insight Center for Community Economic
Development to develop a “toolkit” for advocates based in the Silicon Valley and elsewhere
who might be interested in mounting their own local campaigns. Between 2009 and 2016,
SVCF allocated approximately $4 million to its program on anti‐payday lending policy advocacy
at the local and state levels, making SVCF the ultimate “conscience constituency.”
Outside and Inside Politics
Like basketball superstar LeBron James, it is important for advocates to have both a strong
“outside game” and a powerful “inside game.”34 The outside game consists of building public
support for one’s position, whereas the inside game concerns influencing the views and votes
of public policy makers. Effective messaging is integral to both efforts.
The advocates in the Salt Lake, Dallas, and Silicon Valley areas played the outside and inside
games well. In all three locations, the advocates cultivated a supportive relationship with the
local media, especially the leading mass circulation newspapers. In Salt Lake, quotations from
10

Linda Hilton of the Coalition of Religious Communities found their way into most payday
lending articles in the two leading daily papers, The Salt Lake Tribune and Deseret News. In
Dallas and Silicon Valley, advocates enjoyed not only news coverage but were also invited to
submit guest columns. Meetings with newspaper editorial boards were often followed by
editorials expressing strong support for local ordinances.
Advocates in the Dallas and Silicon Valley areas proactively used social media as well. For
instance, news about payday lending reform was frequently posted on the websites of the
California Reinvestment Coalition and the Center for Responsible Lending. In Dallas, the Anti‐
Poverty Coalition held a press conference, featuring leaders of the local Baptist and Catholic
communities. In the Salt Lake area, the payday campaigns were carried out by the Coalition of
Religious Communities—an anti‐poverty alliance of fifteen different faith communities. Thus, in
Utah and Dallas, where religion looms large in public life, the identification of payday lending
reform with faith leaders was an important element of campaign messaging.
Inside lobbying is designed to close the deal, that is, get members of planning commissions and
city council to vote for local payday ordinances. To this end, advocates employed a number of
methods. The most basic form of inside lobbying is meeting privately with decision makers.
Whereas these decision makers often attend alone or with just a handful of staff members,
advocates are able (and advised) to bring representatives of multiple constituencies. Advocates
also need to be sensitive to the kinds of arguments that are most likely to resonate with a
particular policy maker. In some cases, as best represented by Salt Lake County in this study,
policy makers are most receptive to arguments about the negative economic impacts of payday
lending, especially the impact of too many stores on the image of a city. In other instances, and
as represented by the Dallas and Silicon Valley areas in this study, government officials are
more receptive to moral/social arguments about the devastating impact of payday lending on
the lives of some borrowers.
Another fundamental tactic of inside lobbying is to testify at public hearings. Whereas
representatives from religious, social service, and advocacy organizations are important,
garnered testimony from borrowers who have suffered due to payday loans is probably the
most effective method of pressuring policy makers in public settings. This type of testimony
puts payday lending supporters on the defensive and perhaps explains why representatives of
the payday industry often do not speak at public hearings.
Some methods of inside lobbying are more specific to payday lending per se. In the Dallas area
in particular, advocates were successful in getting some city councils to issue resolutions urging
state legislators to enact strong payday reforms. From the point of view of the city
councilmembers, such resolutions carry few political risks since they change nothing on the
ground when it comes to payday lending, but they do put a councilmember on record as
11

favoring payday reform. After encouraging action by state lawmakers, it may be difficult later
for councilmember to vote against a local ordinance.
As a final and unusual example of inside lobbying, SVCF provided a $50,000 grant to the City of
San Jose in 2011. City leaders had complained that they lacked the financial resources to
devote staff time to research payday lending practices in San Jose or analyze reform options.
SVCF eliminated the city’s concern by directly providing funds to the city for the research.35
While most campaigns don’t have $50,000 they can devote in this way, SVCF’s grant was an
innovative way of advancing payday lending in the city council’s policy agenda.
Inside lobbying is most effective when it is coordinated with the persuasion efforts of someone
inside the government decision‐making body. In Dallas, councilmember Jerry Allen was eager
to work with the members of the Anti‐Poverty Coalition. The same was true of Ash Kalra in San
Jose. In Daly City, Councilmember Mike Guingona tutored the members of the Youth
Leadership Institute on how to communicate with city leaders. While having an inside
champion such as an Allen, Kalra, or Guingona is ideal, advocates and policy makers need to
maintain both the appearance and reality of independence from one another for the sake of
credibility.
Addressing Opposition
In the vast majority of city councils (and county boards of supervisors) examined in this report,
most votes ended up being unanimously in favor of payday ordinances, but this does not mean
all of these votes were cast eagerly. Most decision makers hold private meetings with payday
industry representatives (just as they have with ordinance supporters) and are warned about
the loss of jobs and tax revenue that result from discouraging payday lenders. These decision
makers also are told that payday loans meet a legitimate need, and without them, consumers
will end up paying more for credit and possibly having to patronize illegal loan sharks. In some
cases, payday supporters cite research to add weight to their arguments. On top of all this,
some city council members are philosophically averse to meddling in freely‐chosen contracts
between lenders and borrowers. For all these reasons, ordinance advocates must be prepared
to defend their proposals against pro‐industry arguments.
Pointing out the high cost of payday loans and the cycle of debt in which many borrowers find
themselves does not address the argument that borrowers would be even worse off without
access to payday loans. Accordingly, advocates must be prepared to argue that short‐ and long‐
term alternatives to payday loans are available. In San Mateo County, Board of Supervisors
member Rose Jacobs Gibson developed and disseminated a guide to payday loans, including a
description of alternatives to them. In terms of coping with a financial emergency, the
brochure recommends negotiating directly with creditors, obtaining advances from employers,
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and seeking emergency assistance from faith‐based and community organizations. The guide
also discusses lenders other than payday firms, including credit unions, non‐payday internet
lenders, and lending circles.36
To further awareness of payday alternatives, SVCF co‐sponsored a conference in December
2010 with the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. The conference attracted leaders of
financial institutions, social service agencies, policy institutions and government who were
interested in learning about payday loans and alternative products.37 Later that month, Dr.
Emmett D. Carson, SVCF’s president and CEO, discussed payday loan alternatives on one of the
Bay Area’s most popular radio stations, KQED.38 In the immediate run‐up to the discussion of a
possible ordinance by the San Jose Planning Commission and City Council in 2012, CAPP ran a
public forum called “When Cash Runs Out: Discussing the Alternatives.”39
The City of Sunnyvale, as part of its payday lending ordinance, requires payday lenders to post a
clearly visible sign that provides alternatives to payday loans.40 As a practical matter, most
people who are standing at the threshold of a payday lending store are probably not seriously
considering alternatives, but the sign’s information and implicit message might make a
difference the next time a person is considering a payday loan.
In terms of alternatives to payday loans, California advocates stressed the importance of
consumer education and asset building. These values were reflected in SVCF’s public
pronouncements and, perhaps more important, in its grant‐making. In the spring of 2011,
when only Pacifica had a payday lender moratorium and no other cities yet had ordinances,
Emmet Carson, was quoted as saying: “The financial literacy piece of this is the core. I can’t
stress that enough. You need to understand how to budget, the appropriate uses of credit, and
cash flow.”41 One SVCF grant to promote payday alternatives was made in 2012 to Community
Legal Services in East Palo Alto for supporting a local ordinance and conducting “a
corresponding community education effort to curb voluntary use of these financial products.”42
Another SVCF grant went to Housing and Economic Rights Advocates in 2015 for “increasing
community‐wide awareness of the various alternatives to payday lending.”43
In Texas, too, advocates such as Gerald Britt emphasized educational opportunities, job
training, and a living wage as the ultimate substitute for payday loans.44 In August 2016, Texas
Appleseed published A Toolkit for Cities: Increasing Access to Fair, Low‐Cost Loans.45 Unlike the
2013 toolkit underwritten by SVCF, this one urged cities to do more than pass local ordinances
that restrict payday lending. This toolkit urged cities to encourage low‐cost loan products such
as employer‐based loans as short‐run alternatives to payday loans and promote community
asset building services to obviate the need for loans in the longer run.
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Policy Diffusion
Between 2002 and 2016, thirty‐two zoning ordinances and eight business regulation ordinances
were enacted in the three metropolitan areas covered in this report. These forty ordinances
also helped stimulate passage of additional ordinances in their respective states. Thus, one
ordinance can beget others, especially if it is one of the first in its jurisdiction (as was the case in
Dallas and West Valley City, Utah).
How does diffusion of ordinances occur? In this study we observed two processes—one
reactive, the other more proactive. In Utah, once West Valley City passed its ordinance in 2002,
neighboring cities such as Taylorsville, West Jordan, South Salt Lake, and Salt Lake City felt
pressure to enact their own ordinances to prevent payday lenders from setting up new outlets
on their borders adjacent to West Valley City. This defensive strategy rippled through Salt Lake
County and eventually established a model for more distant communities in Utah.
In Dallas and Silicon Valley, the transmission of ordinances was more deliberate. The City of
Dallas broke the ice in 2011 when it passed its business regulation ordinance. Thereafter,
Dallas City Councilmember, Jerry Allen, who led the effort within the Council to pass the
ordinance, adopted the role of Johnny Appleseed, visiting any town in Texas to which he was
invited to speak in favor of a Dallas‐style ordinance.46 Within two and a half years of passage of
Dallas’ ordinance, the three other largest cities in Texas (#1 Houston, #2 San Antonio, and #4
Austin) passed similar laws. While Allen barnstormed the state, the Texas Municipal League
circulated a model ordinance based on those passed in Dallas, Austin, and San Antonio. The
League recommended that cities considering adoption of a payday ordinance enact one that
was substantially similar to those already passed. By passing similar ordinances, the League
predicted that payday lenders “will not be able to use the argument that city ordinances vary
from city‐to‐city if they seek preemption legislation [from the Texas Legislature].”47
The proliferation of payday ordinances in California was central to SVCF’s anti‐payday strategy.
SVCF’s financial support for a how‐to “toolkit” for passing ordinances illustrates SVCF’s strategy
of encouraging as many local laws as possible. Its support of the Youth Leadership Institute’s
work to pass an ordinance first in Daly City and then in South San Francisco is a further
example.48 In all three locales covered in this report, passage of an ordinance in one city
tended to embolden leaders of other cities. In Salt Lake County and Silicon Valley, not having
an ordinance became the exception. In the Dallas area, several cities chose not to enact
ordinances, but the Dallas ordinance was adopted by nearly thirty other cities statewide.
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Campaign Impacts
Local zoning ordinances are, of course, a limited tool for addressing the problems associated
with payday lending. While many advocates reported that their local ordinances reduced the
numbers of loans and lenders in a particular area, causation issues make these claims difficult
to substantiate with hard data. While these ordinances may reduce the supply of loans
available through brick‐and‐mortar outlets over the long run, the ordinances’ most significant
impacts are more intangible. First, these campaigns can encourage stronger regulatory action
from state and federal governments, and they can signal to marketplace actors that payday
alternatives are needed. Second, as local ordinance campaigns receive media coverage and, in
some instances, generate their own public messages, members of the public receive are
exposed to largely negative information about the payday industry. And as one local ordinance
campaign begets others, each serves as a further blow to the public image of payday lenders.
Finally, local ordinance campaigns can have beneficial side effects for their participants in terms
of stronger organizational capacity and greater sense of individual empowerment.49
State and Federal Action
Campaigns for local ordinances are viewed by their participants as either substitutes for state
action or as spurs to it. The passage of Dallas’s business practices ordinance came only a few
weeks after advocates realized that the Texas Legislature was not going to enact strong state‐
wide protections.50 Similarly in Utah, the perception among payday lending’s opponents that
the Utah Legislature was in the pocket of the payday industry suggested a second‐best strategy
of seeking local reforms.51
In California, SVCF viewed the passage of local ordinances in numerous jurisdictions as both an
end in itself and as a means of building support for state‐ and federal‐level action. In its first
request for proposals, SVCF stated that “[i]n the long term we seek to contribute to state level
reform by supporting advocacy efforts aimed at passage of a cap on payday loan interest.”52
Accordingly, grant applicants were encouraged to describe how their policy advocacy would
“lead to meaningful reforms at the local level and build a constituency for state level reform in
the future.”53
Over time, SVCF also made grants that included support for the payday rule‐making process at
the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. The Foundation’s 2014 grant to the Center for
Responsible Lending included the goal of encouraging “the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau to strengthen its regulatory oversight to end the payday debt trap.”54 In the same grant
cycle, SVCF awarded funds to the Youth Leadership Institute, in part, to “push federal
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legislation to regulate the [payday] industry and advocate for quality youth financial
products.”55
Moving from local to state or federal advocacy also occurred in the absence of a foundation
grant. In Dallas, Reverend Britt of CitySquare and the Anti‐Poverty Coalition expanded the
scope of his advocacy to include support for the CFPB’s efforts to regulate payday lenders.56
The same was true of Councilmen Allen.57 In California, Daly City Councilmember Mike
Guingona was not content with leading the way in passing a local ordinance in his city. He also
wrote a letter to the CFPB urging it to enact payday lending reform.58 In sum, once aware of
the dangers of payday lending, advocates and local policy makers often felt compelled to work
toward policy improvements at higher levels of government.
Public Awareness and Opinion
Media coverage of local campaigns to enact payday ordinances most likely influenced public
opinion regarding payday lending, but ordinance advocates did not collect survey data
regarding public awareness and sentiment. The one exception was a survey conducted by
Goodwin Simon Strategic Research in November 2010 for the Center for Responsible Lending.
The survey found that only 17% of registered voters in San Jose had favorable views regarding
payday lenders, compared to 52% holding a negative opinion. In addition, respondents tended
to be favorable toward additional restrictions on payday loan stores—restrictions that were
being sought by the CAPP at the time. There is no post‐ordinance survey that can be used to
measure the possible impact of the ordinance campaign on public opinion in San Jose, let alone
a before‐after comparison in a comparable city without an ordinance campaign.
In the Silicon Valley, there were several efforts to influence public awareness of and sentiment
toward payday lending after the successful completion of several ordinance campaigns.
Shortly after passage of the San Jose ordinance, for example, CAPP purchased advertisements
on the sides of buses that circulated throughout Santa Clara County.59 A more personal and
individualized effort to influence public opinion regarding payday lending was undertaken
through financial education classes. Community Legal Services of East Palo Alto (CLESPA),
Nuestra Casa, and the entrepreneurship‐oriented Renaissance Mid‐Peninsula offered consumer
education classes to help people develop financial skills and thereby reduce the need for
payday loans. In a particularly creative instance, Nuestra Casa incorporated education about
payday lending into a class for undocumented residents seeking a driver’s license under a new
California law. The theory behind including payday lending education was that getting a license
involves buying a car, and buying a car entails understanding credit, and understanding credit
includes avoiding high‐cost forms of borrowing such as payday loans.60
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While we cannot measure the impact of efforts to influence public opinion with any certainty,
advocates believe that their efforts contributed to a marked cultural shift in the way payday
lending is viewed by their fellow citizens. As Reverend Britt of Dallas CitySquare stated:
We have been a significant voice bringing payday lending to the public consciousness,
and we've actually changed the conversation about payday lending and about financial
literacy and the need for financial literacy, not just among lower to middle class people,
but for everybody. I don't think that that would have happened if we hadn't done this.61
In California, James Zahradka, formerly of the Law Foundation of Silicon Valley, reported that
his coalition’s efforts created a cultural sea change in which lenders were associated with
societal ills. Zahradka explained the importance of getting city after city on record saying that
payday loans are toxic products, and while legal, they are still a problematic land use. He
believes that by regulating payday lenders in the same way as a liquor store or adult bookstore,
a city makes a powerful contribution to changing the national culture with respect to high‐cost
lending.62
Organizational and Individual Capacity
The campaigns we studied changed many of their participants. In particular, organizations
developed new relationships and expanded their missions. Individuals empowered themselves
politically and strengthened their religious beliefs via social action.
As discussed above, coalitions played a central role in all three campaign locales. Utah’s
Coalition of Religious Communities (CORC) existed for a few years before it made payday
lending one of its two signature issues (the other being removing the state sales tax on food).
The Anti‐Poverty Coalition of Greater Dallas (APC) and the Silicon Valley’s CAPP made payday
reform their initial priority. In so doing, APC and CAPP brought together diverse organizations
with limited history of working together. As a result of their ordinance efforts, these
organizations developed a durable spirit of cooperation. Consider the case of Dallas where the
first ordinance was passed in 2011. In 2013, Friendship‐West Church, with predominantly Black
members and located in economically‐challenged South Dallas, formed a “covenant of action”
with Wilshire Baptist Church, with predominantly White and affluent members, to continue the
battle against payday lending.63 Their covenant commits Wilshire and Friendship‐West to act
“jointly to confront predatory lending practices that disproportionately harm the vulnerable . . .
by educating our churches, advocating for more just laws, and creating alternative credit
sources that promote the welfare of the lenders and borrowers alike.”64
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Several organizations reported that their mission was expanded to include policy advocacy by
virtue of participating in a local ordinance movement. For example, Christian Luna of Sacred
Heart Community Service in San Jose said that as a result of his organization’s advocacy work
around payday lending, Sacred Heart became more than a direct service provider; it became an
advocacy organization.65 Similarly, Kyra Kazantzis of the Law Foundation of Silicon Valley said
that her organization had been affected by the process of working on payday lending reform.
The experience taught the Law Foundation how to do a sustained, sophisticated, and coalition‐
based policy campaign and led the organization to more prominently prioritize collaborative
action. Regarding the Silicon Valley Council of Nonprofits, Kazantzis observed that it, too, had
been changed by being an official endorser of CAPP.66 She said: “Payday lending really
solidified, in that entity's mind, that nonprofits should absolutely be doing policy advocacy.”67
Individual empowerment occurred in parallel with the new relationships and expanded
missions that developed for organizations that took part in ordinance campaigns. This process
of empowerment applied to members of advocacy organizations who championed payday
borrowers as well as to borrowers themselves. In Utah, Art Sutherland was a semi‐retired
engineer who was looking for a way to use his talents to help society. Beginning in 2005, he
volunteered to help CORC with its anti‐payday advocacy. Little did he know that a decade later
he would be honored by Money magazine as one of its “50 Heroes.”68 Another example
involving much younger people comes from Silicon Valley where the anti‐payday lending
movement included two organizations that develop the leadership skills of youth.69 Through
their campaigns against payday lending, the young people organized by the Youth Leadership
Institute (YLI) and their partner Mission SF Community Financial Center (now MyPath) learned
to identify social problems, find their own voice in community, and navigate the political
process.
As yet another instance of individual empowerment, Danielle Ayers, Minister of Justice of
Friendship‐West Baptist Church described the feeling of her church members after helping to
enact Dallas’ payday ordinance. Ayers reported that members “were encouraged and felt
empowered. They felt that they had succeeded at something that there was good news.”70
These congregants retained the ability to mobilize when a few years later a plant nursery
located near the church closed and was replaced by a title lender. Through the church’s
advocacy, the lender was forced to leave after it opened for business. Then, the restaurant
chain Raising Cane’s moved in, creating a huge, visible victory for the community.
Ordinance campaigns also taught payday loan borrowers to become their own advocates. In
Silicon Valley, Sacred Heart Community Services not only gathered stories from payday
borrowers but convinced some of them to speak about their experiences with payday loans in
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front of the San Jose Planning Commission and City Council. Christian Luna, a program manager
at Sacred Heart, remarked that this act of standing up for themselves and others like them
helped borrowers grow as individuals and feel part of something important.
Stephanie Mace of the United Way of Metropolitan Dallas (Dallas United Way) recounted a
process of political engagement with a group of people who will never need to take out a
payday loan—United Way’s largest donors. The United Way trained some of them to go to
payday stores and pose as borrowers who wanted to take out a $500 loan. Based on their
experience as secret shoppers, the donors were encouraged to speak with state and local
politicians about the need for changing the law to make these loans more transparent and
affordable.71
For some campaign participants, faith development rivaled political empowerment as an
outcome for the many advocates who were motivated by their religious beliefs. Josephine
Lopez Paul of the Industrial Areas Foundation in Dallas described a member of Father Dan
Kelley’s congregation at St. Joseph Catholic Church in Arlington as being surprised that she
could be “a pretty effective speaker in front of the city council [while having] a way to live out
my faith.”72 Danielle Ayers called the same process "faith formation” and described how her
Senior Pastor, Dr. Frederick D. Haynes, III, would urge parishioners to connect what they heard
in church on Sunday morning with “how we live out our daily lives between Sundays..”73
On at least one occasion, the opportunity for faith development came suddenly and
unexpectedly. As Walker Moore of the Industrial Areas Foundation recalled the events, Father
Kelley at St. Joseph’s Church attended a meeting of the Arlington Chamber of Commerce to
speak in favor of a payday ordinance. To his surprise, the meeting was being chaired by one of
his congregants, a “pro‐business, anti‐regulation guy” who would normally oppose regulating
lenders.74 The councilmember now faced a conflict between his political and religious impulses,
and he ended up taking no position on the proposed ordinance rather than opposing it.75 In
this instance, voting on payday ordinances forced a political leader to live his faith in public.
In sum, payday ordinance campaigns are designed to convince city leaders to address a local
problem, but these campaigns can have many additional impacts. The campaigns may
stimulate political action at the state and federal level. They can influence public opinion and
knowledge about not only payday lending but asset building as well. Participation in these
campaigns can also affect their organizational and individual participants. Organizations can
find themselves with new relationships and with an expanded mission that includes policy
advocacy. Finally, individuals may become more politically empowered and spiritually fulfilled
as a result of being part of a payday ordinance campaign.
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Lessons for Future Campaigns and Conclusion
The following is a list of key observations from the three jurisdictions analyzed in this report.
The observations highlight key components of successful campaigns and, as such, provide
guidance for other organizations and individuals who are planning ordinance campaigns in their
cities (or counties).
Lesson #1: Coalitions of organizations served as the coordinating mechanism for campaigns in
all three locales analyzed in this report. The coalitions varied in the breadth of their
membership and their resources, but they were central in all of the major campaigns. Forming
coalitions and developing rules for their operation should be one of the first tasks of payday
reformers.
Lesson #2: Each of the leaders profiled in this report learned about the dark details of payday
loans from borrowers themselves. Social service providers who were part of the coalitions
played a crucial role in making contact with borrowers, gathering their stories, and empowering
borrowers to tell these stories at public hearings.
Lesson #3: Financial support from Silicon Valley Community Foundation was essential for
running a highly sophisticated set of campaigns involving a broad range of organizations, but it
was absent in Dallas and Salt Lake. In Dallas, a campaign of equivalent impact to that in Silicon
Valley was mounted by a coalition of local organizations that lacked special funding but were
able to reassign personnel to the payday campaigns. In Utah, the absence of financial and
human resources resulted in a bare‐boned but spirited effort by a handful of people. Advocates
should not assume that ample financial resources are necessary for a successful campaign.
Lesson #4: Including faith organizations in campaign coalitions and having faith leaders serve as
figureheads adds enormously to campaign legitimacy in the eyes of the public and policy
makers. Involve faith leaders in a meaningful and ongoing way early in any campaign.
Lesson #5: Advocates in all three study locales successfully cultivated support from major local
newspapers and, to a lesser extent, television stations. Media coverage, op‐ed articles, and
supportive editorials helped create a pro‐reform climate that was difficult for policy makers to
ignore. Advocates should have a detailed strategy for working effectively with members of the
local media.
Lesson #6: Advocates should identify and cultivate a member of the city council (or county
board of supervisors) who will serve as their inside champion. This role includes mentoring
advocates in the peculiarities of the local political process as well as lobbying fellow decision
makers. In some instances, more than one potential champion may be available, making the
choice of a champion especially delicate and important.
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Lesson #7: Advocates should schedule meetings with city decision makers well in advance of
any key votes. In these meetings, advocates should be ready to document the extent of payday
lending in their communities and to present their arguments in favor of an ordinance. Because
different arguments may resonate with different city decision makers, advocates must be ready
to argue for payday ordinances on the basis of the loans’ primary impact on borrowers and on
their secondary impact on local economies, crime, blight, and the general image of the city.
Lesson #8: Industry representatives will not always testify in public settings, but they will
typically meet privately with sympathetic policy makers and express objections to local
ordinances. Advocates must also be prepared to counter the arguments of their opponents,
especially the notion that there are no alternatives to payday loans. If possible, advocates
should develop a concrete list of payday alternatives that can be shared with members of the
public as well as policy makers.
Lesson #9: Once successful at the city level, advocates should press for similar ordinances in
other cities. These additional ordinances should be similar to each other to forestall industry
complaints that complying with differing laws is excessively burdensome. There are, however,
opportunities, to add features that strengthen the basic ordinance as long as they do not
contradict the features of other ordinances (e.g., limiting store hours of operation; requiring a
sign inside the store that describes alternatives to payday loans).
Lesson #10: Along with seeking additional local ordinances, advocates should continue to press
for state‐ and federal‐level reform. In this task, community groups are not alone. A national
network of organizations already exists for the purpose of curbing payday lending and other
forms of high‐cost lending. Marked by an annual conference facilitated by the Consumer
Federation of America, continuous communication via a listserv, and major policy successes,
this network is for all intents and purposes a social movement.
In conclusion, no one ever claimed that enacting local payday ordinances would eliminate
payday lending—let alone eliminate the economic and social conditions that drive people to
resort to these loans. Nevertheless, campaigns in the three locales analyzed in this report
clearly demonstrate that advocates and city leaders can do something meaningful, within the
limits of their authority, to make a statement against payday lending. Their efforts have
resulted in dozens of local ordinances that impose limits on the location, density, hours of
operation, and, in the case of Texas, features of payday loans.
The campaigns have had a variety of beneficial secondary effects. The advocates helped build a
climate for further reforms at the state and federal levels by contributing to a new narrative.
This narrative confronts the payday industry’s claim that their loans, while expensive, meet an
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urgent need when no other options are available. This narrative defines payday loans as
dangerous “debt traps” to which society has an obligation to build better alternatives.
Beyond any impact on payday lending itself, the campaigners changed others and themselves.
In the process of opposing payday lending, campaigning organizations discovered that policy
advocacy was consistent with other missions, such as providing services to low‐income people.
These organizations also came to realize the power of coalitions and developed trust in their
fellow organizations. Finally, individuals found their voice as active members of their
communities and experienced the sense of empowerment that comes with matching beliefs
with action.
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II. Utah’s Salt Lake County Leads by Example
In 1999, the Utah Legislature recognized the rapid growth of payday lenders in the state by
passing the Check Cashing Registration Act. The Act covered businesses that cashed a check for
a fee as well as those “extending a deferred deposit loan.”76 The law’s requirements were
minimal: these businesses had to register with the state, run criminal background check on
their managers, and post signs describing their fees and interest rates. A decade later, state
law in Utah remained permissive toward payday lenders, but most of Utah’s largest cities had
used their zoning powers to curb the growth of payday lenders. This section documents the
process by which these local ordinances came into being.

Policy Entrepreneurship
In the summer of 1997, Chris Peterson, a 22‐year‐old senior at the University of Utah took a job
to earn the money for every student’s post‐college fantasy—a trip around the world.77
Peterson worked as a telephone‐based debt collector for a company that made payday, car
title, and other loans to subprime borrowers. The young man took the job without knowing
very much or having an opinion about the payday loan industry. Indeed, the industry was
relatively young (although growing rapidly in Utah and nationally) and was subject to little state
or local regulation in Utah. 78 Perhaps the student should have been tipped off when his boss
described himself without shame as a “loan shark,” but after a few months of calling delinquent
borrowers, Peterson could no longer stomach the job. The people on the other end of the
phone line would often end up weeping, describing their desperate circumstances but also a
pattern by which they paid significantly more than they had borrowed yet couldn’t seem to
retire their debt.79 Peterson saw that his company’s loans were making its customers worse
off—the opposite of the doctrines he was learning in his economics classes whereby
transactions always benefit both parties.
Peterson’s discovery about the payday lending industry was being made simultaneously by
people—borrowers, activist groups, think tanks, members of the media, government officials—
across the country. But it took until the mid‐2000s for some states to restrict or even ban
payday lenders. When Peterson enrolled at the University of Utah Law School in the fall of
1998 payday lending was unregulated in Utah and in most other jurisdictions. Peterson made it
his personal mission during law school to conduct research on the payday industry and see
what could be done to tame these lenders. But during his year off between college and law
school, Peterson reached out to political leaders, especially State Senator Ed Mayne, a
Democrat who represented the lower‐income, west side of Salt Lake County. As the state
president of the AFL‐CIO, Mayne was respected by his fellow Democrats in the Utah Senate but
had little political clout in the Republican‐dominated body. In early 1999, the Utah Legislature
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passed the Check Cashing Registration Act. The new law required check cashers and payday
(“deferred deposit”) lenders to register with the Department of Financial Institutions and
required prominent disclosure to loan terms, but the law mandated little else.80
While agitating for change at the state level, Peterson also reached out to leaders of his home
town of West Valley City, Utah’s third largest city at the time and second largest today. As of
2000, West Valley City’s population was racially and ethnically diverse compared to the state as
a whole, with nearly 20% of the population being Hispanic and another 7% being Asian or
Pacific Islander. 81 West Valley City’s median household income also was (and remains) lower
than the state’s average.82
Peterson had a major asset in his effort to convince the leaders of West Valley City to address
payday lending: his mother, Margaret, was a member of the city council. She was first elected
to the council in 1990 and she served continuously until 2007.83 With Margaret as his inside
champion on the city council, Chris managed to move the idea of regulating payday lenders
(and the broader category of check cashers) as far as the West Valley City Planning Commission
during the autumn of 1999. The method of reining in payday lenders relied on the power of
city zoning: forbidding check cashing businesses to be located within six hundred feet of each
other and limiting the number of these businesses to one for every 10,000 residents. The
population of West Valley City at the time was about 100,000, so the long‐term ceiling for the
number of these businesses would be ten. 84 (Any excess would be grandfathered in, but no
new lenders would be allowed until the number dropped below ten.) The proposal was framed
by its backers as a way to overcome the city’s image as a lower‐income area and thereby boost
economic development.
When holding a hearing on the proposed ordinance on November 18, 1999, city planners
encountered more and stronger opposition than they expected from the check cashing
industry. Its trade association, the Utah Consumer Lending Association, had hired a powerful
lobbying firm, Foxley, Pignanelli, Lyon & Evans.85 Frank Pignanelli, a Democrat and the party’s
former minority leader in the Utah House of Representatives, and Nancy Lyon, a former
Republican member of the House, were both on hand at the hearing.86 One argument that was
used against the ordinance was that it unfairly singled out one type of business, leaving similar
ones such as pawn shops and rent‐to‐own companies, unrestricted.87 By the end of the
evening, the city manager and the assistant city attorney realized that they needed to go back
to the drawing board.
Chris Peterson responded to the 1999 defeat of the West Valley City proposal by redoubling his
efforts to achieve reform at the state level. He did so using empirical research and legal
analysis. In this respect, Peterson was functioning in the classic mode of a “policy
entrepreneur,” dedicated individuals who find or create opportunities to advance their policy
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objectives.88 He was attempting to generate and disseminate information as a means of
transforming his personal awareness of the problems associated with payday lending into an
issue on the agenda of policy makers (primarily, state‐level ones).
In 2001, he published the first of two articles. The article appeared in the Utah Law Review and
was built around three objectives: (1) document a problem, (2) explain why market forces alone
would not solve it, and (3) recommend policy responses.89
The 2001 article took aim at the impact of multiple types of high‐cost credit, but payday lenders
(what Peterson called “post‐dated‐check lenders”) received the most attention. Peterson
reported the results of two empirical studies of the Utah high‐cost credit market. First, drawing
on research by Professor John Carsky, Peterson used classified listings in Yellow Pages to
document the dramatic growth of pawn shops and check cashing services in the Salt Lake area
between 1980 and 2000. With respect to check cashers, the number of company listings (which
underestimates the number of outlets when one company has more than one outlet) grew
from zero to seventy‐five over the two decades.
The second study described in the article attempted to measure the typical interest rates being
charged on payday loans. Posing as a potential borrower with a good risk profile (i.e., paycheck
stubs spanning the four previous months and a checking account that had been open for seven
years), Peterson obtained loan quotes from twenty‐six lenders, or roughly a third of all payday
loan companies. When expressed on an annual percentage rate basis, the loans ranged in cost
from 360% to 780%. The modal rate was 520%, and the average was 528%. Peterson
attempted to shock the reader by stating: “By way of comparison, the average reported
interest rates for extortionate criminal loan shark syndicates in New York City during the 1960s
were relatively inexpensive at 250%.”90
Next, Peterson drew on his undergraduate training in economics to lay out a theoretically
sophisticated explanation of why market forces, by themselves, would not serve the credit
interests of low‐income consumers. As a result, he argued, a variety of public policy
interventions were justified. Addressing state‐level policy makers in the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches of government, Peterson offered a variety of proposals. They included:
capping delinquent payment fees on loans with interest rates exceeding 40%; requiring
dramatic, “red flag” warnings, similar to those on cigarette packages, affixed to contracts;
providing a clear legislative definition of what constitutes an “unconscionable” loan;
encouraging more aggressive enforcement of the Check Cashing Registration Act’s disclosure
provisions by small claims courts; and reducing barriers for debtors to appears in these courts.
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The second article, published in the March issue of the Utah Bar Journal, was more narrowly
focused on deferred deposit loans.91 It covered essentially the same ground as the earlier
article in terms of its empirical analysis and policy recommendations, but the second article was
far briefer and presented in a manner that would appeal to readers outside the legal
community.
Peterson’s two articles focused exclusively on the options for state regulation of payday
lenders; there was no mention of the possibility of action by cities or counties. It is therefore a
bit surprising that by September, 2012, he and especially his mother would have engineered
passage of Utah’s first law using local zoning to curtail payday lending.

West Valley City’s Ordinance
The efforts of West Valley City to control the growth of payday lenders within its boundaries
unfolded into two stages in 2002. First, in May, the City Council approved the addition of
several use limitations within the city’s overlay zones. (Overlay zones are subject to
requirements or restrictions over and above those in the “underlying” zone.) The city had three
overlay zones. In two of these, the city manager John Patterson suggested, bail bonds, pawn
shops, check cashing, payday loans, car title loans, tattoo establishments, and sexually oriented
businesses would be added as uses not permitted. In the third zone (a business park along a
state highway), the limitations would apply only to bail bonds and payday loans.92 Patterson
argued that the three areas were gateways to their city, and the listed businesses were not
compatible with the image of itself that the city wished to convey.93 Despite prior
announcement of the opportunity to comment on the proposal, no one was present to speak
either in favor or in opposition to the motion. Accordingly, the City Council voted unanimously
(with one abstention) in favor of the zoning change.
The city’s new restrictions lumped together payday lenders with a variety of other types of
businesses that cities often view as harmful to their image and economic development. Two
months later, Joseph Moore, the community economic development director, presented to the
city Planning Commission an ordinance that would provide an additional level of review and
approval for check cashing businesses (under which rubric “deferred deposit loans” were
included).
The proposed ordinance was drafted by city attorney Nicole Cottle at the direction of the city
council. Leaning on ordinances elsewhere that restricted other controversial land uses such as
7‐Eleven stores open twenty‐four hours a day and sexually‐oriented businesses, Cottle’s
ordinance included a formula that would allow only one check cashing business for every
10,000 citizens of the city—a standard that was already saturated by existing check cashing
businesses. In addition, there would be a mandatory separation by 600 feet of check cashing
26

businesses from other residential or commercial uses and a separation of 600 feet between
check cashing businesses.94 There was no one present who wished to comment on the
proposal—a sharp contrast with the Planning Commission’s meeting in 1999 when the payday
industry was represented by two former state legislators and managed to derail the proposed
regulations. This time, the motion passed unanimously and was forwarded to the City Council.
When the City Council considered the proposed ordinance, the only major change was the
addition of car title lenders as businesses subject to the density and distance restrictions. As
with the meeting of the Planning Commission, no one was present to speak for or against the
ordinance. After discussion, the City Council approved the ordinance unanimously, with all
members of the Council present and voting.95
The placid proceedings belied a more complex story of obstacles to be overcome. First, there
was the memory of the unceremonious defeat of a similar proposal in November, 1999. City
attorney Nicole Cottle was only a few months out of law school at the University of Wyoming
and in her first few weeks on the job. The experience left the message that passage of an
ordinance would not only require fending off a powerful industry while a proposal was being
debated but also the possibility of a lawsuit should an ordinance be enacted.
Second, city council member Peterson and city attorney Cottle were aware that West Valley
City’s citizens lean toward the conservative side of the political spectrum, and both city leaders
were eager to preserve the image of their city as business‐friendly. Hence, they knew that they
would have to frame their payday ordinance in terms of the city’s economic development, not
the morality of payday lending.
A final obstacle rested within the West Valley City Council itself. One of the council members
had a commercial interest in a payday lender. This conflict of interest could be difficult to
overcome.
The main method by which Peterson and Cottle addressed these obstacles was by drawing a
distinction between the “secondary effects” of payday lending and its “social effects.” The
secondary effects, which included crime, calls for police service, and reduced property values,
formed the basis of their justification for the ordinance and were documented with data. The
social effects, which referred to the suffering of people who took out high‐cost payday loans
but ended up in a cycle of debt, lawsuits, and wage garnishment, were largely off limits.
The decision to emphasize the secondary effects of high‐cost lending fit well with Cottle’s
perspective and proclivities. She perceived West Valley City as being at a tipping point. She
said: “We’re either going to slide off the edge of this cliff and become a poverty‐ridden, crime‐
ridden, dilapidated, blighted community, or we’re not.”96 Cottle also liked the fact that
secondary effects could be measured and quantified, something that would make the
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ordinance more legally defensible. And she liked the fact that the approach didn’t have a hint
of paternalism, that is, the need to restrict payday loans because borrowers are not smart
enough to avoid them. Cottle distinguished her city’s ordinance from efforts in cities such as
New York and San Francisco to tell people how big their soda cup could be or the type of fat in
which their restaurant food could be fried. She viewed these examples of managing the
consumer as out of step with the philosophy of her city and state.”97
The decision to steer clear of the social impact of payday loans pained Councilwoman Peterson.
She had heard her son Chris’s stories about payday loans tormenting single mothers, and she
was a single mom herself at that time.98 She also reported having a friend and co‐worker who
were caught up in it.99 Peterson had become convinced that high‐cost lending was destructive,
but she did not feel the need for her fellow council members to agree with her as long as they
voted for the ordinance.
The ordinance supporters also benefited from far less resistance from the lending industry than
they had expected. Cottle recalls that initially we had a lot of cursory resistance but then the
industry got smart. The big players in the industry said to themselves: “This might not be such a
bad thing for us because we already are here. The ordinance could potentially limit
competition.”100 Cottle didn’t worry about the lack of competition because there were already
many lenders, but she was thankful if this perception on the part of the industry reduced kick‐
back to the ordinance.
There were sixteen payday lenders in West Valley City in 2002 when the ordinance was
enacted. As Cottle described the situation, “You could get to a payday lending institution within
five minutes from wherever you were in the city.”101 As of 2016, there were twelve lenders, a
few of the smaller, less successful ones having packed up when their lease ran out. Neither
Peterson nor Cottle are confident that the West Valley City ordinance reduced the number of
high‐cost loans taken out by their citizens, but Cottle feels that the ordinance forestalled a
nightmare scenario of “forty or fifty of those businesses in our city at the rate they were going
and at the rate they exist in unregulated areas.”102

The Ripple Effect in Metropolitan Salt Lake City
West Valley City is located near the center of Salt Lake County. It borders Salt Lake City, the
largest city in the state, but also three other cities of moderate size: South Salt Lake City, West
Jordan, and Taylorsville. (See Figure 1)
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Figure 1: Cities in Salt Lake County, Utah

Source: Salt Lake County Cooperative Plan, http://gis.rbf.com/slco/.
When Margaret Peterson and Cottle were working toward passage of their payday ordinance,
they reached out to their counterparts in neighboring cities for support but received none.
Cottle recalls calling around to the cities surrounding West Valley City and asking whether they,
too, were seeing an influx of payday and other high‐cost lenders. Cottle recalls the responses:
“We don’t have that problem.” The leaders of adjacent cities wanted to believe, according to
Cottle, that the surge in high‐cost lending was unique to the demographic profile of West Valley
City’s residents—low‐income, minority, and immigrant. But Peterson said that leaders in these
cities just needed to open their eyes, saying: “I could see it. Everybody else could see it.”103
By the end of 2004, the eyes of the city leaders in adjoining cities were open. West Jordan, the
largest of these cities, moved most swiftly. In February, 2003, its planning commission
proposed an ordinance explicitly modeled on West Valley City’s in terms of requiring a
thousand foot separation between payday lenders (“check cashing credit services”) and setting
an overall cap on their numbers at one per 10,000 citizens. With a population of nearly
100,000, this equated to ten payday lenders.104
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The West Jordan City Council discussed an ordinance on March 25, 2003. In the debate over
the ordinance, supporters cited the precedent of using zoning to regulate the number of
sexually‐oriented businesses in the city. One concern was that, with a population of nearly
100,000, the city already had two more than the permitted ten payday lenders, but the city’s
director of community and economic development, Tom Burdett, assured the council that the
number of lenders would eventually come into conformity as their numbers declined or the
city’s population increased. There were twelve such lenders at the time the ordinance was
passed, so the expectation was that, with attrition, the number of lenders per capita would
drop to ten. The only real point of contention was whether payday lenders had been given
adequate notice of the proposed change. Councilmember Stuart Richardson, who admitted
that he had a conflict of interest because he leased a building to a payday lender, proposed
postponing a vote until after giving local payday lenders more time to comment on the
ordinance, but he was outvoted. The ordinance then passed unanimously, including an
affirmative vote from Richardson.105 (Unlike West Valley City, the ordinance also covered
pawnshops and bail bondsmen.)
The next domino to fall was the city of Taylorsville. At the November 9, 2004 meeting of its
planning commission, Mark McGrath, director of community development for the city,
presented a proposal to define check cashing as including deferred deposit loans and setting
the same distance and density restriction as those in West Valley City. No members of the
public spoke on the subject, and the motion passed unanimously.
The proposal was more controversial when discussed a month later at the Taylorsville City
Council. Don Adams, the city’s director of economic development, urged the city
councilmembers to adopt the new zoning rules, and Mayor Janice Augur supported the idea as
well. She cited the spillover effect of neighboring cities limiting the number of check cashing
establishments. One member of the council, Morris Pratt, removed himself from the
discussion, citing his economic interest in a deferred deposit lending institution. Councilman
Russ Wall spoke in favor of the ordinance. He obliquely attributed the rise of payday lenders in
Taylorsville to caps on these lenders in surrounding cities. That aside, he argued the burden
created by an inordinate amount of police service in the areas where payday lenders are
located. Wall also indicated that these businesses have a stigma associated with them that
inhibits more desirable businesses from locating within Taylorsville.106
Then discussion turned unfavorable.107 Council member Bud Caitlin recommended that a
moratorium be put in place so that the city could further study the matter. A local business
owner felt that limiting the number of check cashing businesses would have monopolistic
consequences. An employee of the city newspaper, The Eagle Sentinel, objected to the
precedent being set in limiting the number of businesses. Once the brief public hearing was
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closed, councilmember Pratt, who earlier said he would refrain from the discussion, stated that
check cashers provide a service that fills a need, and he argued that state regulations already
serve to eliminate bad practices. Councilman Russ Wall expressed his concern that the
ordinance might end up in litigation. Ultimately, the motion failed on a 3‐2 vote, with Pratt
ignoring his conflict of interest and voting no.
By July, 2005, the position of the council had reversed itself as the city council voted in favor of
the same ordinance they had earlier rejected. This time, Pratt chose not to vote, and even in
the absence of councilmember Jerry Rechtenbach, who had earlier voted for the ordinance, it
passed 3‐0.108 The rising number of lenders probably played an important role. There were
seventeen check cashing establishments at that point for a population of 60,000 residents.
Thus, the limit of one establishment per 10,000 people was largely symbolic since existing
lenders were exempt.
In November, 2005, the Deseret News, the more conservative of Utah’s daily newspapers,
published a three‐part series on payday lending by Lee Davidson.109 The series was not
complimentary. It described borrowers caught in a “vicious cycle” of debt. The articles
frequently quoted lobbyist Frank Pignanelli in defense of the industry and Chris Peterson as its
critic. An additional opponent of payday lending was also cited in each article—Linda Hilton of
the Coalition of Religious Communities (CORC), an alliance of about fifteen faith‐based
organizations dedicated to fighting poverty in Utah. CORC was founded in 1995 and paid
attention to payday lending starting in 2000, but it devotes its limited resources primarily at the
state legislature.110 In one of the articles, Hilton cited the “border effect”: once West Valley
City adopted its ordinance, “new lenders started popping up just over the border in Taylorsville,
often literally across the street from West Valley City.”111
The border effect was in full force. By the end of 2007, virtually all of the cities plus the
unincorporated portion of Salt Lake County were covered by either moratorium on new payday
lenders or an ordinance similar to that of West Valley City that capped their number.112 The
one glaring exception was Salt Lake City, the largest city in the county, but city leaders passed a
West Valley City‐style ordinance in 2009.113 During the process of passing these ordinances,
Linda Hilton and CORC increasingly became the face of opposition to payday loans in Utah.

Interest Group Pressure in Utah
Hilton was an employee of Crossroads Urban Center, a non‐profit organization affiliated with
the United Methodist Women that assists, organizes, and advocates for low‐income, disabled,
and minority members of the Utah community. Crossroads is Utah's busiest emergency food
pantry and is well known in the Salt Lake community for its Thanksgiving and Christmas food
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giveaways, allowing thousands of families to enjoy a complete holiday dinner with turkey and
all the trimmings.114
Hilton’s contact with clients at Crossroads served as her education about check cashers and
payday lenders. As she told us:
At Crossroads, we require some sort of photo identification to get services. I was in the
pantry one day doing intake when a lady presents herself with a Check City Check
Cashing Privilege card with her picture on it. I said, “What kind of ID is this,” and she
said, “I use it to cash my monthly disability checks and my mother’s Social Security
checks. They normally charge us twenty dollars per check, but I bought this card from
them for twenty dollars, so now I can cash each check for ten dollars, so it’s a discount
card.” Hilton thought to herself, “It’s outrageous to pay that much to cash government‐
guaranteed checks. And those check‐cashing charges just took away money to afford
meat or the electric bill.”115
Hilton also learned from clients how clients paid their electric bills when they did not have the
funds to cover them. More and more people were coming in to Crossroads saying, “I’m in the
debt trap with a payday lender. I took out this loan to help pay the electric bill, and now I’m
here and I need help paying the next electric bill and getting out of this payday loan.”116 So all
of these experiences created what Hilton called “the perfect storm” in terms of making Linda
aware of high‐cost financial services. She asked herself, "Has anybody done anything on this?
What do we do? Where do we start? There ought to be a law." Some of her questions were
answered when she came across Chris Peterson’s 2002 article in Utah Bar Journal. Like
Peterson, Hilton’s first thought was that the state of Utah ought to be reining in check cashers
and payday lenders. Thus began more than a decade of lobbying by Hilton and CORC to tighten
the rules governing payday lending in Utah. At CORC’s 2002 annual meeting, regulating the
payday loan industry emerged as one of the organization’s three top issues.117 In 2003, Hilton
and her CORC allies helped place the first of several incremental controls placed on payday
lenders by the state legislature, but the goal of an interest rate cap has eluded CORC so far. 118
The fight to enact zoning ordinances in Utah’s cities came to Hilton and CORC, rather than the
other way around. She was contacted by a member of the Taylorsville city council in 2004
about the creeping of payday lenders across Redwood Road from the West Valley side to the
Taylorsville side. She offered to “send out a team from our coalition” to take the West Valley
City ordinance and “cross out West Valley and put in Taylorsville.”119 Hilton also recalls
meetings with members of the Taylorsville city council to educate them and seek their votes:
“One person was hopeless but we talked to the people who were probable votes and possible
votes.”120 CORC’s members were religious organizations, so when possible, she brought to
these meetings a pastor or other religious leader from a church in the district.
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In their meetings with decision makers in Taylorsville and other cities, CORC had three main
talking points. First, your constituents are paying more than 500% interest on these loans, and
CORC brought along contracts as proof. Second, money spent on exorbitant interest rates
forces people to rely more heavily on the city’s emergency services, fall behind on their rent,
and, in the case of property owners, be delinquent on their property taxes. Third, most payday
lenders are headquartered outside of Utah, so their profits are leaving the state.
CORC encountered several counterarguments from city leaders. One was that “you can’t
regulate stupid.”121 Hilton’s response was to ask dubious councilmembers whether they had
carefully read the contract for their credit card or mortgage. If not, then perhaps the line
between smart and stupid is not so sharp. Pushback against a proposed ordinance also took
the form of faith that the free market and competition would eventually drive down interest
rates. This argument was purely theoretical to Hilton compared to the borrowers she met who
were in crisis mode because their payday loan obligations alone exceeded their income.
To Hilton, the meetings with individual city council members are crucial. She said:
One lesson that I would have for anybody who’s trying to do this work is pick them off
one by one. To go and testify at a council meeting is great to have it on record what
payday loans are and how evil they are. But where you really win the votes is meeting
with them one on one. We had many, many questions over the years from city council
people, county council people, concerning things they had heard about payday lending
or information that they needed, like the density of payday lenders they have right
now . . . Figure out what each person’s hot button is, and then address that issue with as
much information and detail and data as you can.122
Just as the West Valley ordinance stimulated the one in Taylorsville, the Taylorsville ordinance
stimulated the appetite of CORC’s members for additional ordinances. Hilton said:
Once Taylorsville happened, there were other people in the coalition who said, “I live in
city X in suburban Salt Lake County, and these lenders are popping up all around us too.
I know a city council person or I know the mayor's sister, or whoever. So we should do
something there.” We started dividing up the Valley and seeing where the most feasible
areas were and started picking them off with the goal of locking up the entire county.123
Passing ordinances was easier in some cities than others. Hilton cited Mayor JoAnn Seghini as
especially supportive and her city council as fairly progressive. Midvale also has a large
percentage of racial minorities and renters, making it both an attractive place for payday
lenders and a good place to see the negative effects of these loans. Representing CORC at the
August, 2006 city council meeting was Arthur Sutherland, a recent retiree who had moved to
Utah after a career as an aerospace engineer.124 Wanting to do something worthwhile, he
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spoke to his pastor, who directed him to Linda Hilton at CORC. At the Midvale City Council,
Sutherland was the only one to speak about the ordinance, which passed unanimously.125
More affluent and more Caucasian Sandy, Utah, was a heavier lift for Sutherland. In front of
the Sandy City Council, Sutherland faced off against John Swallow, the general counsel for the
payday lending company, Check City. The statuesque Swallow was forty‐four years old at the
time. He had represented Sandy in the Utah House of Representatives for six years, was the
unsuccessful Republican candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives in 2002 and 2004, and
was elected Utah Attorney General in 2012.126 (He resigned in 2013 and currently faces federal
corruption charges related, in small part, to his relationship with the payday lending
industry.)127
Like previous ordinances passed in Utah, the Sandy proposal capped payday lenders at one per
10,000 residents. This left room for only one more store in Sandy despite there being four
applicants. Check City was one of those applicants, and Swallow wanted the winner to be his
company. He and two other employees of Check City addressed the city council on February
21, 2007, citing the value of payday loans for people facing financial emergencies. Sutherland,
a resident of Sandy, countered that payday lenders trap and then harass people in desperate
financial straits. At the end of the evening, the council voted to postpone consideration of the
ordinance.128 During the next few weeks, Swallow managed to secure the last slot for Check
City, and on March 7, 2007 the ordinance passed by a narrow 4‐3 vote.129
Sometimes supporters of payday ordinances get lucky . . . and a good laugh. One such instance
took place at a meeting of the Salt Lake County Council. Councilmember Joe Hatch was the
inside champion for a measure that would cap the number of lenders, and he waged a two‐year
campaign culminating in a 2008 ordinance.130 Hilton, Sutherland, and several other members
attended a meeting of the council in 2007. Upon arriving, they were surprised to find the
council room packed despite it being 2pm on a Wednesday afternoon. As Hilton tells the story,
the payday lenders had paid a large number of Hispanic people to attend wearing yellow t‐
shirts saying “Love Payday Lending.” Hilton had an opportunity to testify as did payday
representatives. One of these speakers argued that passing an ordinance would take away
access to credit. He then turned to the people in the room and asked, “Would everybody that
wants to keep payday lending and is against the ordinance please stand up?” Nobody budged.
Then a lady said something in Spanish. The people in the t‐shirts start looking at each other and
then many of them stood up. Councilmember Hatch tried hard to smother his laughter and
maintain decorum because it was so ridiculous to him.131

Impact of the Ordinances in Greater Salt Lake City
A timeline of payday ordinances in Salt Lake County is presented below.
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Figure 2: Timeline of Salt Lake County Payday Ordinances

To date, no rigorous evaluation study has been conducted to estimate the impact of the eleven
local ordinances that were passed in Salt Lake County between 1999 and 2012.132 At a
minimum, this type of study would measure changes in the availability of payday loans as
measured by the number of outlets. (Ideally, one would want to track the number of loans
received and the interest rates charged on them, but this is difficult for a number of reasons,
including the growth of internet‐based payday lending.) In late 2008, an article in one of the
state’s two leading newspapers, the Deseret News, noted that the rapid growth of payday
stores in the state had slowed markedly compared to the 1995‐2005 period.133 Nevertheless,
the article noted there were more stores in the state than the number of 7‐Elevens,
McDonalds, Burger Kings and Wendy’s–combined.
City leaders whom we interviewed in West Valley City and Midvale provided specific examples
of payday lenders that had closed yet could not be replaced because the number of outlets per
capita exceeded the number permitted. Existing excess outlets had been “grandfathered”
under the ordinances, but new outlets could only be approved if the number of stores fell
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below the per capita maximum. In West Valley City, the number of lenders had dropped from
sixteen to twelve in the post‐ordinance period.134 Population growth since 2002 would have
allowed a thirteenth lender, but no applicants had stepped forward.135
Despite a modest decline in the number of outlets in some jurisdictions with density and
distance ordinances, Wendy Gibson, speaking for the Utah Consumer Lending Association,
argued that any reduction in the number of new stores was due to the maturation of the
industry and the saturation of markets. Gibson did not believe the ordinances had any effect
on loan availability. Phillip Hill, assistant city manager for community development in Midvale,
tended to agree with Gibson. He noted that there had been about a dozen lenders when the
city of 30,000 people passed its ordinance in 2006.136 As of mid‐2005, there had been a drop to
about eight or nine payday lenders, according to Hill, largely because there had been too many
lenders for the original population base. Even though Midvale’s population is now approaching
40,000, it will be a long time before a new payday outlet can be approved because of the per
capita limit, but he saw no signs that people who wanted payday loans cannot obtain them.
Even the activists who worked for the passage of the ordinances held very tempered views of
the impact of the ordinances. Arthur Sutherland observed, “There are enough [payday lenders]
out there if you are willing to go a little distance. It may be a little hard to shop around because
you are going to need a car instead of being able to walk from one store to another. But there
are enough of them out there for borrowers to take out a loan from one guy to pay off the loan
from another guy and pretty soon have to take out a loan from another guy to pay that off.”137
The gloomiest assessment of the Utah ordinance “movement” came, surprisingly, from Chris
Peterson, the person who did so much to expose the payday loan market in Utah and convince
his mother to tackle the industry in West Valley City. After passage of the West Valley City
ordinance in 2002, Peterson worked for a year in Washington, DC as an attorney for the
consumer activist group, United States Public Interest Research Group. In 2003, he began a
four‐year stint as an assistant and then associate professor of law at the University of Florida,
during which time he published a book, Taming the Sharks: Towards a Cure for the High Cost
Credit Market, tracing the evolution of high‐cost credit markets in the U.S. 138 In 2007, he
returned to the University of Utah Quinney College of Law where he has been a professor ever
since.139
Recall that Peterson’s articles on payday lending in 2001 and 2002 had recommended state‐
level regulation of payday lenders. Looking back from the vantage of late 2015, Peterson said:
I never had a great deal of faith in those local ordinances, and since then I've had even
less. I never saw those ordinances as very promising, so I honestly didn't invest that
much time into it. At the time, I remember telling myself, "Well, let's just get a win, and
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it will help raise the profile of the problem. Maybe it will deter a few locations, and
maybe that's good at the margin." But there were already so many lenders out there
that it seemed to me that West Valley City was already saturated, and that capping
them, or even pulling them back a little bit via attrition was not really going to help
people very much. Also, some of the people on the city council were worried about
blight, but to me the more concerning issue was what was happening to those
borrowers, and this didn't seem like that promising of a method for helping them. . . . At
the time, though, I felt like the city had very limited options and ought to do something,
and this was the best that they could do.
In retrospect, I don't think that that's true. I think there are better things that cities can
do than zoning ordinances. But that's only become clear to me now. As more and more
cities pass these ordinances, they don't really decrease the volume of lending. They
create an illusion of actually having done something when nothing has really been done,
and that tends to demobilize political change. So since then, in West Valley, my sense is
that back then, there was a real growing movement to actually do something. This was
not something that had been done in the state before; it was a new idea, and there was
real momentum to actually do something. But then that momentum got spent out going
down a false path that didn't really provide meaningful reform for folks. Instead of
being a stepping stone to building for a more sustaining and more meaningful change, I
think it became a false lead in the maze that became a dead end, in my opinion.140
What are those “better things” that Peterson believes that cities can do? In a 2012 article,
Peterson recommends that local jurisdictions use their power to regulate merchants’ exterior
signage.141 Specifically, he proposes that lenders offering loans with annual percentage rates
exceeding 45% should be required to display on their street, storefront, and other exterior signs
a message designed to give pause to potential customers. The message would be similar to a
warning on the labels of cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, or potent prescription drugs. But
instead of referring to the dangers of the product, the sign would refer more bluntly to the
payday store. It would say, “Warning: Predatory Lender.” So far, no city has taken up
Peterson’s proposal.
Despite the pessimism of Peterson’s assessment of density and distance ordinances, the Utah
ordinances were precedent‐setters. The West Valley ordinance was one of the first in the
country to set a limit on the number of lenders per capita and set minimum distances between
these lenders. In addition, the Utah ordinances testify to the power of deeply committed
individuals—whether an issue champion within government or a policy entrepreneur applying
pressure from the outside—to change the rules governing payday lending in their communities.
They did so in Utah without funding for research studies, public opinion polls, focus groups,
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advertising campaigns, or coalition‐building. The ordinance supporters did benefit, though,
from sympathetic press coverage, especially from Lee Davidson of the Deseret News and later
the Salt Lake Tribune. According to Linda Hilton, Davidson’s coverage helped educate the
general public and move individuals to action. She recalled that friends would say to her:
“Oh, I read that article! I had no idea! This is awful! You know, maybe I should get
involved. Maybe I should do something.” Or, “I had no idea that you were working on
this. Let me tell you about my” fill in the blank—niece, brother, son—who’s got
problems with payday lending. So, his reporting brought us victims through the
reporting, which has been really helpful.142
Hilton also believes that the local ordinances aided her efforts to get state‐level regulation of
payday lenders, but she laments that this catalytic effect has been weaker in Utah than in some
other states. Her goal, like that of Chris Peterson, Art Sutherland, and a handful of other
consumer advocates like Laura Polacheck of AARP Utah, remains strict state‐level rules,
including an interest rate cap, that would make local ordinances unnecessary. 143
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III. Silicon Valley Earthquake—How Grassroots Advocacy Shook
Up Payday Lending
SVCF Prioritizes Payday Lending
Silicon Valley Community Foundation (SVCF) was launched in January, 2007, the result of an
unprecedented merger between two community foundations—the Community Foundation of
Silicon Valley and the Peninsula Community Foundation. Serving the people of San Mateo and
Santa Clara counties, SVCF describes itself as “a catalyst and leader for innovative solutions to
our region’s most challenging problems.”144 Emmett D. Carson, Ph.D., was selected to be the
founding CEO and President of SVCF. 145 With assets that have grown rapidly to almost $8
billion, SVCF is the world’s largest community foundation.146 Community foundations, as public
charities, have more latitude in funding advocacy activities and engaging in lobbying themselves
than private foundations, and SVCF has exercised these prerogatives.147
Shortly after the merger, SVCF conducted a community input project to engage the community
and choose priorities of importance to their constituents. Through the project, SVCF conducted
research and an on‐line survey, and held a series of nine strategic conversations with people in
the community, including donors, government officials, leaders of nonprofit organizations, and
members of the public at large.148 The board of directors and staff at SVCF then held
discussions on how their grantmaking activities could make the greatest positive impact on the
lives of people in the Silicon Valley area. Based on the initial research and community input
process, SVCF’s leaders selected four areas of highest priority, one of which was titled
“economic security” and encompassed anti‐predatory lending advocacy along with asset‐
building and financial education. 149
SVCF found that in a geographical area known for its prosperity and innovation, there were
wide economic disparities. Many community members were already asset‐poor, even before
the recession brought on by the bursting of the housing bubble in 2008. Now, with even fewer
assets, people were vulnerable to financial emergencies, such as those caused by job loss or a
health crisis. In the face of these emergencies, high‐cost payday loans could seem like the only
solution, despite the long‐term negative impact on asset‐building.
The details of payday lending, once highlighted through the community input process, alarmed
the leadership at SVCF, who noted that there was even a payday loan store located one block
away from their offices.150 The situation called for SVCF’s involvement, but there was an
impediment to jumping right in to combat payday loan abuses: SVCF’s parent foundations did
not have traditions of funding (let alone engaging in) public policy advocacy.151 This meant that
doing policy work would require approval by SVCF’s board. CEO and President Emmett Carson
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came from the Minneapolis Foundation, a foundation that did policy work. He felt that SVCF
should also fund local organizations that engaged in policy advocacy and, from time to time,
take a leadership role on certain issues.152 SVCF staff gradually built support among members of
the board of directors, and in 2009 the board approved grants for the specific purpose of
addressing predatory payday lending.
Before requesting proposals for this work, SVCF leadership—led by Ellen Clear, Vice President
for Grantmaking; Erica Wood, Vice President for Community Leadership; and Pat Krackov,
Program Officer for Economic Security—articulated their vision in Asset Building and Financial
Education: Critical Vehicles for Helping Low‐Income Families Achieve Greater Economic Security.
The document, authored by Krackov, was used to educate donors and show that payday
lending was an issue of deep importance to people from many diverse parts of the Silicon
Valley community. The report argued for a combination of financial education and asset
building as the long‐term foundation for economic security. In particular, the research paper
stressed the need to:
• Combat predatory lending practices that siphon money away from families;
• Increase access to affordable financial services that help families develop credit
histories and other key banking relationships; and
• Create incentives so that families can more easily save and build wealth.153
The research paper identified two goals for SVCF’s grantmaking: (1) “to increase the availability
of financial education, counseling and legal services, as well as asset building products, by
scaling effective programs and services or designing and piloting new ones” and (2) to
“promote policy advocacy that supports an asset‐building agenda focused on anti‐predatory
lending measures to effect change at the municipal and state levels and to generate public
awareness about the topic.”154
While not focusing exclusively on payday lending, the research paper described payday lending
as one piece of a much larger problem that could be addressed through organized advocacy
efforts. The research paper cited the use of moratoria and zoning ordinances in cities such as
Oakland and San Francisco to curb the number of payday lending establishments in their
communities. It noted as well that non‐English speaking families could greatly benefit from
SVCF’s advocacy work, as could local youth, who could in turn educate their families.
Finally, the research paper made the case for the appropriateness of financial education and
asset building as activities for SVCF. The report argued that these efforts fit squarely within
SVCF’s vision and mission of inspiring civic participation to address the most challenging
problems in San Mateo and Santa Clara counties.155 The proposed activities were presented as
building upon the past community development initiatives of the Peninsula Community
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Foundation, SVCF’s own efforts to bring a credit union to East Palo Alto, and the expertise of
SVCF’s staff.
The grantmaking strategy paper constituted a roadmap for SVCF’s efforts. Internally, it was
designed to generate buy‐in from the members of SVCF’s board of directors. Externally, it
signaled to potential grantees SVCF’s goals with respect to asset building and its preferred
strategies. With respect to payday lending, SVCF expressed the view that a cap on interest
rates on the order of 36% is generally recognized, locally and nationally, as “the most effective
regulatory lever for reducing” predatory lending practices.156 In addition to acknowledging the
importance of a state‐level interest rate cap, SVCF articulated its support for locally‐based
efforts to enact anti‐payday lending ordinances throughout Silicon Valley.

SVCF Commissions a Report on the Status of Payday Lending in California
Before issuing its first request for proposals (RFP) for Anti‐Payday Lending Policy Advocacy in
June, 2009, SVCF commissioned a study to help guide this work.157 The study, Report on the
Status of Payday Lending in California, was conducted by the Public Interest Law Firm (PILF) of
the Law Foundation of Silicon Valley and issued in October 2009. According to a foreword to
the report by SVCF’s CEO and President, Emmett Carson, the study’s findings dramatically
revealed how payday lending traps many low‐income borrowers—especially those in African‐
American and Latino communities‐‐in deepening cycles of debt.
The study also offered possible policy work at the federal, state and local levels. Describing
federal and state action to date as inadequate, the report included a section on what would
become a major thrust for SVCF’s future work in this space: the passage of local municipal and
county zoning ordinances to restrict payday lending. Like SVCF’s research paper authored by
Krackov, the authors cited approving recent payday ordinances in Oakland, San Francisco and
Sacramento, and encouraged advocates in other large cities, including San Jose, to mount
campaigns for similar ordinances.158
In June, 2009, several months before the PILF study was released, SVCF released its RFP to
promote Anti‐Payday Lending Policy Advocacy.159 The RFP laid out SVCF’s two‐part strategy for
curbing payday lending: first local ordinances to ban or restrict new payday lending
establishments, and, eventually, a statewide payday loan interest rate cap. The call for
proposals encouraged applicants to prepare themselves to meaningfully participate in efforts to
pass local ordinances by studying the experiences of cities such as Sacramento, Oakland and
San Francisco as well as others around the country.
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Prior Action in Major California Cities
Prior to 2009, Oakland and San Francisco, the other two large cities in the San Francisco Bay
Area, had enacted local ordinances to restrict payday lenders. On October 10, 2004, the
Oakland City Council gave final approval to an ordinance that required any new payday lenders
(called “check cashiers” in the ordinance) be subject to a conditional use permitting process and
meet certain distance requirements. Specifically, check cashiers (or any business engaged in
check cashing activity) had to be at least one thousand feet from the nearest check cashier and
a minimum of five hundred feet from state or federally chartered banks, community assembly
facilities such as recreational centers, and alcohol stores. The ordinance further required that
store windows and doors permit law enforcement personnel to have a clear view from the
public sidewalk of the entire public area of the premises. Check cashiers also had to post at
least one no‐loitering sign (with letters at least two inches tall) in front of their building. Finally,
the ordinance limited hours of operation to between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m., Monday through
Saturday.160
Two years later, on January 10, 2006, San Francisco’s board of supervisors issued a 45‐day
moratorium on the opening of any additional “fringe financial services” to allow the city time to
study the impact of payday lending on the city’s residents and businesses.161 A permanent
ordinance was passed in November 2007 that set a “Fringe Financial Service Restricted Use
District” composed of several noncontiguous areas in which payday lenders were already
numerous. Additional new payday lenders were banned from these areas. Outside of the
restricted use district, no new fringe financial service provider was allowed within a quarter
mile of an existing provider. As justification, the ordinance cited the potential of fringe financial
service to displace other financial service providers offering a broader range of financial
services as well as other desired commercial developments.162
Completing the landscape of payday lending ordinances in California’s largest cities as of June
2009 (when SVCF issued its first RFP with respect to payday lending) was Sacramento, which
passed an ordinance three months earlier in March. The Sacramento restrictions closely
resembled those implemented in Oakland five years earlier: additional payday lenders needed
to obtain a special use permit, maintain a minimum distance of a thousand feet from any other
payday lender (as well as any school, religious institution or mainstream financial institution),
and be no closer than five hundred feet from any residential zone or other residential use.163 In
its June 2009 Anti‐Payday Lending Policy Advocacy Request for Proposals, SVCF cited the efforts
of Sacramento, San Francisco, and Oakland, but if San Jose could be added to the list, it would
be the largest California city to date to use its zoning powers to limit payday lending.
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The Role of the California Reinvestment Coalition
In Oakland and San Francisco, the primary impetus for passage of these protective ordinances
came from within city government. In San Francisco, for example, Supervisor Tom Ammiano
and Treasurer Jose Cisneros provided the inside leadership to first enact a moratorium and then
an ordinance.164 In Sacramento, however, the California Reinvestment Coalition (CRC)
culminated a multi‐year push for payday lending reform by helping to secure passage of an
ordinance through persistent education of elected officials and mobilization of community
groups and the public.
CRC is a statewide network of organizations that advocate for equitable access to credit for all
California communities and individuals. CRC’s focus on this work began in March 2005, when its
Executive Director Alan Fisher authored its first study on payday lending in California. Titled
The Financial Divide, the report criticized the concentration of check cashers and payday
lenders in lower‐income neighborhoods.165 Fisher blamed mainstream financial institutions,
especially banks, for closing branches in lower‐income communities while helping to finance
(and profit from) high‐cost providers of credit. He called it “two faces of a seamless financial
web.”166 Among several recommendations for addressing the harms of a two‐tiered system of
consumer credit, the report encouraged cities and counties to “restrict the proliferation of
predatory lenders through zoning restrictions and other land use tools.”167
In March 2007, CRC turned up the heat on payday lending by issuing a scathing report titled,
Payday Lenders Evade Regulations: A Summary of Findings from Surveying Payday Lending
Establishments.168 The report provides the results of an in‐store survey of 253 payday lending
outlets throughout California. The researchers investigated the degree of compliance by
lenders with state requirements, especially those dealing with information disclosure to clients.
The researchers found that 32% of payday lenders did not post a complete schedule of fees and
an even a higher percentage did not provide accurate estimates of the loan’s annual interest
rate, both state requirements. Similarly, only 16% of lenders complied with the requirement to
tell borrowers that lenders cannot accept collateral for the loan, and a few lenders unlawfully
asked for auto titles as a condition for securing a payday loan. The researchers found that, in
addition to failing to comply with state laws, lenders did not even comply with their own
industry’s self‐regulatory standards. For example, the Community Financial Services
Association of America requests its members to extend a free, 24‐hour opportunity to return
the original amount of the loan, yet 38% of the lenders surveyed did not offer this right of
rescission. The report did not contain any policy recommendations, but the implication was
that the state needed to beef up enforcement of existing laws. Local zoning designed to curb
payday lending was not part of the report.
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As of 2009 when SVCF took up the issue of payday lending, CRC’s payday loan activism had
been primarily focused on the state level. In 2007, the Center for Responsible Lending (CRL), a
North Carolina‐based organization with an extensive track record of advocacy, opened a
California office in Oakland. CRL’s attention was more focused on state‐level reforms of payday
lending, especially a tough interest rate cap, than on local zoning ordinances.169 CRL’s position
was that a payday loan was a debt trap and a 36% rate cap was the only way to spring it.

Silicon Valley Payday Reform Activity
The Pacifica Campaign
The opening rounds in the fight to restrict payday lenders in Silicon Valley took place in Pacifica
and East Palo Alto, both in San Mateo County. Two SVCF grantees provided pressure from
outside on the City Council to pass a short‐term moratorium with a longer‐term goal of
preventing any additional payday lenders from locating in Pacifica. The two SVCF grantee
organizations were the Insight Center for Community Economic Development and the Pacifica
Resource Center (PRC), while Councilmember Mary Ann Nihart provided the necessary
leadership within the council. 170
Even though Pacifica had only three payday establishments, it had the largest number of
lenders per capita than any other city because of its small population size. Anita Rees, Executive
Director at PRC was well positioned to address the human toll of payday lending because PRC
was a well‐established charitable organization devoted to helping Pacifica families and
individuals meet their food, housing, and other basic needs.
In October, 2010, the Insight Center and PRC presented data to the Pacifica City Council noting
the city’s ranking among cities in San Mateo County of hosting the most payday lenders per
capita in the county. This theme of Pacifica having a disproportionate number of payday
lenders was repeated often and even found its way into the January 2011 resolution that
established a 22‐month‐and‐15‐day moratorium on licensing new payday lenders in order to
allow the city time to study payday lending’s impact on the community.171 Speaking to the
Pacifica City Council in October, 2010, Rees recounted the story of a family that came to the
Pacifica Resource Center for assistance: the family had payday loans from four different
businesses (one of which was online) and was trying to pay off loans that came due by taking
out a new one.172
The East Palo Alto Campaign
Whereas a moratorium on new payday lenders in Pacifica generated excitement and provided
an early win from the point of view of SVCF and its partners, moratoria are by definition
temporary. Indeed, as it turned out, Pacifica did not take any further action against payday
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lending when the moratorium expired in late 2012. This was not a big blow in the grand
scheme of things, however, because opponents of payday lending in Silicon Valley had their
eyes trained on a more ambitious target—a permanent ordinance that would prevent new
payday lenders from opening for business in the area’s largest city, San Jose.
SVCF seeded the effort to move beyond moratoria with a second request for grant proposals in
November, 2010. In the invitation to submit proposals, SVCF indicated its interest in supporting
efforts to “advocate changes in municipal laws and regulations that allow for excessive interest
and service fees.”173 The request for proposals stated that proposals addressed to cities with
high concentrations of payday lending establishments would be given priority. Four of the five
grants awarded were designed to promote local anti‐payday lending ordinances. Two of those
grants were focused on Santa Clara County’s largest city, San Jose, where payday lending stores
were abundant. The first city in which grant recipients were successful in passing a permanent
anti‐payday lending ordinance, however, was East Palo Alto in San Mateo County.
East Palo Alto is the poor sister of affluent Palo Alto, home of Stanford University. The two
cities are not separated by the proverbial railroad tracks, but they are separated by a major
freeway. The cities are even in different counties (East Palo Alto in San Mateo County and Palo
Alto in Santa Clara County). Despite some gentrification along its western border due to the
city’s proximity to companies like Google and Facebook, the majority of East Palo Alto’s 30,000
residents are Latino, with the second largest group being African‐Americans. Median
household income in 2010 was around $48,000—far less than the cost of attending Stanford for
one year.174 The demographics of East Palo Alto would suggest that it would be attractive to
payday lenders, but, strangely, East Palo Alto had no payday lenders within its borders when
the ordinance was passed in late 2011, although borrowers could avail themselves of payday
lenders in nearby Redwood City and via the internet.
The key organization in the effort to curb payday lending in East Palo Alto was Community Legal
Services of East Palo Alto (CLSEPA). CLSEPA’s first connection to SVCF took place in early 2009,
when CLSEPA received a $75,000 grant to assist homeowners facing foreclosure.175 In 2011,
CLSEPA received another SVCF foreclosure grant but also a $50,000 grant to support a
collaborative campaign to pass a local ordinance and to redirect present and potential users of
payday lending to other products.176 As explained by Keith Ogden of CLESPA, it was an easy
jump from work on subprime mortgages to advocacy on payday lending because they both
included predatory practices: “Just like subprime mortgage lending caused a debt trap that
wreaked havoc on some people, payday loans create a debt cycle that wreaks havoc on
others.”177
The campaign in East Palo Alto established a basic pattern that was repeated elsewhere in the
moderate‐size cities of Silicon Valley, and this approach expanded into a more elaborate and
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sophisticated effort in San Jose. Supported with funds from SVCF, the key campaign elements
in East Palo Alto included:
(1) Building a coalition in support of the ordinance;
(2) Using traditional and new media;
(3) Putting the ordinance on firm legal ground by basing it on distances between payday
lenders themselves and between payday lenders and certain other types of uses;
(4) Identifying a champion within the city council to help introduce and push forward
the ordinance, while meeting one‐on‐one with city council members, and backing all of
this up with well‐planned testimony at public hearings; and
(5) Combatting industry arguments by offering alternatives to payday loans and
promoting consumer education.
CLSEPA took the lead in pushing for a payday ordinance in East Palo Alto, but it led a loosely‐
defined coalition. Nuestra Casa, a local organization devoted to promoting economic
development and political participation among Latinos, was a particularly important partner.
Nuestra Casa received grants from SVCF beginning in 2009, but in program areas separate from
payday lending (Adult English Language Acquisition; Bridging the Cultural Gap). The willingness
of Nuestra Casa to collaborate with CLSEPA on payday lending was one of many examples of
what SVCF’s Krackov called “cross‐fertilization” across SVCF’s programs.178
A notable example of the partnership between CLSEPA and Nuestra Case was co‐production of
a short film satirizing payday lending, titled “U‐PAY‐US.” The film follows a new employee in a
payday lending store as she is introduced to the tricks and traps of the industry by two
seasoned co‐workers. The film was written, directed, and edited by John Slattery, the spouse of
CLSEPA attorney Leah Simon‐Weisberg, and it premiered in East Palo Alto on June 30, 2011.179
The film was used to educate the public about the problems associated with payday lending
and served to complement more traditional pamphlets explaining these loans and alternatives
to them.
The legislative solution advocated by CLSEPA and its allies was an ordinance that incorporated
features of ordinances that had been passed elsewhere in California (and in other states such as
Utah). Accordingly, the ordinance would likely be immune to a legal challenge. Like Oakland
and Oceanside in California, the ordinance would set minimum distances between one payday
lender and another as well as between a payday lender and certain “sensitive” land uses. The
latter would include residences, schools, and churches as well as bars and liquor stores. From
the city of South Gate in the Los Angeles area, the East Palo Alto ordinance would incorporate
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the idea of setting time of day limits for payday lenders. Whereas South Gate restricted payday
lending from 7 a.m. to 10 p.m., East Palo Alto’s ordinance was stricter, making 7 a.m. to 7 p.m.
the acceptable hours of operation.180
The Political Process in East Palo Alto
The city of East Palo Alto is governed by a five‐member city council elected at‐large to four‐year
terms. The mayor is selected from among members of the city council by majority vote of the
council. Councilmember Carlos Romero had expertise in city planning and a long history of
social and environmental justice. He was approached by CLSEPA about a possible ordinance.
According to Keith Ogden, Romero understood the issue of payday lending quickly and gave his
strong support to the concept of a payday ordinance. 181
Feelings about the presence and absence of financial institutions in the city were raw at the
time of the ordinance debate. In May, 2011, California Bank & Trust, the city’s only depository
institution, announced that it would close its doors in August, citing a lack of profitability.182
Critics of the proposed ordinance, such as Councilmember Peter Evans, argued that banning
payday lenders would leave people without options. He said: “Some of our residents have no
choice. It [the payday industry] exists because there is a need. Some [residents] are
undocumented, with no way to access [other] types of financial services.”183 The strong
leadership of Carlos Romero helped to counterbalance this perspective on the city council. It
was helpful, too, that Romero was serving as mayor of the city in 2011.
The ordinance’s community supporters pressed their position privately through one‐on‐one
meetings with members of the city council as well as publicly via testimony at public hearings
held by the city council and the city planning commission. Fifteen and six people testified at
these hearings, respectively. Fernando Peña, government affairs director for payday lender
Cash America, and Ogden of CLESPA anchored the two sides at both hearings. Peña drew
support from representatives of other payday lending companies, while Ogden had more
diverse allies with activists representing youth and the elderly in East Palo Alto speaking in favor
of the ordinance as well as the pastor of a predominantly African American church. SVCF’s
Krackov also weighed in, stressing the cycle of debt that payday borrowers often enter and the
economic impact on the city’s residents.184
Opponents of the ordinance made a number of arguments. Most challenging among them for
ordinance advocates was the question of alternatives. If you make payday loans difficult to
obtain, what are you going to offer people as an alternative? Ordinance supporters were not
surprised by this argument, however. Indeed, the CLSEPA 2011 grant from SVCF had two
objectives: to direct a collaborative campaign to focus on a local ordinance and to redirect
present and potential users of payday lending to other alternative products, and CLSEPA and its
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partners already developed a hierarchy of responses to short‐term financial needs. First in the
progression was borrowing from friends and family. The next option was non‐payday lenders,
including credit unions, community development financial institutions and other new entrants
to the financial services field offering loans on non‐predatory terms. The final suggested
alternative was turning to social service agencies for emergency assistance, for example to pay
a utility bill or even rent.
Coping with the need for immediate cash without resorting to payday lenders was one thing,
but SVCF and other ordinance supporters also emphasized financial literacy and asset building
as the keys to making payday loans unnecessary. Toward these ends, groups like CLSEPA,
Nuestra Casa, and the entrepreneurship‐oriented Renaissance Mid‐Peninsula offered consumer
education classes to help individuals develop the financial skills to free them from needing to
turn to payday loans. Nuestra Casa even began offering education about payday lending into a
class for undocumented residents seeking a driver’s license under a new California law: the
logic went that getting a license involves buying a car, and buying a car entails understanding
credit, and understanding credit includes avoiding high‐cost forms of borrowing such as payday
loans.185 In Pacifica, PRC has also developed a small‐scale program to help borrowers pay off
payday loans and build savings to cover future emergencies.186 In the spring of 2011, when
only Pacifica had a payday lender moratorium and no other cities yet had ordinances, SVCF’s
CEO and President, Emmet Carson, was quoted as saying: “The financial literacy piece of this is
the core. I can’t stress that enough. You need to understand how to budget, the appropriate
uses of credit, and cash flow.”187
Ordinance Enactment in East Palo Alto
On November 14, 2011 the East Palo Alto Planning Commission voted 5‐0‐1 in favor of the
ordinance, and the City Council passed the ordinance two weeks later by a vote of 4‐1.188 At
one level, the ordinance was purely preventative given that there were no payday lenders in
East Palo Alto. This meant that the various distance requirements between any two payday
lenders as well as the minimum distance requirements between a lender and residential,
religious, and school buildings were unlikely to have any immediate effect. Viewed more
broadly, though, the campaign to pass the ordinance created a playbook that would be
successfully transferred to other communities in Silicon Valley, many of whom had large
numbers of payday lenders.
Indeed, within five years, approximately a dozen jurisdictions in the two‐county Silicon Valley
area had passed ordinances similar to the one pioneered in East Palo Alto. These campaigns
relied on the efforts of additional advocacy organizations, including the California Reinvestment
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Coalition, the Youth Leadership Institute, and others. The biggest prize, however, was the city
of San Jose, where a much broader coalition and more intense community organizing was
required to pass an ordinance covering a million people.

The San Jose Campaign
San Jose, with a population of over one million people, is California’s third largest city (behind
Los Angeles and San Diego). European settlement in the area dates back to the 1770s. The first
census in 1778 showed 68 people of different races living there. Today, the city is highly
diverse in terms of race and ethnicity. The U.S. Census Bureau reports that about 33% of San
Jose residents are Hispanic or Latino. Another 32% are Asian and 28% are White.189
Judged by household median income, the city of San Jose is one of the wealthiest cities in the
United States.190 Many of its residents commute through heavy traffic to find lucrative
employment at the many high‐tech companies headquartered throughout the Bay Area. (More
people commute out of San Jose each day than commute into it.191) Income inequality in San
Jose is higher than the national average but on par with that of California as a whole.192
According to the California Budget & Policy Center, in a report supported by SVCF, household
incomes in Silicon Valley have grown further apart over the last twenty‐five years as the
region’s income gains have been enjoyed almost entirely by high‐income households.193
Meanwhile, low‐income households have actually seen income declines over the past
generation. A low‐income household in San Mateo, Santa Clara, and San Francisco counties has
a lower income today than a similar household would have had in 1989, after adjusting for
inflation, meaning that there is now a wider gap between Silicon Valley’s higher‐income
households and the region’s lower‐income households than twenty‐five years ago.194 Despite
its overall prosperity, payday lenders have been attracted to San Jose, and as of 2009, when the
effort to control them began, the city was home to thirty‐nine payday lenders.195
Finding a Campaign Leader for San Jose
When SVCF decided in 2009 to target payday lending as part of its initiative on economic
security, it knew it could rely on CRC and CRL, but SVCF had no obvious, Silicon Valley‐based
leader for a campaign that would seek an anti‐payday lending ordinance in San Jose.196 The
Law Foundation of Silicon Valley (“Law Foundation”) stepped up to the challenge. The Law
Foundation’s mission is to advance “the rights of under‐represented individuals and families in
our diverse community through legal services, strategic advocacy, and educational
outreach.”197
Work on payday lending was new to the Law Foundation. Kyra Kazantzis, one of the Law
Foundation’s key leaders throughout its payday lending work, admitted to being a bit surprised
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when she heard that the Law Foundation was going to write a report for SVCF on payday
lending. She thought that the Law Foundation might have been chosen to do the research
precisely because it had not been involved in payday lending work. That way, its findings could
be viewed as relatively unbiased. Kazantzis soon saw, though, that addressing payday lending
was a natural extension of the Law Foundation’s previous work on mortgage lending and
foreclosure. Moreover, in the process of conducting research for the report, Kazantzis and her
co‐authors interviewed people who had already been engaged “on the ground” in ordinance
work, and they began speaking with people like CRC’s Liana Molina. These conversations got
Kazantzis excited about doing additional work on payday lending.198 When SVCF’s RFP came
out in June 2009, the Law Foundation was eager to submit a proposal.
On October 15, 2009, SVCF announced its first round of grants for anti‐payday lending policy
advocacy and made three awards totaling over $400,000, the largest of which went to the Law
Foundation.199 The purpose of the $255,000 grant to the Law Foundation was to “establish a
San Jose anti‐payday lending coalition” that would educate, mobilize, and advocate “for public
policy that addresses the growth of payday lenders in low‐ and moderate‐income
neighborhoods and communities of color.”200 The resulting coalition engaged in a three‐year
campaign that culminated in the passage of a payday lending ordinance in San Jose as well as
several other key jurisdictions in Santa Clara County.
The table below describes SVCF’s extensive grant‐making with respect to anti‐payday lending
reform for the 2009‐2016 period.
Figure 3: Grantees in SVCF Anti‐Payday Lending Program by Year and Total
GRANTEE
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$255,000 $200,000 $250,000 $250,000 $238,500 $237,000 $250,000 $1,680,500
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$65,000

$115,000

$125,000 $125,000 $125,000 $125,000 $500,000

$427,000 $500,000 $460,000 $581,000 $673,500 $767,000 $760,000 $4,168,500

Source: Silicon Valley Community Foundation

Shaping the Coalition that Would Move San Jose
Facilitated by the financial resources and engagement of SVCF, the Law Foundation (in the form
of its Public Interest Law Firm), with strong involvement from the California Reinvestment
Coalition, was able to pull off a textbook example of community organizing. It involved building
a campaign organization and generating support from other organizations, influencing public
opinion, and participating in the policy‐making process of city governments.
The centerpiece of the campaign was the creation of the Coalition Against Payday Predators, or
CAPP. Under the auspices of the Law Foundation, CAPP formed an alliance of community
organizations that were based in or worked extensively in Santa Clara County. Eventually, there
were eleven core members, all of whom received direct or indirect funding from SVCF’s
Economic Security program at one point during the 2009‐2012 period.201 CAPP’s leaders also
built up a list of more than thirty “organizational endorsers.” These endorsers added legitimacy
to the campaign and, at key points, political clout as well. They added legitimacy by virtue of
the diverse constituencies they represented, including Latinos, African Americans, the elderly,
religious organizations and labor unions. The endorsers added political clout by helping to find
individuals who had experienced the dangers of payday lending and were willing to speak out
as well as take part in teams of ordinance supporters to meet with individual members of the
San Jose City Council.
James Zahradka, an attorney at the Law Foundation between 2001 and 2015, believes that his
organization’s ability to successfully manage a broad coalition was predictable but not
guaranteed. The Law Foundation’s Public Interest Law Firm had pre‐existing relationships with
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many of the eventual core members of CAPP, including Alliance for Californians for Community
Empowerment, the Asian Law Alliance, and Sacred Heart Community Services.202 These prior
alliances allowed CAPP to develop organically. Nevertheless, the Law Foundation’s core skill
was litigation. It embraced public policy advocacy, but it had never led a coalition before.203
In the process of gaining organizational endorsers, the effort to gain the support of La Raza
Roundtable de California (Roundtable) for an ordinance in San Jose was particularly important
and challenging. Every community has its influential non‐governmental groups, and in San Jose,
The Roundtable was one. Thirty‐three percent of San Jose’s residents are Latino, but equally
important, there is a strong identification with the life of Cesar Chavez among many of San
Jose’s older Latino political leaders. Chavez lived in San Jose as a teenager and young adult, and
he began his career as a community organizer there. As a result, the political positions of the La
Raza Roundtable carry considerable practical and symbolic weight in San Jose.
The goal of the Roundtable is to improve the quality of life for Chicanos, and it aims to do so in
an inclusive fashion that welcomes all people.204 It meets every month on a Friday night.
According to Kyra Kazantzis of the Law Foundation, “It’s a huge meeting with perhaps seventy
people in attendance. The police chief is there. The district attorney is there. Five city council
members are there.”205 Anyone is welcome to attend and speak, but you can’t just show up
and expect to have credibility. Kyra Kazantzis introduced herself to the Roundtable’s long‐time
chairman, Victor Garza, and began to attend regularly, bringing up the subject of payday
lending at every opportunity. To speak privately with the Roundtable’s board of directors,
Kazantzis enlisted the help of a friend, Deputy District Attorney Chris Arriola. Arriola is a
respected Latino leader in San Jose and was able to open the door to the Roundtable’s board
for Kazantzis, and after hearing from her about the abuses of the industry, especially on low‐
income, communities of color, the Roundtable agreed to sign on as an organizational endorser
of CAPP.
Candidates for San Jose City Council often seek the Roundtable’s stamp of approval. During the
candidate interviews, the Roundtable’s Board would ask questions regarding issues of
importance to the Latinx community. Kazantzis reflected on how this played out with respect
to the anti‐payday lending advocacy campaign:
“It was gold. One of the candidates was asked about payday lending and whether she
supported an ordinance. She said she did, and, ultimately, two years later, she voted for
it. I always thought that the commitment she made to the Roundtable Board solidified
her vote.”.206
The support of the Roundtable continued to be important during the campaign because Manny
Diaz, another Latino leader and a former member of the San Jose City Council, was a registered
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lobbyist for the payday lending trade association, the Community Financial Services Association
of America.207 In addition, the California Hispanic Chamber of Commerce was one of the few
opponents of the ordinance other than the payday industry itself.208
Reaching Beyond the Coalition in the San Jose Campaign
Successful efforts to bring about policy change typically require an “inside game” and an
“outside game.”209 The inside game consists of efforts to directly influence political decision
makers. These methods of persuasion include meeting with government officials and members
of their staffs, providing them with technical reports, and making campaign contributions.
Playing the inside game is greatly enhanced when groups that are seeking policy change have
an “inside champion,” a political decision maker who seeks the same policy change and can
lobby fellow decision makers.210 Just as City Council member Jerry Allen had served as an inside
champion in Dallas; Ash Kalra would play a similar role on the San Jose City Council (Rose Jacobs
Gibson would take on this role on the San Mateo County Board of Supervisors, Mike Guingona
would do likewise on the City Council of Daly City, along with additional political leaders in
other Silicon Valley jurisdictions).
A strong inside game is best complemented by an effective outside game—the education and
mobilization of members of the public. Because public policies typically impose costs on some
segments of societies, political decision makers rarely act until pressed. The role of the outside
game it to create that pressure by changing the public climate in which policy decisions are
made. Most often, the outside game involves creating media content (e.g., creating a website;
buying advertising) or earning media coverage (e.g., television stories, newspaper editorials).
CAPP developed an extensive outside game. By September 2010, it had a website. CAPP’s
outreach efforts also benefited from a focus group study funded by SVCF, commissioned by the
Center for Responsible Lending’s California office, and conducted by the opinion research firm
of Goodwin Simon Strategic Research.211 The study’s results were based on four focus groups
composed of low‐income residents of the greater San Jose area. Three of the focus groups
contained people who had taken out a payday loan within the last year, one group each for
African‐Americans, Latinos (conducted in Spanish), and Anglos. The participants in the fourth
group were mixed‐race and mixed‐ethnicity and had not taken out a payday loan within the last
year, including some people who had never had this type of loan.
The focus group study confirmed that some payday customers feel trapped in a frustrating
cycle of debt, and many payday customers feel shame or embarrassment for not being in better
control of their finances. Yet, the report yielded some surprising results. One was that
borrowers do not appreciate being told that their decision to rely on a high‐cost payday loan
did not make financial sense. They view credit cards as more dangerous than payday loans, and
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they rejected advice in a flyer shown to them that recommended applying for a credit card as
an alternative to relying on a payday loan. Moreover, focus group participants felt that at least
the fees associated with a payday loan were clear at the outset, as opposed to the surprise fees
that many banks levy. Far from being unsophisticated consumers who take out payday loans
because they are a person’s only contact with a financial institution, some borrowers used
online banking to monitor account balances or make bill payments. Finally, many participants
considered the terms of payday loans to be fair and transparent. Almost all of the participants
seemed to know the exact amount of the non‐sufficient‐funds fees charged by banks in the
event of exceeding debit or credit card limits. While some people said they would find other
ways of managing their finances if payday loans were banned, others were not sure how they
would cope.
From the point of view of CAPP’s leaders, the most important take‐away from the focus groups
is that payday borrowers are more sophisticated than generally believed and are likely to resent
any portrayal of them as being “ignorant pawns” of the payday lenders. They admit to holding
negative views of people who rely on payday loans, but they do not want others to judge them
badly on this basis because they take out payday loans when they are desperate and perceive
no better alternatives. CAPP would soon modify its messaging in light of the focus group
findings. Rather than emphasizing borrower victimization, CAPP framed its message in terms of
the right of all people to healthy and safe financial products.212
A second study conducted for CRL by Goodwin and Simon in November 2010 revealed that half
the members of a sample of registered voters in San Jose supported tighter regulation of
payday loan stores, but if CAPP’s goal was to push public opinion further in the direction of
supporting a payday ordinance in San Jose, CAPP would have to rely on messages carried in the
mass media.213 To this end, representatives of CAPP, including Kazantzis and Paul Leonard of
the Center for Responsible Lending, met with the editorial board of San Jose’s major daily
newspaper, the San Jose Mercury News, and contacted its reporters. Cause and effect is
difficult to unravel, but CAPP found a receptive audience at the paper. Reporter Karen de Sá
covered the campaign to pass an ordinance in San Jose, although her stories often spent more
space addressing the power of payday lenders in the state legislature than developments in San
Jose.214 The editorial board at the newspaper weighed in unequivocally in favor of a strong
ordinance—twice before its passage and once immediately after it.215 In the second editorial,
the newspaper urged the city council to go beyond the distance requirements being considered
by the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors and enact a numerical cap on the lenders. It
wrote: “San Jose has 38 of them. That is more than enough.”216
Local television news programs also devoted time to the San Jose ordinance process. A
December 17, 2010 story on KCBS‐TV about a discussion of payday lending by the Rules
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Committee of the San Jose City Council began: “We’ve told you about them before—predatory
lenders who promise payday loans to low‐income people only to charge some massive fees,
and there’s been a huge influx of those businesses into San Jose recently.” 217 The story
included interviews with three payday borrowers, several of whom testified to the cyclical
nature of payday loans—taking out a new one to pay off a previous one. The story attributed
the phrase “legalized loansharking” to San Jose Mayor Chuck Reed as a descriptor of payday
lending.
Engaging in the Policy‐Making Process in San Jose
Many smaller cities in the Bay Area are governed by a five‐person city council, with the position
of mayor rotating among the council members. In contrast, San Jose has a “council‐manager”
form of government. There are eleven members of the city council, ten of whom are elected in
districts. The eleventh member of the council is the mayor, who is elected city‐wide. Terms of
office for all members of the council, including the mayor, are four years, with a limit of two
consecutive terms. In late 2010 when the city of San Jose began to address in earnest a
possible payday lending ordinance, Mayor Chuck Reed was beginning his second term in office.
Ash Kalra, who was to serve as the ordinance’s strongest support on the council, was in the
middle of his first term in 2010.218
The leaders of CAPP had used most of 2010 to get their alliance organized and obtain the
endorsements of key community groups. In December, it was time for CAPP to begin its inside
game and participate directly in the policy‐making process.219 The issue at hand was whether
the City of San Jose would apply for a request for proposals issued by SVCF. Time was short
because the deadline for submissions was January 5, 2011. On December 9, 2010, Kalra and
newly‐elected councilmember Xavier Campos addressed a memo to the mayor and city council
recommending an application be submitted.220 If funded, city staff members would be directed
to draft an ordinance that would establish a moratorium on permits or licenses for additional
payday lenders. In addition, the funding would cover the expense of city staffers drafting an
ordinance that would require the issuance of a special use permit prior to the establishment of
any new payday loan businesses; enact distance and density restrictions; require greater
disclosure of payday loan terms to potential borrowers; set minimal security and anti‐blight
measures; and limit hours of operation. Finally, the grant would also be used to coordinate and
conduct an outreach process with key stakeholders.
The memo would be discussed at the December 15 meeting of the City Council’s Rules and
Good Government Committee. CAPP issued an action alert to its members, encouraging them
to attend the afternoon meeting or contact members of the Rules Committee by phone or
mail.221 At the meeting itself, three of CAPP’s core members who fund or provide direct
services to thousands of low‐income families (United Way Silicon Valley, Catholic Charities of
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Santa Clara County, and Sacred Heart Community Service) spoke in favor of the grant, as did
two payday borrowers.222 In light of this support, the members of the Rules Committee voted
to apply for an SVCF grant.
Mike Cassidy, a columnist for the San Jose Mercury News, congratulated the city council for its
decision. He wrote: “The city is taking baby steps. But even talking about enacting restrictions
has raised the profile of payday loans and the fiscal havoc they wreak. And maybe the city can
adopt its own New Year's resolution: Get that grant and get to work.”223 Not everyone was so
pleased. Mayor Reed received at least one letter of protest. Along with calling for an
investigation of SVCF and insulting councilmembers Kalra, Liccardo and Campos, the letter
writer insulted borrowers as well, asking: “Should San Jose rescue the stupid?”224
On March 16, 2011, SVCF announced a grant of $50,000 to the City of San Jose for the purpose
of conducting research on the development of a local ordinance that would regulate the
location of payday lending establishments.225 Although accepting the grant did not commit city
leaders to passing an ordinance, it certainly increased the likelihood of one passing. Whereas
the City’s grant proposal had identified July‐December 2011 as the timeframe during which
grant activities would be carried out, the city’s managers asked SVCF for an adjusted timetable.
Under the new schedule, work would begin in August 2011 and last until February 2012.226
One interpretation of the delay was that the commitment of the city council to the grant had
been weakened by industry lobbying. Manny Diaz, a former San Jose city councilmember and
state assembly member, was then working as a registered lobbyist for the Community Financial
Services Association of America. During January, Diaz met, typically more than once, with eight
of the ten city councilmembers as well as staffers for the mayor and city manager.227
Councilmember Ash Kalra, a strong supporter of the grant and the ordinance, provided a less
nefarious explanation for the delay. It was simply attributable to higher priority matters that
had been officially set for city staff in February and the uncertain impacts of likely budget
cuts.228 Kalra reported that support for the ordinance remained strong. In either event, SVCF
granted the city’s request to delay working on the grant until August 2011.
CAPP members wanted to make sure that when the City of San Jose revisited its top priorities in
August, consideration of a payday lending ordinance would be considered urgent. At the
August 30, 2011 meeting of the San Jose City Council, representatives of several CAPP member
organizations offered public comments. These people were: Richard Konda of the Asian Law
Alliance; Liana Molina of the California Reinvestment Coalition; Steve Preminger of the South
Bay Labor Council; Ricky Alexander of Sacred Heart Community Services; and Kyra Kazantzis
from the Law Foundation of Silicon Valley.229 The City Council then voted to add three issues to
its “top ten,” and payday lending was one of the three.230
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Before an ordinance could be passed, CAPP organizers knew, they would have to make their
case in front of San Jose Planning Commission and then the City Council. In preparation, they
focused on three strategies: finding borrowers who were willing to speak about their problems
with payday loans in a highly public setting, rebutting industry arguments about the need for
payday loans, and pressing their case in meetings with city councilmembers.
Finding payday borrowers was relatively easy for CAPP; getting them to agree to tell their
stories in public was a bigger challenge. Two members of CAPP—Sacred Heart Community
Services and Somos Mayfair—were especially helpful in identifying payday borrowers. Christian
Luna, a program manager at Sacred Heart, explained how the process worked. Sacred Heart,
like Somos Mayfair and several other CAPP members, is a non‐profit social service organization
that provides essential services for individuals and families in need and tries to put them on the
path to economic self‐sufficiency. As part of its financial education classes, clients filled out
pre‐ and post‐questionnaires to assess learning. Luna added a question to the pre‐class survey:
Do you or anybody you know have any experience with payday loans?231 A few months passed
before Luna analyzed the results. He was surprised to find that a quarter or more of their
workshop participants answered in the affirmative. He said: “So we knew that payday lending
was a significant issue, something that definitely impacted our base of clients at Sacred Heart.
We realized that it was something that we could definitely begin getting more deeply involved
in, and we partnered up with the Law Foundation to figure out what our next steps should
be.”232
Once payday users were identified among Sacred Heart’s clients, Luna would ask them whether
they would be willing to talk about it. If they were, they met with a community organizer, Ricky
Alexander, who helped prepare them to share their testimony.
On paper, the process of recruiting people to speak in public about their experience with
payday loans sounds simple, but the process was challenging and extremely time consuming.
The focus group research conducted for CRL showed that borrowers, even when they did not
blame themselves for taking out payday loans, know that other people think they are stupid or
irresponsible for doing so. Borrowers realize there is a stigma attached to taking out a payday
loan, taking months to repay it, and racking up huge fees and interest payments. Other
potential “witnesses” to the ravages of payday loans were afraid to speak in public because
English was not their first language. Thus, it took considerable time for community organizers
such as Ricky Alexander to help clients feel comfortable with the idea of testifying at a city
forum.
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Planning Commission Testimony in San Jose
CAPP’s efforts to recruit and prepare borrowers to speak publicly about their negative
experiences with payday loans resulted in testimony at city government meetings in San Jose
and elsewhere. At the April 25, 2012 meeting of the San Jose Planning Commission, Ricky
Alexander led off by describing the efforts made by Sacred Heart to fight poverty through
financial education and assistance in finding a job. He said:
We work with families to help them repair their credit . . . when we hear that families
have taken out payday loans in the past and regret the experience. We are doing our
part. We are even engaging families in advocacy so they have the opportunity to make
their voices and experiences known as you'll hear tonight. Tonight is [about] what
you're able to do. Knowing predatory practices happen in our own backyard what are
you going to do about it?233
Alexander’s testimony was followed by that of Evelyn Bonado and Shane Randolph Virtue, both
of whom described the pitfalls and high cost of payday lending.234 Matt King, a community
involvement advocate at Sacred Heart, read a statement from a bar owner named Maurice,
who felt “too much shame to come out and tell his story.”235 Maurice told of using a payday
loan to cover some bills and then getting a succession of loans to cover the previous ones. His
testimony continued:
When I was finally able to secure a few hours of part time work, the payday shops went
into my bank account, without notifying me, and took the money I had to pay back the
loan I owed. Instead of offering me a reasonable payment plan with incremental
payments they raided my account when I was finally getting back up on my feet. I was
broke all over again.236
In support of an ordinance, the Commission also heard from representatives of core
organizations in CAPP that, like Sacred Heart, work directly with the people who are most likely
to borrow from payday lenders. These speakers were: Step‐Up Silicon Valley/Catholic Charities
of Santa Clara County, Alliance of Californians for Community Empowerment, Community
Homeless Alliance Ministry, and Working Partnerships USA.
In total, about thirty people spoke in support of an ordinance. Two were especially
noteworthy. Pat Krackov spoke on behalf of SVCF, signaling the foundation’s willingness to
lobby alongside its grantees in support of Silicon Valley’s low‐income communities. Another
was Karyn Sinunu‐Towery, assistant district attorney for the County of Santa Clara.237 Sinunu‐
Towery urged adoption of a cap on the number of payday loan outlets in San Jose. Members of
the Planning Commission took note of the participation of the assistant district attorney.
Commissioner Norman Kline commented: “It is not very common for us to get a letter from our
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District Attorney. It's not very common for our District Attorney representative [to be] talking
here about land use issues.”238 Kyra Kazantzis of the Law Foundation observed that the
members of the Planning Commission treated Sinunu‐Towery with deference and concluded
that the county’s support of an ordinance was “huge.”239
In terms of justifying an ordinance, supporters drew attention to the high cost of payday loans
and the “cycle of debt” into which many borrowers become trapped. Payday loan fees and
interest rates were described as “exorbitant” and “unconscionable.” None of the witnesses
cited blight, decline in property values, crime, or other negative spillovers/secondary effects of
payday loan establishment as the rationale for their support of an ordinance, instead their
arguments were based on empathy with borrowers rather than community economics.
The people who spoke against payday lending and for an ordinance were important because
there were three speakers who defended the industry as well—all employees or owners of
payday stores. There were no lobbyists for the industry as a whole, although the Community
Financial Services Association of America submitted a comment letter a day prior to the
hearing.240
Those who spoke in opposition to an ordinance made a variety of arguments. The opponents
pointed out that taking out a payday loan can be less expensive than bouncing a check. They
argued that payday lenders are employers, so curtailing these lenders would cause job losses.
Their most fundamental point was that payday loans meet a consumer need. They help people
cope with financial hardship when they have no other options. If payday loans become less
available, what alternatives will be available?
The issue of payday loan alternatives was a legitimate one, so much so that SVCF and the
members of CAPP had been developing a response to it from the beginning of their campaign.
In December 2010, SVCF co‐sponsored with the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco a
conference for leaders of financial institutions, social service agencies, policy institutions and
government to learn about payday loans and alternative products.241 Later that month,
Emmett Carson, SVCF’s president and CEO, discussed payday loan alternatives on the Bay
Area’s main public radio station, KQED, describing what a payday loan is and then explaining
that while the loans are not bad in concept, “predatory payday loans charge exorbitant interest
rates, upward of 400‐500%, which we believe at the Community Foundation are usurious.“242
In the immediate run‐up to the discussion of a possible ordinance by the San Jose Planning
Commission and City Council, CAPP ran a public forum called “When Cash Runs Out: Discussing
the Alternatives.”243 These activities identified a wide range of short‐term loans from credit
union and employers; lending circles; bill forbearance programs run by utility companies; and
borrowing from friends or family; along with longer‐term options (e.g., financial education,
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increase in the minimum wage, and creating emergency savings). At the hearing, ordinance
supporters were able to state confidently that alternatives to payday loans existed.
Overall at the hearing, supporters of an ordinance outnumbered opponents by a ratio of at
least 5 to 1. With the preponderance of speakers favoring an ordinance, some commenters
spoke to the specific features an ordinance might contain. Two issues received particular
attention. One was the minimum distance that would separate payday lenders from each other
and from sensitive users such as churches and residences. Several speakers urged that the
ordinance go beyond the 500 feet minimum found in some ordinances, such as Oakland’s, in
favor of a distance of 1000 or 1320 feet (a quarter mile). A second issue was whether the
number of lenders should have a numerical cap and, if so, at what level. Some speakers
supported a cap that reflected the current number of lenders in San Jose (38), while others
recommended a cap in the range of 20 or 25 so that the number of lenders would decline when
stores moved or closed. Kyra Kazantzis of the Law Foundation described a cap as the “gold
standard across the country,” although it was something that other cities in California had not
done yet.244
At the end of the discussion, the members of the Planning Commission voted 6‐0‐1 to
recommend to the City Council approval of a proposed ordinance that would require new
payday loan establishments to be separated by a quarter mile from another payday lender or
from any low‐income census tract. The initial motion, made by Commissioner Hope Cahan,
would have capped the number of establishments at twenty and imposed an immediate
moratorium on the approval of any new establishments, but these two features created
resistance from some commissioners. In the end, the Planning Commission recommended that
its staff provide information to the City Council that would help it decide whether to establish a
limit on the number of payday lending establishments. The Commission was silent on the
option of a moratorium.245
San Jose City Council Meeting
The San Jose City Council was scheduled to meet on May 15, 2012, to consider the final
ordinance. Five days earlier, the Mayor and the Council received a memo from Joseph
Horwedel, director of planning, building, and code enforcement for the city, addressing the
unresolved question of whether to include a limit or cap on the total number of payday lending
establishments in San Jose. The memo recommended against a cap, beginning with the
observation that “no other city of comparable size in the State of California or in the nation
currently imposes a specific limit (or “cap”) on the number of payday lenders within their
jurisdiction.”246 The memo expressed the view that an ordinance without a cap would be
sufficient to address problems related to the location of payday lenders. The memo also
cautioned that “imposing a cap will create a new and unique regulatory/monitoring process
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that will require additional staffing resources.”247 A final reason for opposing a cap could have
been read as an indictment of the whole idea of an ordinance:
A cap will reduce potential competition within the payday lending industry and thereby
reduce economic pressure that could lead to reduced rates or fees for payday loans.
Establishing a cap will potentially raise the value of existing payday lending businesses
and thus promote their long term economic viability.248
If the Council nonetheless decided to include a cap in the ordinance, the memo pointed out
that four options existed: a cap at the current number of lenders (thirty‐eight), a cap above that
number, a cap below that number, or a density limitation on the number of lenders per capita.
In the weeks and months leading up to the May 15 meeting of the City Council, members of
CAPP had attempted to meet with as many members of the Council (and their staff) as possible.
By virtue of the breadth of the coalition, CAPP was typically able to bring a group of people,
each selected because of his or her potential to be persuasive to a particular councilmember.
For example, citizens who lived in a councilmember’s district were preferred to citizens who
lived outside it. For some councilmembers, representatives of organized labor might be most
appropriate; for others, people of a particular ethnicity, race, or social class might be especially
appropriate. CAPP’s members knew that the votes of several councilmembers were certain to
be cast in favor of an ordinance, but Councilmember Kalra was limited in his ability to provide
inside intelligence to his allies in CAPP. The state’s Brown Act sets a limit on the number of
people who may be present at informal, behind‐the‐scenes meetings involving elected
officials.249 As a result, ordinance supporters remained anxious as the meeting of the City
Council was called to order.
The payday ordinance was not considered until after a long list of less controversial matters.
Councilmember Kalra moved for approval of the ordinance as recommended by the Planning
Commission with one exception. The ordinance would include a cap of thirty‐nine on the
number of payday lenders in the city. Councilmember Campos seconded the motion.250 Next,
came the public comment portion of the meeting. The minutes of the meeting indicate that
forty‐four people expressed support for the ordinance, the majority of these people having an
affiliation with one of the organizations in CAPP. The minutes provide the names of eight
people who opposed the ordinance. The minutes also note five hundred letters submitted for
the record in opposition to the ordinance, all dated that day.
Discussion among the councilmembers was brief. The final vote was 9‐1‐1, with
Councilmember Pete Constant voting no, and Councilmember Rose Herrera being absent. The
minimum distance separating payday loan establishments from each other was 1,320 feet. In
two other respects, the final ordinance was unprecedented. Not only did San Jose become the
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only city of its size to impose a cap on the number of payday lenders, but it was also the first to
prevent new payday lending businesses from opening in or near the boundaries of a census
tract of the city designated as “very low income” based on median household income.251
Councilmember Kalra described the city’s decision as a response to the inaction of the state
legislature, and he and other councilmembers hoped that their stance on the payday issue
would send a clear message to state leaders.252
To drive home the anti‐payday loan message in San Jose, CAPP purchased advertisements on
the sides of buses that circulated throughout Santa Clara County. The ads were printed in
various combinations of English and Spanish.253 An example is found below.
Figure 4: CAPP Side‐of‐Bus Messages in San Jose

Image courtesy of Kyra Kazantis
Using images from the same artist, CAPP also distributed brochures in English and Spanish that
explain how payday loans work, how they create a cycle of debt, how to cope with a financial
emergency without resorting to a payday loan, and how to develop a long‐term savings plan.

Youth‐Led Campaigns in Daly City and South San Francisco
One of the more unique approaches supported by SVCF’s anti‐payday lending work was its
support of two organizations that build skills of low‐income, at‐risk young people through
leadership development programs so that they can help create more equitable communities.
The organizations—Mission SF Community Financial Center (now named MyPath) and the
Youth Leadership Institute, or YLI—view young people as “the most effective social architects”
of social change.”254 Youth development includes the ability to work with peers and adults,
including local elected officials.
YLI was the lead organizer of the youth‐led ordinance campaigns in Daly City and South San
Francisco. Since 1991, youth involved in YLI have identified and tackled significant problems in
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their communities. In 2012, YLI youth were in the midst of a project focused on gambling
addiction among young people. That year, a group of YLI members from a primarily Filipino
neighborhood in Daly City conducted research in a casino. They initially were interested in
finding ways in which young people, especially Filipinos, were being targeted by gambling
establishments, but they stumbled onto a payday lending machine inside the casino which
offered payday loans through pre‐paid debit cards.255 Fahad Qurashi, a senior director at YLI
who was in the casino with the YLI young people, reported:
The youth were flabbergasted. They were thinking, what is this thing? It’s not an ATM,
that’s for sure. There was a bad feeling to it. It just felt like something was up with this.
This doesn’t seem right. There wasn’t even human interaction in order to get that
money fronted.256
Motivated by their encounter with the novel machine, members of YLI became interested in
launching a campaign to learn more about payday loans and their connection to problem
gambling. After an unsuccessful effort to pull together a grant application to SVCF in 2012, YLI
received a grant of $125,000 in 2013.257 The purpose of the grant was to “support youth‐led
advocacy efforts against payday lenders in Daly City and to train new youth leaders in La
Honda/Pescadero and South San Francisco that will form part of a statewide anti‐payday‐
lending coalition.” 258 According to Qurashi, the grant was transformative for YLI inasmuch as
the resources for a campaign would be available up front as opposed to the more typical
situation of having to do a lot of work, put in a lot of time, and show accomplishments before
getting any funding. YLI greatly appreciated the show of confidence by SVCF.259
Organizing Model for Daly City and South San Francisco
The organizing model was largely the same for Daly City and South San Francisco. First, young
people would meet with experts on payday lending to become better informed. One such
expert was Tim Lohrentz of the Insight Center, who had recently prepared two important
documents. In March 2013, Lohrentz published an analysis of the net economic impact of the
payday lending industry in the United States, where he concluded that despite the economic
benefits of the industry in terms of employee compensation, taxes paid, owner income, and the
like, the overall national impact of the industry was a net loss of $774 million and a net loss of
over fourteen thousand jobs.260 YLI campaigners extrapolated that there was a roughly $50,000
annual economic loss associated with each payday lender in Daly City.
In June 2013, Lohrentz published, Tools for Advocates of Limiting Payday Lending.261 The
report, funded by SVCF, included a detailed comparison of census tracts in Daly City with and
without payday lending establishments.262 The comparison revealed that the census tracts with
lenders had lower incomes, education, and homeownership rates, and higher percentages of
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Hispanic/Latino residents than tracts with no payday lenders. Readers are meant to conclude
that payday lenders target people with particular characteristics.263
Next, the YLI youth conducted their own observational assessment, making note of how many
payday lenders existed in their community and where they were located. The youth also
conducted a community survey in which they asked people whether they knew what a payday
loan was, and if they did know, how much the loans cost. Respondents were also asked if they
would support a city ordinance that restricted payday lending. Most of the approximately two
hundred survey respondents were recruited on Mission Boulevard, the main corridor in which
payday lenders are located and the area of Daly City where many of the YLI youth lived. The
survey results were likely subject to interviewer bias, but the overall findings of general lack of
knowledge of the payday loan product was consistent with other research on this topic.264 The
survey also yielded a key lobbying tool: the claim that 80% of respondents supported increased
regulation of payday lending.
In September 2013, YLI youth made their first appearance before the City Council. They took
only two minutes of the Council’s time, but submitted their economic impact analysis and
survey research results. They also asked for the city to implement an ordinance that would
stop payday lenders from opening within a one‐mile radius of schools and low‐income
communities.265
In October 2013, shortly after YLI’s appearance before the city council in Daly City, an event
took place that helped spread the anti‐payday activism beyond Daly City. It was the launch of
the School for Financial and Economic Justice. The purpose of this three‐day class was to
convene and train youth leaders from across San Mateo County. By emphasizing the history of
predatory and discriminatory financial practices, the presenters aimed at agitating the students
enough that they would want to fight for reforms. To that end, the school emphasized a train‐
the‐trainer model whereby participants would be able to transmit not only their knowledge but
also their passion to other young people.266 Several of the youth trainers were from Daly City,
where they had already gained some experience and media attention.267 There was also a
group of students from the nearby city of South San Francisco who knew some of the young
people from Daly City. According to Qurashi, the youth from South San Francisco came to the
training because their friends in Daly City told them there was going to be food and the
opportunity to stay for free in a hotel for two nights, away from parents. While many of the
attendees may have attended for “some good pizza,” Qurashi recalled, they left the school
“super‐hungry” for social change because they and their families are the ones most affected by
predatory lending.268
Daly City Political Dynamics
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Back in Daly City, YLI met with city officials to advance the idea of an ordinance. They arranged
meetings not only with the five city councilmembers (one of whom served as mayor) but also
with the city attorney and the city manager. The YLI youth came to these meetings ready to
discuss the economic impact study and the community survey. The economic analysis was
particularly important when lobbying the city manager, who, according to Qurashi, holds a lot
of power in small cities such as Daly City.269 Nevertheless, it is the city council that makes the
final decision on whether an ordinance will be enacted, and the dynamics on the council were
complex. The main issue was who on the council would be the ordinance’s main champion and
therefore get credit for its passage.
Councilmember David Canepa had introduced the legislation in May 2011 to ban permanently
any new payday loan companies from specified areas in Daly City and set minimum distances
between each lender.270 His proposed ordinance also called for a partnership between Daly
City and local credit unions to offer short‐term loans at interest rates far below those charged
by payday lenders. Canepa reported that pushback from payday industry lobbyists was almost
immediate.271 The city’s planning commission supported the proposed restrictions, but without
any effort by Canepa to mobilize citizens, the ordinance was not enacted by the city council.
When it came time in 2014 for YLI youth to identify a member of the city council to champion a
payday ordinance, they were faced with a difficult choice. Canepa was mayor at the time and
appeared to have better access to the media, but the youth felt that another councilmember,
Mike Guingona, was more likely than Canepa to work with youth as equal partners.272 The
young people opted for Guingona, a choice that annoyed Canepa and exacerbated a budding
rivalry between Guingona and Canepa, both of whom, according to Qurashi, had their eyes on a
seat on the San Mateo County Board of Supervisors.273 Not choosing Canepa created a danger
that he would quash the policy or at least proceed without involving or acknowledging YLI.
Guingona coached the members of YLI about meeting with his fellow councilmembers. He told
them:
Have a meeting with every single one of the council members on your own without me.
And do what we do. . . . Start counting votes. At the end of your meeting with these
people you have to say, "Will you support it?" And they have to tell you yes or no,
because when you get in front of them in public, you're going to reference a prior
discussion that you had with them in public.274
Guingona cautioned the young people not to use his support of an ordinance as a talking point
in their favor. He said that the Council is politically divided, so they needed to line up at least
two other supporters before he would exercise inside leadership. Until then, he provided
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strong but quiet mentoring to YLI, especially on how to counter arguments that an ordinance
was unnecessary or should be a matter of state or federal action.275
The prospect for an ordinance improved markedly in June 2014 when the city’s Planning
Commission voted 5‐0 to forward a proposal to the City Council with a recommendation for
approval. The ordinance was modest. It would require a one thousand foot minimum distance
between new payday lending establishments and existing ones.276
Along with Qurashi, the youth members of YLI turned out in force at the July 14, 2014 public
hearing for the ordinance. The YLI contingent dressed nicely for the occasion. Qurashi, wearing
a suit, introduced himself to another well‐dressed gentleman who turned out to be a lobbyist
for the payday industry. By the time the hearing began, the gentleman was gone, which Qurashi
attributes in part to the vibrant presence of the youth. In addition to Qurashi, eight members
of YLI’s youth addressed the City Council.
An additional ordinance supporter, Jessica Martinez‐Escobar of the California Reinvestment
Coalition, urged the Council to strengthen the ordinance further by requiring a conditional use
permit for new establishments and increasing the locational separation to 1,320 feet.277
Appropriately for a story that started in a casino, Councilmember Sal Torres saw the 1,320 feet
increase and raised it to 2,000.278 After review by the city attorney, the ordinance requiring a
2,000 foot buffer between lending establishments passed unanimously at the August 11
meeting of the City Council.279 This became one of the strongest distance restrictions in
California. In navigating the tension between councilmembers Canepa and Guingona, the youth
learned valuable lessons about politics because the support of both men was likely needed to
gain passage of the ordinance.
Spillover to South San Francisco
YLI youth from South San Francisco attended the crucial July City Council meeting in Daly City.
According to Qurashi, “They were watching, they were examining, they were learning. And
then in two months, they flipped it in South City.”280 In other words, these youth took the
lessons learned in Daly City and succeeded in convincing the South San Francisco City Council to
pass a similar ordinance on October 22, 2014. The victory was tempered in two respects,
however. First, YLI’s members were disappointed that the distance requirement was only a
thousand feet compared to two thousand in Daly City. 281 Second, YLI youth got the impression
that the motivation for the ordinance was less about protecting low‐income citizens from
predatory lending practices than it was about making South San Francisco attractive to high‐
tech companies and their employees.282 Despite that, the South San Francisco ordinance
limited the hours of operation of payday lending establishments to 7 a.m. until 7 p.m.,
something the Daly City ordinance did not include.283
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The experiences of Daly City and South San Francisco demonstrate that a youth organization
can, with adequate funding and involvement from SVCF, make an enormous difference in
passing political reforms. Perhaps equally important, organizations like YLI can transform the
lives of at‐risk youth and turn them into community activists and leaders, all while also
changing the law for the rest of society. When interviewing Qurashi, we asked whether the
most troubled youth were simply not up for the challenge of organizing. He responded that
those were the very youth that YLI sought to engage, retain, and, ultimately, transform.284

The Work Continues
As of October, 2016, sixteen zoning‐type moratoria or ordinances had been passed in the two
counties comprising Silicon Valley. In 2015, CAPP’s efforts in Santa Clara County were rewarded
with new ordinances in Campbell and Morgan Hill. In 2016, CAPP helped secure a moratorium
in Cupertino and is currently seeking a permanent ordinance. In San Mateo County, the Youth
Leadership Institute (YLI) and Community Legal Services of East Palo Alto are currently working
toward ordinances in Pacifica and Half Moon Bay. The timeline below summarizes ordinances
in Silicon Valley.
Figure 5: Timeline of Silicon Valley Payday Ordinances
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Several SVCF grantees have taken lessons learned in Silicon Valley to other California cities.
Most notably, the California Reinvestment Coalition and YLI have helped enact ordinances in
Long Beach (2013) and Fresno (2014), respectively. In Berkeley, the Planning Commission has
been considering a payday ordinance based on the San Jose model.285
SVCF’s advocacy on payday lending has also made an impact at the national level, by leveraging
their network of community foundations across the country to join together in urging the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to adopt tougher standards to curb harmful
payday lending practices. Erica Wood, SVCF’s chief community impact officer, emphasized the
important role community foundations can play in advocacy work. “Issues like payday lending
that greatly impact our communities require a multi‐faceted approach to create lasting
change. We can’t just rely on funding. We have to be actively pursuing public policy advocacy
efforts at the local, state and national levels.”286
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IV. The Metropolitan Dallas Experience: Passion, Perseverance,
and Collaboration
Introduction to Dallas‐Area Campaigns
Beginning in the mid‐2000s, Texas became a hotbed of payday lending activity. According to
Ann Baddour of Texas Appleseed, a nonprofit organization devoted to social and economic
justice, in 2004 most payday lenders were operating with the “rent‐a‐bank” model—licensed by
the state, but evading state usury laws. After 2004, they all migrated to the CSO model
(described further below) due to FDIC rules limiting consumer indebtedness to payday loans
offered by banks. According to Texas state records, using this CSO model, payday loan stores
increased from 1,303 in 2004 to about three thousand in 2011.287
By 2008, Texas was becoming a hotbed of local anti‐payday lending ordinances as well.288
Religious congregations, charities, and other nonprofits in Texas saw an uptick in requests for
financial assistance (or “benevolence”) from consumers who could not pay both their payday
loans and their regular monthly expenses. This galvanized religious groups and nonprofits to
organize into a diverse coalition and take strong unified action to curb payday loan abuses.
As in Salt Lake County and the San Francisco Bay Area, efforts in the Dallas area to enact payday
loan ordinances were spurred by a perceived lack of meaningful state or federal regulation to
address a growing social problem. As one interviewee explained, the community needed to act
locally because the industry’s lobbying money was “too concentrated at the state level. At the
local level, you can cut through that.”289
The first local payday loan ordinances in Texas were zoning ordinances like those in California
and Utah, but in 2011, the city of Dallas passed a substantive regulation that limited the terms
of these loans.290 Among other provisions, the ordinance capped the number of times a loan
could be renewed or paid in installment, and it required that the proceeds of any renewal
payment reduce the original loan principal by at least 25%. Ignited by the action in Dallas,
similar substantive regulations spread like wildfire all over Texas. In 2012, three cities including
Dallas had passed these substantive regulatory ordinances.291 By mid‐2016, the number of
cities with similar ordinances had jumped to thirty‐five, the result of a grassroots social
movement.292
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Figure 6: Time of Regulatory Payday Ordinances in State of Texas

This movement, pictured in the Figure 6 above, demonstrates the power of a diverse coalition
to pass a substantive ordinance and then spread it statewide.

Barriers to Reform in the Dallas Metropolitan Area
Local payday lending reform in the Dallas area faced some seemingly formidable barriers. The
number of payday lenders was high, meaning any restrictions were likely to be resisted
strongly. In addition, two of the state’s (and nation’s) largest payday lenders were
headquartered in the Dallas region—ACE Cash Express in Irving and Cash America in Fort
Worth.293 Their economic importance would likely translate into political clout.
As mentioned above, a change in the legal regime for payday lenders accounted for their large
number and rapid growth in Texas after 2004. Prior to that year, many payday lenders in
states, such as Texas, that had usury limits partnered with banks that were incorporated in
states without interest rate limits.294 This “bank‐charter” or “rent‐a‐bank” arrangement was
roundly criticized by consumer advocates as a method of evading state‐level lending
restrictions, and the arrangement came under increasing scrutiny from Texas lawmakers and
federal regulators such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Commission and the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency.295 In response, many payday lenders in Texas gravitated to a new
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business model, one that that allowed lenders to suddenly lend on any basis they liked, without
legal oversight, under a loophole to the state’s 10% usury cap.296
The loophole derived from the ability of a payday lender to register as a Credit Service
Organization (CSO) under Texas law.297 CSOs receive payment for brokering the extension of
credit between a borrower and a lending institution. While the lender itself is subject to the
10% interest rate limit, the CSO is providing a brokering service, not offering a loan, and can
charge any fee it chooses. Once the CSO model was declared legal in 2004 by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals in the case of Lovick v. Ritemoney Ltd., payday lenders gravitated to it. A pro‐
industry website proclaimed: “An important aspect of the CSO or Credit Services Organization
model is that there IS NO LICENSING required by the state! CSO's are required to "REGISTER"
with the Secretary of State, they are NOT licensed, AND THEIR FEES ARE NOT REGULATED.”298

Unique Opportunities for Reform in Texas
Whereas the CSO model enabled the payday lending industry to flourish in Texas, it also
created an opening at the local level for payday lending’s opponents. Cities and other local
jurisdictions were preempted from regulating the lending practices of the companies that
supplied the funds for payday loans, but localities retained the right to set rules for the CSOs.
Moreover, these rules could go beyond zoning, as in Utah, and address the features of the
services provided by CSOs, such as the loan amount, the number of loan rollovers, and the
terms under which the loan can be repaid.
The enormous opportunity for limiting payday lending provided by the CSO model was
amplified by various aspects of Texas legal, political, and religious culture. First, Texas is a
“home rule” state. Under the home rule contained in the Texas constitution, municipalities
with more than 5,000 residents possess “the full power of self‐government” and must look to
the state legislature, not for grants of power, but only for limitations on their powers.299 The
legislature can limit the broad powers of home‐rule cities only explicitly and with unmistakable
clarity. This leaves municipalities in Texas with expansive power to enact local laws and makes it
unlikely that their actions will be preempted by state lawmakers.300
Second, Texas has a strongly populist spirit that disdains big government and holds that
Washington, DC and Austin should stay out of local affairs. This populism crosses the political
spectrum. For example, progressive activist Jim Hightower and conservative ex‐governor Rick
Perry both call themselves populists.301 Whereas home rule permits localities to control payday
lending, populism supports it.
Third, religiosity runs deep in Texas and, in the case of payday lending, helped spur reform.
Whether the Texans interviewed for this study were Catholic, Baptist, Non‐denominational,
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Evangelical, or Jewish, they were uniformly passionate about their faiths and the obligations
that flowed from them to promote social justice. In the predominantly Black churches of
Dallas, social justice played a prominent role in church life, to the point where some churches
had specialized social justice ministers. Danielle Ayers, who serves as Minister of Justice at
Friendship‐West Church in located south of downtown Dallas, explained that the Black
churches have always been an important catalyst for social change, both nationally and in
Texas. In an episode described more fully below, Reverend Gerald Britt, former Senior Pastor
for the New Mount Moriah Missionary Baptist Church in South Dallas and a vice president of
the Dallas nonprofit CitySquare at the time of the payday ordinance campaign there, was able
to get a large number of people to sign a petition in support of a payday loan ordinance as they
left a multi‐church rally.302
The idea that faith should drive political action extended beyond the Baptist churches of South
Dallas. Members of interfaith organizations such as the Dallas Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF)
felt that tackling a social issue through faith would lead to greater faith development.303 Other
faith leaders felt that tackling social issues was a way for a religious organization to stay
relevant with all parishioners but particularly with millennials looking for reasons to stay
affiliated with formal religious organizations. Some religious leaders were bothered by inaction
in the churches in which they grew up and wanted to fight hypocrisy with action, to actually do
something and not just talk about rewards in heaven.304
The social justice implications of faith and justice not only crossed religious congregations and
denominations; it brought these congregations together as well. For example, Wilshire Baptist,
a relatively wealthy Baptist church in a predominantly White North Dallas suburb, teamed with
a Baptist church in predominantly Black South Dallas, Friendship West, to form a strong
multiracial partnership to address social issues and inequalities, including payday lending.
Inclusive religious coalitions also made it possible for the Jewish community to take a stand
against payday lending, even though the issue was one that had little everyday relevance to
many of its relatively affluent members. The breadth and depth of coordination among
different religions and ethnic groups in combatting payday lending was unique to the Texas
experience in our study and chipped away at historical racial and economic divides such as
those between North Dallas and South Dallas.305
Religiously‐based opposition to payday lending had the further advantage of being viewed by
the campaign participants as being non‐political and non‐partisan. Several interviewees felt it
was important to mention that they were political conservatives, a philosophy not typically
associated with government control of business practices. Furthermore, some interviewees
flinched at being called “activists,” a term often associated with liberal social causes. Walker
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Moore, an organizer for Dallas Area Interfaith, said: “We are not activists. We are engaging with
a congregational member who is anti‐this, but he's part of a religious institution, and his
opposition is part of his faith development. If we're in a Catholic Church, its development of
Catholic faith. If it's a Jewish synagogue, it's their Jewish faith.”306
Ann Baddour of Texas Appleseed, also frames opposition to payday lending in completely
apolitical terms:
I wouldn't say we were activists in the traditional sense of the word. This was a real
community‐based call for help. The nonprofits were seeing their investments in the
community drained. Pastors were seeing this as both a moral and a bottom line
issue for their communities and were speaking up. That's what was really driving
the cause—problems that were very real to the organizations in the community as
well as individuals. The word “activist” can lead to connotations that make it seem
like, "Oh, people were just out to do something.” This was really driven by, bottom
line, very real impacts in the community and people trying to find a way to address
a problem.307
Whether by virtue of payday lending’s relationship to faith development or the everyday
problems of communities, the ability to present the issue as non‐political helped support
local reform efforts.
The remainder of this Dallas section describes chronologically the events leading up to the
passage of the various Dallas ordinances, including coalition building, the inside work of Dallas
City Councilmember Jerry Allen, and the role of the media. This discussion is followed by a
description of how the Dallas ordinance spread throughout the state, highlighted by one
example from Denton, Texas. This Dallas section ends with a brief discussion of the strategies
used by advocates and industry.

Components of the Dallas Area Payday Loan Ordinance Movement
When people are asked how the local anti‐payday lending movement got started in Texas, most
people consider Ann Baddour of Texas Appleseed to be the key person. Baddour began working
at Texas Appleseed in 1998. Payday lending first came to her attention in the early 2000s. By
the mid‐2000s, payday and auto title lending had moved up Texas Appleseed’s issue agenda
due to the rapid increase in payday lending in the state associated with the new CSO model.308
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Baddour’s enduring contribution was seeing the possibility of moving beyond zoning as a means
of controlling payday lending. This insight emerged from research Baddour supervised by a
student in the Entrepreneurship and Community Development Clinic at the University of Texas
School of Law. She and the clinic student concluded that Texas city councils had more power to
regulate substantively than most local governments nationally. Baddour shared these findings
with city council members around the state. No one showed much initial interest in using their
local powers to regulate payday lending, that is, until Baddour spoke with Councilman Jerry
Allen of the Dallas City Council in early 2011. Teaming with a coalition of community
organizations, Allen would be instrumental in passing Dallas’ landmark payday lending
ordinance.
Champion within the Dallas City Council: Jerry Allen
To get a local payday loan ordinance passed, there must be leadership within city government.
If no one in City Hall is interested, nothing will happen no matter how much local groups build
support. As Ann Baddour explained, “I can have as many good ideas as I want, but if there is not
someone who has the capacity to implement it, then it will never happen.”309 Jerry Allen played
that role in Dallas.
Before being elected to the Dallas City Council, Allen made his career in the banking industry.
He is a self‐described conservative who wanted people to know that the payday ordinance
movement was not created by “a ‘bunch of crazy liberals.”310 Allen had a long‐standing interest,
however, in helping bridge the gap between the rich and the poor. He grew up in the same
Dallas neighborhood he represented on the City Council, an area with pockets of poverty.
Many of his actions on the Council were directed at alleviating this poverty in his district.
Sixty‐three percent of his district lived in a series of aging multi‐family dwellings, which could
have been torn down, but rather than push for that, he did what he could to reduce crime and
improve education for the area’s residents. As a former banker, Allen was especially interested
in a program called Bank on Dallas that increases financial literacy, promotes traditional banks
as an alternative to payday lenders, and boosts savings rates.
Allen looked forward to a press conference scheduled for the afternoon of June 16, 2010 to
publicize the new program, but a morning event stole the media’s attention. The Dallas City
Council presented an award to the payday lender ACE Cash Express for providing humanitarian
aid via the Red Cross to earthquake victims in Haiti.311 According to the press release of the
event, the $106,000 in relief funding had come from donations provided by ACE’s customers.
For an opponent of payday lending, it might have been hard to take the statement by ACE’s
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President and CEO that the company was “dedicated to giving back to society,” but even harder
to swallow was the proclamation by the City of Dallas praising ACE’s community outreach
efforts.
The press attention devoted to ACE Cash Express’s donation and award diverted attention from
Allen’s Bank on Dallas celebration, which galvanized Allen to fight payday lending. As
Councilman Allen recalled:
When I was doing my Bank On program, of course it's all about the media. We were
going to have a big kickoff at City Hall for the Bank on Dallas program—big kickoff, huge
kickoff—and the day before the kickoff, I get a call from a lobbyist who wanted me to
meet with the ACE check cashing people in the morning, and I said I could not because
we were having a Bank on Dallas celebration.
Well, this is the day I'm having my kickoff at City Hall in the flag room. The mayor's
going to be there and all these folks have been working six months to put this together,
and suddenly that morning, the City of Dallas is giving a proclamation to ACE for being
an outstanding corporate citizen.
At that point in time, it was pretty much game on. You gonna pull that on me, you
gonna do that? Well, then, well guess what? It's show time. You know, we'll take you on
now. And that's really what set the tone. When you pull that, when you pull that, it was
show time.”312
Thus, the clash of events on June 16 became the galvanizing force behind Jerry Allen’s
passionate fight for payday loan reform.313
Building a Coalition
Jerry Allen’s decision in mid‐2010 to use his position on the city council to fight the payday
lending industry took place against a backdrop of growing pressure for reform. A few years
earlier, several cities in the Dallas metropolitan area had used their zoning powers to limit the
growth of payday lenders in their communities. In April, 2009, Texas Appleseed released a
survey of Texas payday borrowers and made several policy recommendations, although passing
local ordinances was not one of them.314 A year later, AARP Texas, along with the Texas NAACP
and the Austin‐based Center for Public Policy Priorities, had launched a campaign based on the
theme that “500% Interest is Wrong.”315 Also during the 2009‐2010 period, newspapers in
Texas, including the Dallas Morning News, ran stories on the payday industry.316
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What Jerry Allen lacked, however, was a local partner who could mobilize grassroots support
for an ordinance and thereby add legitimacy to his cause. Allen’s partner emerged in the fall of
2010 in the form of the Anti‐Poverty Collation of Dallas (APC). The coalition described its goal
as moving 250,000 people out of poverty permanently by 2010 “by coordinating efforts to keep
people from falling into poverty and increasing pathways out of poverty. We are a broad‐based
coalition that unites the business community, faith‐based organizations, social service agencies,
and foundations.”317 The APC did most of the heavy lifting in organizing community support
around the Dallas ordinances. Long‐time community organizer and community leader
Reverend Gerald Britt described this particular coalition as the “longest lasting, most nimble
coalition that I've been a part of when it comes to addressing issues of poverty.”318
Pre‐Coalition Organizing
The coalition started through the efforts of the Dallas area AARP, which began focusing on
payday loan advocacy in 2009 after its leaders were startled to see storefronts popping up
everywhere.319 The AARP regularly educates members on financial security, financial resiliency,
and related health issues, and its leaders began hearing stories about members who were
facing financial difficulty after taking out the loans. Additionally, a survey of nonprofit clients
conducted in collaboration with multiple partners and analyzed by Texas Appleseed showed
that one in five payday lending customers was over fifty.320 As a result, while continuing to work
on other financial security issues, AARP began working closely with Texas Appleseed for state‐
wide reforms. AARP began doing polling, creating videos, and helping to organize and get
borrower stories behind the scene.321
In late 2009 and early 2010, religious groups around Dallas began hearing about the AARP’s
involvement in payday lending education and advocacy and themselves began thinking about
payday lending in the context of overall poverty alleviation strategies.322 Religious
organizations initially got involved when people came to them and said, "I need help paying my
utility bill." The church would help them but then realized that the money they were providing
was really going to a payday lender who would have gone unpaid otherwise. Similarly, social
service grantees of the United Way realized that by helping people with bills, they were really
just helping them to pay their payday lenders. As Stephanie Mace further explained:
A lot of our basic needs service providers have limitations on what they can pay off
for their clients. And so, it's usually limited to utilities, mortgage, things like that. So,
that is how they're able to help a family meet their monthly expenses. The Texas
Catholic Conference actually did a survey of non‐profits that provide financial
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assistance to individuals. They found that 32 or 33% of the clients needing financial
assistance actually have a payday loan too.323
Founding the Anti‐Poverty Coalition
In mid‐2010, these religious groups, along with the United Way and other nonprofits, held
several community meetings to brainstorm about solutions. In the fall, the Jewish Community
Relations Council (JCRC), CitySquare, and the Dallas area United Way founded the Anti‐Poverty
Coalition of Greater Dallas and began holding meetings with other organizations across the
Dallas metro area to discuss general poverty alleviation strategies.324 The AARP was not a
member of this coalition but did help organize meetings. As explained by Susan Williams of the
AARP, her organization along with JCRC, CitySquare, and the United Way, set up the initial
meeting with this strategy in mind:
Rather than us determining the priority, what we really wanted to do was to invite
foundations, invite nonprofits, invite faith organizations, invite everybody to come
together and for the attendees to really determine the priorities of the coalition. And
that was where payday and auto title lending and financial education really rose to the
top.325
The resulting group of attendees, which totaled forty to fifty people from all across the
community, held several meetings which included breakout sessions in which participants
brainstormed about poverty and barriers to alleviating it. In September or October of 2010,
using anonymous clickers to set priorities, the group placed reform of payday lending at the top
of their issue agenda.326
This outcome reflected the fact that the members of the coalition were seeing problems among
congregants and clients associated with the loans but were unsure what to do about these
loans. As Marc Jacobsen, formerly of the JCRC, explained: “They are service agencies, not
advocates, so they didn't see what their role was going to be or how to take it on
themselves.”327 The APC’s response was to create a fair lending campaign sub‐committee to
address payday lending. The members of the sub‐committee included AARP Texas, Catholic
Charities of Dallas, Inc., CitySquare, Friendship‐West Baptist Church, Jewish Community
Relations Council of Greater Dallas, Literacy Instruction for Texas, United Way of Metropolitan
Dallas, National Council of Jewish Women (Greater Dallas Section), Texas Baptist Community
Development, Prestige Community Credit Union, and the Urban League of Greater Dallas and
North Central Texas.
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Religious Involvement in the Coalition
The faith‐based community played a far larger organizational role in the local anti‐payday loan
movement in greater Dallas than in either Northern California or Salt Lake City. Their
participants spanned different religions, races, and social classes. Most of the major religions in
the Dallas area were represented in the coalition, although a few played more prominent roles
than others. Some of the key figures are described below.
Reverend Gerald Britt of CitySquare
Reverend Gerald Britt, a Baptist minister and vice president of the anti‐poverty organization
CitySquare, became the de facto figurehead for the Anti‐Poverty Coalition. He explained his
introduction to payday lending as follows:
I met with an individual who suggested that I read a book called Broke, USA by Gary
Rivlin, and I read the book. At that time, I was writing a column for the Dallas
Morning News. We ran a column on payday lending, after which we actually
reviewed the book in our monthly book review. From there, I was introduced to
Stephen Reeves, who at that time was [legislative counsel] at General Baptist
Convention. Then [I] just kind of got involved from that point in trying to do what
we could at least in CitySquare's role, just being an advocate for getting people to
watch out on payday lending. We were dealing with for‐profit colleges and payday
lending and a few other issues that, you know, just helped keep poor
neighborhoods poor, so this was one of them.328
Describing the difficulty of gaining public support for payday loan regulation, Britt explained:
We were accused of being anti‐business and anti‐capitalist and all this other kind of
stuff. [We are told that borrowers are] ne'er‐do‐wells who were taking out these
loans were unable to pay them back or whatnot, and that was really the climate. It
took some persistent work to change the conversation when people actually got to
realize that this was a problem.329
Reverend Britt contributed to the campaign to enact local payday ordinances in several ways.
He helped lead the Anti‐Poverty Coalition, contributed guest columns about payday lending to
the Dallas Morning News, and blogged about the industry and its practices. He was also
instrumental in generating petition signatures in support of the Dallas ordinance. In late 2010,
Reverend Britt helped lead a large revival meeting dedicated to social justice issues. The revival
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drew participants from about fifteen churches and took place in a church accommodating nine
hundred people. According to Britt, “The church was packed, and the last night of the revival,
we stationed people at each of the exits with petitions for people to sign. The hallways leading
to those exits were so clogged with people signing the petition that mayoral candidate Mike
Rawlins couldn’t get out.”330 Several months later, the petition was presented to the Dallas City
Council with nearly four thousand signatures.331
Danielle Ayers of Friendship‐West Baptist Church
Within a short time after the original founders of the coalition began meeting, Danielle Ayers,
the Minister of Justice of Friendship‐West Baptist Church, became a pivotal figure in the
coalition and the movement.332 She was already doing community outreach with her
congregants around payday lending after seeing congregants unable to pay back their loans and
meet regular expenses.333 The church’s head pastor, Reverend Fredrick Hayes, even began
educating people about payday lending from the pulpit.334
Friendship‐West eventually prioritized payday lending as a major social issue. Ayers explained
the process by which her church decided to get involved in the issue of payday lending:
Unfortunately, in the African‐American community—because we have so many
multi‐layered issues—we can't say, "We'll deal with debt later." Because it's just as
critically important as the other issues and they are all interconnected. So we just
try to manage the process and connect the dots. I'll sit down and talk with Dr.
Haynes and say, "What do you feel is best? How do you want to handle this? Do you
want to lead because we feel so strongly about payday lending or just support other
organizations?”335
Friendship‐West decided to lead. In November, 2010, Ayers organized a huge march down
Camp Wisdom Road, a large street with numerous payday and car title lenders that is close to
Friendship‐West and several other mostly‐Black mega‐churches.336 As Ayers explained when
asked if it was common for churches to be involved in these social advocacy movements:
Prior to the interwar period between World War I and World War II, that was the black
church. It was a justice‐oriented and prophetic‐oriented church. . . . We carried the
prophetic tradition from slavery because we were always fighting against systems that
oppress. So, it wasn't until Gayraud Wilmore [a theologian and historian of the African‐
American religious experience]—who does an amazing job at laying this out—that some
churches began to allow politicians to come in. And white folks started coming in and
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saying, "Not so loud, not so much." So, it then blossomed into what you have today. We
are not monolithic at all. You have some black churches who would never talk about
justice work. Theologically, they have a problem with it.337
Ayers noted that pursuing social justice is like long‐distance running. She said: “When we talk
about justice, it's not charity. It's not a one‐time act. It's really trying to uproot systems that are
broken. And that takes time.”338
When discussing how she organized the march down Camp Wisdom Road, Ayers noted that the
people who came to march were not necessarily the ones who had taken out payday loans. She
noted that there was shame and stigma associated with the loans, and borrowers were unsure
what others would think if they knew a person had taken out one or more loans, especially if
the borrower was an educated person like a teacher. Others might think:
“Oh, it's people who were mismanaging their money,” or “They're trying to buy
drugs." People don’t think of the grandmother who is raising her grandchildren and
trying to decide if she wants milk or medication, or a single mother, because, we
know single women are the largest group of loan users.339
Ayers explained that the people who marched came because of their faith and to take a
stand for those harmed. Including other area churches, 300‐400 people marched. One
payday lender actually came to Friendship‐West and offered to pay off the existing loans
of every person in the congregation if the church would stop “marching and making noise
and advocating and trying to get the [CSO] loophole closed.”340 Ayers said that the
intention was not just to stop the march:
The idea was to stop the movement. To stop us from doing the advocacy work,
going down to Austin, making noise, having Dr. Haynes stand up in the pulpit and
talk about the issue. The church is not his only audience. The word goes out to
thousands of people around the country and the world.341
Ayers and her church formed an anti‐payday partnership with Katie Murray, the Christian
advocacy specialist for Wilshire Baptist Church, a mostly White church in prosperous North
Dallas. Murray described doing social justice work as a way to keep North Dallas youth engaged
in the church and to grow the church’s population at a time when more and more people are
becoming unaffiliated. Ayers had different reasons:
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For us [in my church,] justice plays out whether the membership goes down or not.
Katie's coming from a different socio‐economic place than we are. Socio‐economically,
we are polar opposites, which is why I love working with Wilshire.342
Despite any differences in motivation, the two congregations and their leaders share a deep
devotion to social justice. The congregations formalized a covenant in 2014 and have worked
together since then to combat predatory lending.343
The Catholic Church
Although Catholic congregations and leaders did not play a big role with respect to the Dallas
ordinance, they were central in the push for payday lending reform in nearby Arlington. Father
Daniel Kelley of St. Joseph Catholic Church was particularly influential. In addition, the Texas
Catholic Conference, the public policy voice of Texas’ Catholic bishops, worked directly on
payday lending reform at the state and local level, and also participated in Dallas Area Interfaith
and Faith Leaders for Fair Lending.344 Hearing stories from borrowers who sought assistance
from Catholic charitable organizations helped generate interest in the payday issue among
Catholic leaders.345 The religion’s long‐standing antipathy to usury provided these leaders with
a ready‐made framework for opposing payday loans.346
Within the Dallas metropolitan area, the role of the Catholic Church was most notable with
respect to the ordinance passed in Arlington in 2015. The political stakes were high there.
Arlington is the seventh largest city in Texas, and prior to the passage of the 2015 ordinance,
Arlington was the second largest city in Texas without a regulatory ordinance similar to the one
passed in Dallas.347 Arlington is also home to one of the nation’s largest payday lenders in the
nation. Accordingly, industry opposition to an ordinance was strong. Rob Norcross, spokesman
for the industry’s trade association, Consumer Service Alliance of Texas, warned: “If they [the
Arlington City Council] did something consistent with what the other cities have done, we
would have to sue them.”348 Nevertheless, through the strong leadership of Father Daniel
(“Dan”) Kelley of Arlington’s St. Joseph Catholic Church, the Texas Catholic Conference, and
Dallas Area Interfaith (an arm of the Industrial Area Foundation), Arlington became the site of a
strong and successful ordinance campaign.349
Beginning in 2015, Dallas Area Interfaith community organizers Josephine Lopez Paul and
Walker Moore used the power of faith and conviction to build a coalition of Arlington‐area
community organizations to push for passage of a regulatory ordinance. Lopez Paul and Moore
held listening sessions at St. Joseph’s on the subject of payday loans, asking people if they had
heard of them or knew people who had taken them out. At one of these sessions, they heard a
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story of a lady who had taken out a title loan. On a subsequent Sunday, they learned that the
woman was not in church because her car was repossessed the previous Friday. Dallas Area
Interfaith also held “civic academies” to educate people about payday lending. Based on what
they had learned at listening sessions, civic academies, and other educational events, many
parishioners e‐mailed and called their representatives to support the regulatory ordinances.350
After the Arlington City Council unanimously passed a Dallas‐style ordinance on November 17,
2015, about one hundred members of Arlington churches, community groups, and nonprofits
organized by the North Texas Industrial Area Foundation, gathered outside City Hall to thank
the council. Father Kelley addressed the crowd, lauding the Council for “standing up for our
constituents by being the first city in Tarrant County to pass a payday loan ordinance.”351
Events in Arlington were emblematic of the role of religious organizations in passing payday
ordinances.

Supportive Mass Media in the Dallas Area
In the Salt Lake City area and California’s Silicon Valley, the largest circulation daily newspapers
were supportive of efforts to enact local payday lending ordinances. Papers such as The Salt
Lake Tribune and San Jose’s The Mercury News did more than merely report on the activities of
payday reform advocates and city council meetings. These newspapers also conducted
unflattering studies of the payday industry and editorialized in favor of local ordinances. The
same was true in Dallas but even more so. The Dallas Morning News—the largest circulation
newspaper in Texas—not only covered the news; it helped make news in this instance.
As mentioned above, the Dallas Morning News invited Reverend Gerald Britt to regularly
contribute opinion pieces that discussed payday loans.352 At the time the Dallas local ordinance
movement was gaining steam in late 2010 and the first part of 2011, Reverend Britt wrote
regularly about the issue.353 Britt’s opinion pieces complemented the reporting being
conducted by Jim Mitchell and other writers at the Dallas Morning News.354
It was the practice of The News to set annual priorities for the coming year’s coverage. The
paper chooses a few or a couple of major social issues and focuses on them for that entire year,
trying to have real influence on the way that issues are handled in society. Given that most
Americans are unaware of how payday loans work, this level of news coverage can make a huge
difference in increasing awareness and, plausibly, getting ordinances passed. Many
interviewees commented on the prominent role played by the Dallas Moring News, and
reporter and editorial board member Jim Mitchell in particular. Other reporters such as
Rudolph Bush also covered payday lending, as the issue crossed into several subjects covered
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separately by the paper, including business and economics, politics, and the North Dallas South
Dallas racial and socio‐economic divide.

Industry Opponents in Texas
The payday lending industry opposed both the zoning ordinances and business practice
ordinances passed by Texas cities beginning in 2008.355 With respect to the Dallas ordinances,
payday lenders were typically represented by their trade association, Consumer Service Alliance
of Texas (CSAT). The trade association argued that their product served a legitimate consumer
need and prevented consumers for paying even higher amounts for bounced checks.356 Rob
Norcross, representing CSAT, commented that the Dallas ordinance “runs the risk of hurting
people in Dallas by driving them to more expensive forms of consumer credit.”357 In two
studies released in August, 2010, CSAT argued that payday lending establishments neither
contribute to crime nor lower property values.358
It took less than a month for CSAT to sue the city of Dallas over the ordinance. The trade
association—later joined by two individual payday loan companies—argued that the city was
preempted by Texas law from regulating the payday loan business. CSAT lost this suit at both
the district court and appeals court levels.359 CSAT and/or individual lenders brought additional
but unsuccessful lawsuits against the cities of Austin, Denton, El Paso, and San Antonio.360 As a
general matter, the industry expended more resources seeking to overturn the municipal
ordinances than trying to prevent them. Payday and auto title lenders saved their strongest
lobbying efforts for the Texas legislature, where they achieved largely favorable results.361

Passage of the Dallas Ordinances
The city of Dallas passed two ordinances in 2011 that restricted payday lenders in quick
succession. A zoning ordinance along the lines of ordinances passed previously in several Texas
cities and in locales like Salt Lake City and Northern California was enacted unanimously on May
25. A more innovative ordinance controlling the practices of payday lenders passed on June 22,
again unanimously. This substantive regulatory ordinance restricted the amount that payday
lenders can lend and required principal reduction if a loan is renewed. By mid‐2016, over thirty
Texas cities had followed suit by adopting the regulatory ordinances that closely followed the
Dallas model, resulting in a "unified payday ordinance."362 This section details how the political
efforts played out over the roughly nine‐months leading up to the passage of Dallas’ two
ordinances.
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Early Coalition Action
During the fall of 2010, the Anti‐Poverty Coalition began a two‐pronged approach to getting the
Dallas City Council to act against payday lending. In terms of an inside political strategy, APC
members began meeting informally with City Council members to discuss perceived abuses in
payday lending. With respect to an outside political strategy of showing broad public support
for reform, the Coalition participated in two important activities in November 2010. APC
members helped organize an anti‐payday lending march down Camp Wisdom Road in South
Dallas, and they addressed a multi‐church justice rally attended by nine hundred people.
The APC made its first foray into formal city council meetings in December, when several
members of the Coalition addressed the City Council’s Quality of Life Committee. This
committee has a diffuse mandate, as reflected in subsequent expansions of its name: Quality of
Life & Government Services in 2011 and Quality of Life & Environment in 2013.363 During its
2010‐2011 meetings, the Committee discussed issues such as abandoned shopping carts, illegal
dumping, animal services, trail safety, and library services. The Committee’s meetings were
sometimes cancelled due a lack of business and were rarely covered by the press, but the
meeting held on December 13, 2010 provided the pro‐ordinance forces the opportunity to gain
some experience in presenting their views in public to city leaders in advance of more
important meetings during the coming months.
At the Quality of Life Council Committee meeting, Gary Godsey, President and CEO of the
United Way of Metropolitan Dallas; Tim Morstad, Associate Director of Advocacy of AARP
Texas; Reverend Gerald Britt, Vice President of Public Policy & Community Program
Development; and Danielle Ayers, Minister of Social Justice at Friendship‐West Baptist Church,
described the high cost of payday loans as part of an information items on the agenda. The
goal of the speakers was not only to urge passage of a local ordinance but also to pass a City
Council resolution in favor of action at the state level to close the CSO “loophole” in Texas law
that allowed payday lenders to charge so much.364 Councilmember Jerry Allen was not a
member of the Committee, but he attended the meeting, presumably as a sign of support for
payday reform. As the presentation was listed on the agenda as an information item, no action
was taken by the Committee.
In January of 2011, ACP began having regular meetings. The minutes of the meetings on
January 6 and February 17, attached as Exhibit B, show that twenty and sixteen people
attended the meetings, respectively. Exhibit B also provides an idea of how ACP organized itself
and the devotion of nearly all its attention to the payday lending issue. Indeed, the February
minutes contained the following caveat: “There was some discussion about the need to keep in
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mind other issues for reducing poverty, including job creation and developing job skills, with the
understanding that the payday lending and financial literacy focus is just the initial agenda
items of the Coalition.”365
ACP was aware of the importance of messaging. During the course of the campaign, there was
a gradual shift from being against “predatory” lending to being in favor of “fair” lending.
Another element of message was to make sure that the problem of payday lending was not
viewed as just about poor people. Rather, the APC stressed that everyone should care because
it affects everyone.366 Walker Moore gave the example of a woman who worked for one of the
banks that Dallas Area Interfaith used. At first, the woman said she did not know of anyone who
had used a payday loan but then recalled that her daughter had. As Moore explained:
She's not an executive of this bank, but she works with the executives. And her
daughter had just had to take out a payday loan for her car, which had some serious
problems. After talking with me, this lady goes home and starts checking on what
her daughter did because she knew what her daughter had done, but she didn’t
understand the ramifications. And so the woman from the bank started coming to
our training sessions. And she immediately got that loan paid off for her daughter.
She [ended up doing] all the behind the scenes organizing it takes to get the
meetings set up because she saw what happened to her daughter. And this is a
white lady, the nicest sweetest, lady in the world. I mean, she works for a bank. Her
daughter is a schoolteacher. We're not talking about a low‐income person barely
scraping by.367
A final aspect of the Coalition’s messaging was to address the payday industry’s argument that
regulation of loans was unwanted by payday borrowers and would leave them with no place to
go to get loans that they desperately need. Reverend Britt countered that the industry talks
about need but does not talk about how it “feeds the need.”368 In any case, advocates in the
Dallas metropolitan area got way out in front of this common industry argument by originally
defining their goal as: “Countering the problem of predatory lending by advocating for changes
to public policy and promoting consumer‐friendly lending alternatives” [emphasis added].369
The Coalition also created a flyer for the first city council meeting that listed alternatives to
payday loans, and APC repeated the message throughout the ordinance campaign that there
were alternatives.370
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The Dallas City Policy Process Crests
Once the Dallas APC organized, APC wanted to pass the strongest possible ordinance to curb
payday lending. The rough plan was to pass a zoning ordinance to make a public stand on the
payday issue and then wait to see if the state would substantively regulate payday loans in its
regulatory session. If the state did not act, the plan was to follow the zoning ordinance with a
substantive regulatory ordnance, which is exactly what ended up happening.
As in most cities, any potential change to the zoning laws is first reviewed by the planning
commission. This was true in the case of Dallas, where the body’s name is the City Plan [sic]
Commission. Support for a zoning ordinance regarding “alternative financial establishments”
did not come easily from the Commission. On January 11, 2011, a motion was initially made to
deny creation of a new use category for alternative financial establishments. Before a vote
could be taken, a substitute measure was proposed to take the matter under advisement until
the next meeting in early February.371 Things went a bit better at the February meeting for
ordinance supporters. A motion to create a new use category was passed unanimously, but a
second motion to create minimum distance requirements between alternative financial
establishments failed to pass.372
While using the city of Dallas’s zoning authority to regulate payday lenders was moving slowly
and timidly through the City Plan Commission, the City Council as a whole signaled its interest
in the payday issue at its February 9, 2011 meeting. At the meeting, the Council unanimously
passed a resolution calling on the state legislature to address problems associated with CSOs.373
Two weeks later, on February 22, City council member Jerry Allen appeared before the Senate
Committee on Business & Commerce and conveyed his city’s resolution to the Texas
Legislature.374 He also stressed that interest in payday reform reflected a “groundswell” and
broad‐based “movement.”375 Allen mentioned the Bank on Dallas program as well as the likely
consideration by the Dallas City Council of a thousand‐foot separation requirement between
establishments.
One other important city meeting took place during February, 2011. The City Council’s
Committee on Finance, Budget & Audit met on February 28 and was briefed on the status of
possible zoning changes pertinent to payday lending. Jerry Allen was the chair of the
committee, so this meeting represented an opportunity to push forward the idea of a zoning
ordinance, but the committee decided that it wanted to wait to see what action, if any, would
be taken by the State Legislature before taking further action.376
The decision in February by the Dallas City Council’s Committee on Finance, Budget & Audit to
delay action on payday lending reflected a realistic assessment of possible state‐level reforms.
A package of three bills was filed in early March with House Republican Vicki Truitt as their
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author.377 House bills 2592 and 2594 were fairly modest in scope. They required, respectively,
certain disclosures to payday borrowers (technically, clients in the CSO model) and licensing of
lenders (technically, credit service brokers). Both bills were embraced by Republican Senator
John Carona and were eventually passed by the Legislature in June. A third bill, H.B. 2593, was
more ambitious. It would have imposed restrictions on amounts, fees, renewals, and payment
of payday and car title loans. It was H.B. 2593 that reflected the aspirations of people like Ann
Baddour and Jerry Allen as well as the members APC.378
April Activity
On April 12, one day before the scheduled April meeting of the Dallas City Council, APC held an
interfaith press conference about payday lending at City Hall.379 The press conference photo
below shows, from left to right, Bishop J. Douglas Deshotel, Rabbi Adam Raskin, Minister
Danielle Ayers, Reverend Gerald Britt, Dr. Fredrick Haynes, III, and Councilmember Jerry Allen.
Figure 7: Leaders of Anti‐Poverty Coalition Press Conference on April 12, 2011

Photo courtesy of Stephanie Mace.
At the City Council meeting the next day, Reverend Britt spoke about payday lending during the
public comment open mike period following the formal meeting. City councilmembers asked
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Reverend Britt a series of questions related to the availability of alternatives, the density of
lenders throughout the city, the level of public support for regulation, and how the payday loan
model traps borrowers. Britt was joined by two other notables in speaking for payday lending
reform: Will McCall of the Dallas Leadership Foundation and Lisa Hembry of United Way of
Metropolitan Dallas.380 Simultaneously, Jerry Allen worked behind the scenes to get Council
support for payday loan reform.381
On April 25, the City Council’s Budget, Finance & Audit committee met to be briefed on the
amendments to the city’s development code that were being considered by the full City
Council.382 The Committee was chaired by Councilmember Allen, so it was not surprising that a
motion was passed to move the draft ordinance onto the agenda of the Council’s May 25th
meeting. At that point, the zoning ordinance would require alternative financial establishments
(check cashing, payday, and auto title loan businesses) to be separated by at least five hundred
feet and to obtain a special use permit. There was no discussion of an ordinance that would
regulate the financial products themselves.383
An editorial in the Dallas Morning News on April 28th bolstered the support that had been
building all month for a payday zoning ordinance. The editorial called on the City Council to
pass a zoning ordinance and the State Legislature to regulate the products offered by the full
range of “alternative financial establishments.” The editorial urged immediate action: “With
deadlines looming in Austin and a new council taking office in June, this is a fleeting opportunity
to rein in abuses inflicted on those who can least afford to take a financial hit.”384
May 25th City Council Meeting
From the point of view of payday lending reform in Dallas, a potentially troubling event took
place on May 14, 2011: Mike Rawlings was elected mayor. Rawlings, a former CEO of Pizza Hut,
defeated several candidates. In April, outgoing Mayor Dwaine Caraway had blasted Rawlings as
the “king of payday loans” by virtue of Rawlings’ service on the board of directors of ACE Cash
Express several years earlier.385 With Rawlings due to take office at the end of June, payday
loan reform advocates realized that the clock was running.386
With respect to the zoning ordinance, the climactic meeting of the Dallas City Council took
place on May 25th. Over two hundred community members attended the public hearing
portion of the meeting to show their support for the zoning ordinance. Representatives of APC
attended and brought detailed research notebooks with them, ready to answer any questions
that might arise. Their “Fair Lending Campaign” binder (see its table of contents as Exhibit C)
contained maps showing the location and density of payday lenders in Dallas, information on
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alternatives to payday loans, and letters of support from a variety of community organizations
as well as two of the city’s representatives in the Texas Legislature (Rep. Eric Johnson and
Senator Royce West). ACP members also came prepared with over 4,000 signatures on
petitions, postcards, and emails, favoring the zoning ordinances .387 Inside the City Council
chambers, APC members also wore the sticker shown below.
Figure 8: Anti‐Poverty Coalition Lapel Stickers Worn at Dallas City Council Meeting

Courtesy of Stephanie Mace.
Four people in favor of the zoning ordinance addressed the City Council: Marie Graziano of
AARP Texas, Rev. Frederick Haynes, III of Friendship‐West Baptist Church, Rabbi Oren Hayonof
the Rabbinic Association of Greater Dallas, and Rev. Gerald Britt of CitySquare and the Anti‐
Poverty Coalition.388 No one spoke in opposition to the City Plan Commission's
recommendation.389
Describing the overall ambience of the hearing, Marc Jacobsen explained:
At the city council meeting, Reverend Britt spoke, and Reverend Britt is a very powerful
speaker. We had two hundred people there. A lot of them were from Friendship‐West,
but there were others as well. We had lots of people there from different communities.
Perhaps this was overkill for the zoning ordinance, but it worked. The industry attended,
two people, but did not speak.
When Reverend Britt spoke, the City Council could see that the entire room was standing (both
literally and figuratively) with Reverend Britt and the other clergy present.
By the time of the public hearing, Jerry Allen had already spoken repeatedly to other members
of the Council as well as the City Attorney. Allen also addressed the Council’s fears of being
sued over the ordinance. Before the hearing began, Allen knew that he had the votes to pass
the ordinance.
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The final zoning ordinance was stronger than the one the City Council Budget, Finance & Audit
Committee had seen. Councilmember Allen amended the proposed ordinance as follows:
increase the distance of separation between alternative financial establishments to 1,500 feet;
require a minimum distance of 300 feet from a lot in a residential district and 500 feet from an
expressway; and mandate that establishments be located in freestanding buildings.390 The City
Council passed the amended ordinance unanimously.
All of this was happening at the same time as the state legislative session, at which many of the
same advocates were also working. The members of the APC and Councilmember Allen
deliberately pushed forward the zoning ordinance and waited on a possible ordinance covering
payday loan products to see if the state legislature would make this second ordinance
unnecessary by passing H.B. 2593. By late May, it became clear to the payday reform
advocates in Dallas that only the more modest state bills would pass (H.B. 2592 and H.B.
2594).391 If payday lenders in Dallas were to be subject to stronger control than disclosure
requirements, licensing, and zoning rules, the City Council would have to re‐visit the issue.
June 22 City Council Meeting
In light of the State Legislature’s action and inaction, Ann Baddour, Jerry Allen, and the Dallas
City Attorney’s Office drafted an ordinance that would regulate the features of payday loans
(or, as described in the ordinance, “credit access businesses”). The ordinance was modeled
loosely on failed House Bill 2593. H.B. 2593 would have: (1) limited the amount that could be
borrowed in a “deferred presentment transaction” to the lesser of $2000 or 35 percent of the
borrower’s gross monthly income; (2) limited rollovers (“consecutive reauthorizations”) of
these loans to three times; (3) applied any partial payment of the loan to the loan’s principal;
and (4) prevented any additional fees from being imposed once payment of 25% or more of the
loan principal had been made.392
The regulatory ordinance proposed for Dallas required payday lenders to register with the city,
and maintain complete records of all extensions of consumer credit. Far more controversially,
the ordinance limited the payday loan to twenty percent of the consumer’s gross monthly
income and mandated that lenders maintain the documentation used to establish the
consumer’s income. Further, any loan involving a lump sum repayment could not be refinanced
more than three times, and the proceeds for each loan renewal or extension must be used to
repay at least 25% of the original principal. For loans involving installments, the proceeds from
each installment must be used to repay at least 25% of the loan principal, and installment loans
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may not be extended, renewed, or refinanced.393 In short, the Dallas ordinance strongly
resembled H.B. 2593.
Given the potential impact of the proposed Dallas regulatory ordinance on lenders, one might
have expected the June 22 meeting of the City Council to be hotly debated by advocates and
proponents. Instead, the ordinance, which was an addendum to the official agenda, passed
without controversy or fanfare. Reverend Britt was the only person who addressed the City
Council, and APC had sent a letter of support for the ordinance to Mayor Caraway and the City
Council. (See Exhibit D.) That was the entirety of the visible lobbying. Councilmember Allen
moved for passage of the ordinance and, after a brief discussion, it was passed unanimously.394
Within a month, the Consumer Service Alliance of Texas filed a lawsuit challenging the
ordinance, but the suit proved unsuccessful.395 The genie was out of the bottle. The Dallas
ordinance was to become the model for other cities in Texas. Within five years, similar
ordinances passed, more or less verbatim, in more than thirty Texas cities.396
Diffusion of Regulatory Ordinance to Additional Texas Cities
Once Dallas passed the substantive local ordinance, other city councils around Texas followed
suit. By 2013, the number of similar ordinances had spread to six, and by mid‐2016, thirty‐five
Texas cities had passed similar ordinances.397
Jerry Allen and the Spread of Local Payday Loan Ordinances
Councilmember Jerry Allen was not content with resting on the laurels he had gained by
spearheading passage of the Dallas ordinance. Soon thereafter, he began going from town to
town to help other municipalities pass regulatory‐style ordinances. His approach was to look
for like‐minded councilmembers in these other cities. He believed that he just needed one and
then he would do whatever it took to help him or her. He said: “Just give me one
councilmember. I'll pick the phone up, I'll go down to do business with them, and if I have to,
you know, I’ll get on the plane. I'll go down there. If I get 'em one‐on‐one, I got 'em. I get
anybody one‐on‐one, I'll get you.” 398
Allen was careful not to frame his conversations with councilmembers elsewhere in terms of
passing “the Dallas ordinance” but rather the Denton, Austin, or Mesquite ordinance. He
elaborated: “If I am in San Antonio, I am not going to talk about how great what we did in Dallas
was. No, I'm going to talk about what a great city San Antonio is: second largest city in Texas,
proud history that has got the Alamo.”399

91

Allen was happy to work behind the scenes or address the members of the city council in cities
such as Amarillo and El Paso. Allen’s approach was to focus on the city council’s role serving the
public. In Houston, Allen privately told the mayor, “You're a public servant. You're not a
politician. Politicians know that these poor people don't vote, but you're a public servant and
you're after their best interests.”400 In addressing a city council, he said:
Fellow public servants—and I call you public servants. That's what you are because
you care about people. That's why you're sitting here. That's why you're here today.
What'd he [an industry spokesperson] just say? It kinda sounded like the
Boogeyman, didn't it? Well, let's just open that closet door and take a look at that
Boogeyman. He says, “We're going to have to leave Dallas.”' I said, “You know
what? Y’all remember reading the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau fined his
company $10 million for lying and mistreating the people?
Well, I don't know about y'all—yeah, I do. You're good, solid public servants. That's
not the kind of company I want to see in Dallas. But let's take it a step further. He
talked about other companies leaving. Well, yeah, we've had 'em leave. I had
maybe 250 payday lenders; today, I've got maybe 125. Well, guess what? Those
doors are still open to those 125, and our guess? They're still making money after
three years.401
Jerry Allen’s barnstorming was an important reason for the rapid spread of regulatory
ordinances in Texas. Although he was careful not to be Dallas‐centric, he encouraged other
cities to keep things simple by passing an ordinance similar to the one in Dallas. Doing so would
help Dallas and other cities defend their ordinances against industry claims that differing
ordinances made compliance onerous. In his effort to promote uniformity, Allen also had the
support of the Texas Municipal League.402
The Non‐Profit Texas Municipal League
The Texas Municipal League (the Municipal League) is a non‐profit association that assists Texas
cities through legislative, legal, and educational activities.403 It was founded in 1913 as a way to
allow leaders and officials of Texas municipalities to confer with each other on issues facing
their individual cities.404 As of 2016, the Municipal League had 1,150 members—virtually all of
the state’s cities, towns, and municipalities.
The Municipal League has been instrumental in the state’s fight against payday loan businesses,
especially through its dissemination of a model payday loan ordinance based on the Dallas
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regulatory ordinance and its extensive coverage of news pertaining to the passage of
ordinances and legal challenges to them.405 The model ordinance is seven pages long and
contains options for minor modifications to the Dallas ordinance.406 The model ordinance has
made it easy for Texas cities to pass a Dallas‐type ordinance. The model ordinance, by
encouraging cities to pass identical or very similar ordinances, undercut the ability of the
payday lending industry to claim that compliance with a patchwork of differing ordinances
would be an undue burden and therefore is or should be preempted by state law. The
Municipal League’s coverage of the litigation based on this preemption argument emboldens
Texas cities, particularly given that industry litigation has been unsuccessful to date.407

The Denton Story: Careful Planning Fueled by Outrage and Faith
The passage of a regulatory‐type ordinance in Denton shows the power of two individuals
fueled by the injustice they found in payday lending. Pat Smith is a retired U.S. Air Force officer
and directs the non‐profit Serve Denton, which serves other Denton‐based nonprofits through
shared infrastructure. In 2012, Kayce Strader, fresh from earning a master’s degree in non‐
profit organizations, joined Serve Denton as its director of development.408
Discovering Payday Lending in Denton
Neither Smith nor Strader were familiar with payday lending until Smith and Strader attended a
conference called No Need Among You, organized by Mission Waco, Mission World, on October
19, 2012. The conference sought to mobilize middle‐class Americans to find “Christian‐based,
holistic, relationship‐based” solutions to the problems of poor and marginalized people.409 In
the case of Strader, the organization succeeded.
Strader attended a session called The Politics of Poverty by Suzii Paynter, which included the
topic of payday lending.410 As Paynter described payday lending through statistics and
anecdotes, Strader felt herself getting very angry. When people at the session started asking
how these loans could be legal, Ms. Paynter said to the crowd, “That is your job. Go home and
change it.” Paynter advised people to talk to their city council members. As Strader exited the
session, she ran into her colleague Pat Smith in the hallway. Smith immediately became
concerned about Strader’s physical well‐being as she looked ill. He asked her if she was O.K. and
Strader answered that she was, but she informed Smith that they had a job to do when they got
home. Strader had become aware of a serious injustice, and her Christian faith impelled her to
act.411 While stories about how benevolence ends up in the hands of lenders galvanized their
campaign, for both Pat Smith and Kayce Strader, injustice was the primary fuel in their
campaign for payday reform.
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Finding an Inside Champion in Denton
Two weeks later, Smith and Strader met with Kevin Roden, a young member of the Denton City
Council who was first elected in 2011. They had lunch in a Chinese restaurant and shared what
they had learned about payday lending at the Christian conference with Roden. Smtih chose to
contact Roden because he viewed Roden as supportive of grassroots efforts and making local
government work for people. According to Smith, “Roden is a big believer in local government.
He’s said many times in different web posts that he believes local government is more
impactful than any national election or national policy ever could be, so he's really, I would say,
a lover of local government.”412
At the lunch, Roden said that he had heard a bit about payday loans but was not familiar with
their details. Rodin knew they were financial products for the poor and felt they might be
connected to neighborhood blight, but he did not know how much the loans affected his
community.
Based on his conversation with Smith and Strader, Roden agreed to try to help change the law
in Denton, and he gave Smith and Strader advice on how to move forward with other council
members. According to Strader, Roden gave them the breadcrumbs and said, "This is the path
you need to follow."413 At the same time, Roden was very careful not to get too involved
because it might compromise his ability to serve as the ordinance’s inside champion on the city
council. He opened the door to get Smith and Strader access to one city councilman and then
another. According to Strader, Roden told them to be well prepared and very organized when
they came to the city council meeting at which the ordinance would be discussed.
Lobbying the City Council in Denton
The Denton City Council is composed of a mayor and six other council members. Smith and
Strader knew that there was an informal rule about city council people meeting outside a public
meeting in groups of three or more, so they met with the remaining city council members in
groups of two and began cultivating relationships with them, if they did not already have them.
Strader and Smith also reached out to local non‐profits and churches for support, resulting in
the formation in early December, 2012, of Denton for Fair Lending. In addition to Serve
Denton, the coalition included: Hope, Inc., Village Church, Vision Ministries, and the United Way
of Denton. The United Way of Denton was initially quite cautious about supporting the local
ordinance because it did not want to upset some of its donors. Fortunately, Smith was very
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good friends with the president of the Denton United Way, Gary Henderson, and according to
Smith:
A turning point for [Gary] was when we had a meeting with Councilman Allen from
Dallas, and United Way of Dallas attended that meeting. The United Way had launched
Bank On here in Denton and in Dallas, and that flipped the switch for Gary and he
became a very strong supporter of the ordinance.414
As had been the case in Dallas, non‐profit social service organizations came to realize that the
benevolent aid they were providing ended up indirectly in the hands of payday lenders.
Longtime Denton resident Janet Shelton is on the board of Giving Hope, which was one of the
big nonprofits that tracked whether people had payday loans. She informed the staff of Giving
Hope to watch for people with payday loans, and the staff concluded that over 50% of the
dollars that they distributed to help the poor were being used to offset payday lending.415
The members of Denton for Fair Lending had to move fast because they were scheduled to
make a presentation at the December 18 meeting of the City Council. Following Roden’s
admonition to be well prepared, the coalition found a talented graphic designer to create flyers
to be used at the meeting.416 (The designer worked for free because he believed in the cause.)
The flyers employed the same graphic theme as the polished Prezi presentation that the
members of Denton for Fair Lending gave in tag‐team fashion at the meeting.417 The
presentation ended with a request for three actions: (1) add predatory lending to the city’s
lobbying agenda at the state legislature, (2) pass a zoning ordinance similar to those in Dallas,
Austin, and San Antonio, and (3) enact a regulatory ordinance similar to the one in Dallas that
requires repayment of payday loans and auto title loans in no more than four installments.418
As coincidence would have it, the audience for the hearing was larger than expected because
the agenda item right after the payday loan ordinance was a proposed bill that would outlaw
smoking in bars. The room was packed, and while many in the crowd did not know the details
of payday lending, they cheered after the payday presentation and gave the people from
Denton for Fair Lending a standing ovation. Some people in attendance said it was the best
presentation they had ever heard.419
An initial sign that the work of Denton coalition was paying off came on January 15. The
Denton City Council addressed the first request made by the coalition to press for state‐level
change. The Council passed a resolution “to enact laws to reduce exploitative payday lending
and auto title loan practices.”420 The resolution also expressed support for the cities of Dallas,
Austin, and San Antonio in their efforts to regulate these lenders. With the resolution passing
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unanimously, the City Council tacitly committed itself to taking further action to control lending
within its borders.
Subsequent to the City Council meeting, Smith, Strader, and the members of Denton for Fair
Lending continued to gather research to bolster their case. With the help of Ann Baddour at
Texas Appleseed, they extrapolated to Denton the results of a recent study by Tim Lohrentz of
the Insight Center for Economic Development showing the negative net economic effect of
payday lending on communities.421 To supplement this economic research, Strader and Smith
reached out to nonprofits to gather personal stories that exemplified the problems with payday
loans. They asked the nonprofits, “Are people coming to you for food because they're spending
their money on payday loans?"422 Smith and Strader also got some non‐profits to add questions
on their intake forms: "Are you paying on a payday loan? Are part of your financial struggles
due to a title loan?"423 In this way, Smith and Strader were able to obtain anecdotal stories
from borrowers.
One such story involved Dorothy, an 86‐year‐old widow. Strader and Smith learned about her
when a church member, who was her neighbor, was concerned about Dorothy’s health because
she was living on crackers. Dorothy’s husband had been a POW in World War II and had passed
away. Dorothy had gone to get a $75.00 payday loan to pay insurance on her car and the loan
ended up costing her nearly $10,000.00 in combined loan payments and overdraft fees.
Dorothy was hospitalized for stress related to the loan. When Smith and Strader sat down with
Dorothy and started unpacking what was going on, they realized this was “just pure hell for
her.”424
Final City Council Meeting in Denton
Like in Dallas, Denton for Fair Lending benefited from a good relationship with one of the lead
reporters at the local paper, the Denton Record‐Chronicle , Peggy Heinkel‐Wolfe.425 Heinkel‐
Wolfe and her colleagues provided in‐depth coverage of payday lending in Denton as part of an
annual feature called “Sunshine Week.” As Pat Smith explained regarding Sunshine Week: “The
paper picks a topic each year to pull the cover off and shine a light on it. In 2013, they picked
payday lending.426 Thus, somewhat serendipitously, Smith and Strader had an ally in exposing
the problems associated with payday lending and a means of publicizing their room efforts.
The newspaper ran a series of articles during the second week of March, 2013, just a few days
before the meeting of the City Council in which a regulatory ordinance would be considered.427
Members of Denton for Fair Lending attended the March 13 City Council. They sported stickers
with the words: Texans Deserve Better/Stop Predatory Lending. Five people spoke about the
ordinance, and all were in favor of it. They included coalition leaders Kayce Strader, Pat Smith,
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and Pastor Joe Ader.428 No one spoke against the ordinance, and it passed unanimously. That
night, Ader went to the Facebook page of Denton for Fair Lending and wrote: “Thank you for all
of the citizens—from the Boy Scouts to AARP to churches and everything in between—who
came out in support over the last few months and tonight.”429

Payday Industry Strategy and Response in Metropolitan Dallas
As set out above, representatives of payday lenders rarely testified, or even attended, zoning or
city council meetings. Walter Moore did not find this particularly surprising in the case of
zoning ordinances because payday outlets were already at a saturation point. He thought the
payday industry was willing to lose on the Dallas zoning ordinance if it could win on ordinances
that regulated business practices. Moore said: “Payday lenders were just going to throw up
their hands and say, ‘You can have the zoning ordinance.’”430
The industry defended itself in ways other than appearing at public hearings, however. The
chief spokesman for the industry was Rob Norcross of the Consumer Service Alliance of Texas.
The starting point of his view of any regulation of payday lending is that the loans meet a need
and are better than alternatives such as bouncing checks or frequenting loan sharks. He said:
"It's access to credit on terms and conditions that are more favorable than the other options
that most of our customers have. . . . I think people are making rational financial decisions
based on options available to them."431 According to Walker Moore, an industry representative
asked the people attending a hearing to "Raise your hand if you have a mortgage." When
everyone raised their hands, then he said, "Raise your hand if you want the city involved with
what kind of mortgage you can take out."432 The industry’s argument was that the city should
not be involved in regulating people's financial transactions.
Norcross also frequently stressed the economic contribution of payday lending to communities
and the state. He pointed out that the industry employed almost eight thousand people in the
state of Texas and paid tens of millions of dollars in property taxes and rent.433 According to
AARP’s Susan Williams, the industry’s arguments have changed over the years from arguments
about unmet need to arguments about how the real answer was fighting for a living wage. A
last ditch pitch by industry was to argue that cities ought to wait and see what the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) proposed before passing local ordinances. Jim Mitchell of
the Dallas Morning News noted the irony of this last argument: “There was a time when the
payday lenders—the big ones—were saying, ‘We don’t like [the CFPB’s] intervention.’ Then,
once the power started to shift to the cities, the message changes to let’s wait and see what the
Feds do.”434
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Whereas the payday industry aimed its specific objections to additional regulation at policy
makers, it tried to build support for itself among the general public via charitable giving and
advertising. ACE Cash Express has been particularly active in terms of donating to worthy
causes in its home region and elsewhere.435 Reverend Britt expressed skepticism about
donations from industries that, he believes, help keep poor people poor. He cited the case of
an industrial recycling plant located in a low‐income area that stepped forward with the money
for a Fourth of July fireworks celebration when the City of Dallas cancelled because it was too
expensive. Britt said this type of public relations effort projects companies as good corporate
citizens while, in reality, they are “robbing these neighborhoods of economic vitality.”436
Lenders also upped their advertising in an attempt to paint themselves in the most favorable
light possible. As Josephine Lopez Paul explained, “We could tell that the industry was feeling
pressure because they started putting up billboards all along [Highway] 360 and running radio
ads saying, ‘ACE Cash Express, your hometown lender since 1960.’”437
The payday industry’s major force of resistance to regulatory ordinances was reactive: it raised
the specter of lawsuits. Councilmember Allen recalled being threatened with a lawsuit after the
business regulation ordinance passed in Dallas:
A payday guy, he came up to me and he said, "Well, Councilman, you know we're
gonna have to sue you. We're gonna have to sue the city." And I said, "Well,
partner, that's exactly what we want you to do 'cause we're gonna get your ass in
the court of law and we're gonna whip you, but more importantly, we're gonna get
your ass in the court of public opinion and we're really gonna whoop you there."
We weren’t blinking.438
The industry was good to its word and filed suit against the Dallas ordinance three weeks
after it passed. Three years later, in May, 2014, a Texas Appeals Court ruled against the
payday lending trade association and two individual companies, closing the matter.
Journalist Jim Mitchell explained the critical importance of getting that first ordinance
passed and that first lawsuit won:
At the local level, I mean I think the cat was out of the bag. Once the Dallas
ordinance was passed and it was challenged and [the industry] lost, it left no other
refuge other than the state or the hope that somehow the federal government
intervenes and gives them a more flexible regime going forward.439
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The anger of lenders at the legal outcome of the Dallas case and a similar unsuccessful
challenge in Denton was no match for the righteous indignation that motivated people such as
Kayce Strader, Reverend Britt, and Councilmember Allen and for the social movement they
helped create. In the summer of 2016, the Texas Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal of
the decision on the Denton ordinance, a huge victory for the cities. 440
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V. Campaign Impacts
Types of Impacts
Based on the three locally‐based campaigns described in this report, we identify five categories
of impacts. These impacts pertain to: (1) local payday law, (2) payday lenders and loans, (3)
state and federal policymaking, (4) public awareness and opinion, and (5) community cohesion,
organizational and individual empowerment, and faith development. Some of these impacts
are readily observable while others are more speculative or, at least, hard to measure.
Although a few of the impacts are unique to a particular time and place, most are likely
replicable in other locations.
Impact on Local Law
The most direct and visible impact of the local campaigns described in this report has been the
rapid spread of local payday loan ordinances in the three locales studied. As of late‐2016, there
were eleven “density‐type” zoning ordinances in Salt Lake County and fourteen such ordinances
(or bans) in the two counties that compose Silicon Valley.441 The situation in the Dallas area
(defined as areas within Dallas, Denton, and Tarrant counties) is more complicated because
there are ten density‐type and eight “business regulation” ordinances, with three cities having
both types (Dallas, Garland, and Mesquite). In the cases of Dallas and the Silicon Valley, the
diffusion of the ordinances was the result of a sustained and well organized effort by a coalition
of organizations. A less powerful coalition was present in Utah, but concern among officials in
Salt Lake County cities that restrictions in a nearby city would lead to spillover of lenders into
their city helped propel passage of numerous ordinances.
The diffusion effect of early ordinances in the three locales studied extended to other areas of
their respective states. In Utah today, there are density‐type ordinances in eight of the state’s
largest cities, including two of the state’s three largest cities outside of Salt Lake County (i.e.,
Orem and Ogden). In California, Silicon Valley was not the site of the state’s first anti‐payday
ordinances, but activity in Silicon Valley galvanized efforts elsewhere, including Long Beach
(2013) and Fresno (2014).442 In Texas, after Dallas passed its business regulation ordinance,
highly similar ordinances spread quickly throughout the state and now cover the jurisdictions in
which over nine million Texans live.443 As Reverend Britt of Dallas CitySquare explained:
The ordinance movement has made a difference in terms of the sheer number of cities
that have adopted the ordinance. I've just recently read about thirty cities that have
adopted it. So I think that's made a difference, and if there's been any influence on the
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industry that has made them change their message, it's been these ordinances that
other cities [beyond Dallas] have adopted.444
As set out in the first part of this report, the three campaigns we studied are part of a
movement that goes well beyond these three campaigns. Since the first ordinances in
Metropolitan Salt Lake City in the early 2000s, the number of local ordinances nationally has
grown dramatically.
Impact on Lenders and Loans
While it is easy to measure the proliferation of local ordinances, it is much harder to measure
their impact on payday lenders and payday loans in the regions studied. Given the focus of
most zoning ordinances on lender density, one would expect to observe a short‐term
stabilization in the number of lenders in ordinance jurisdictions. Eventually, there might be a
decline in lender numbers as some close their doors and new lenders are prevented by the
ordinances from taking their place.
A decline in the number of lenders was predicted or subsequently reported by members of the
payday industry. In San Jose, California, the California Chamber of Commerce argued that
restricting payday lenders would lead to shop closures and make companies think twice about
trying to open new ones.445 In 2014, Rob Norcross of the Consumer Service Alliance of Texas
argued that Fort Worth should not enact a payday ordinance because the Dallas ordinance had
resulted in 107 payday loan shops closing, “which meant 205 workers were laid off and $5.9
million in annual wages and benefits lost.”446 In filing a legal challenge to the ordinance passed
in Denton, Texas, ACE Cash Expressed stated: “As a result of the enactment of this Dallas
Ordinance, ACE has lost most of the customers served by, and the majority of revenue formerly
earned in, its Dallas locations. In fact, multiple ACE storefronts in Dallas have closed or will
close as a result of the impact of the Dallas ordinance.”447 In Austin, Texas, the lender Check ‘n
Go said it was closing about half of its stores due, in part, to the city’s new ordinance.448
Whereas payday lenders cite the loss of outlets—and the attendant jobs and taxes—as a means
of dissuading restrictions in additional cities, anti‐payday advocates view declines in payday
stores as a sign of success. Several of our Texas interviewees mentioned that the numbers of
lenders had gone down, citing industry claims regarding closed stores. 449 Dallas City
Councilmember Jerry Allen reported a drop from 250 to 125.450 AARP’s Susan Williams recalled
reading in the Dallas Morning News that the number had dropped from 220 to 190.451 Similar
drops in lender numbers have been reported in the media for other Texas cities. A recent news
account regarding San Antonio’s ordinance reported that the “number of payday lenders
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operating in San Antonio has been cut in half since a city ordinance seeking to end ‘abusive and
predatory lending practices’ took effect in 2013.”452
As eagerly as anti‐payday advocates might wish to believe that zoning ordinances are
responsible for stabilizing or causing a decline in the number of lender outlets, there are several
reasons to be cautious about drawing any conclusions. The absence of growth in payday
lenders could reflect a saturated market at the time when an ordinance was passed, and a
decline could be attributable to the growth of the internet as an alternative channel for
consummating payday loans. Similarly, a decline in lender numbers might be due to macro‐
economic factors. At least in California, the economic recession that began in 2008 appears to
have been responsible for a general decrease in new licenses for payday stores, including
jurisdictions without ordinances.453 Our own analysis shows, however, that the decline was
more rapid in California jurisdictions with ordinances than in those without them.454
Effect on State and Federal Payday Loan Regulation
In addition to passing local ordinances, local payday loan advocates in Utah, California, and
Texas also worked to influence their state‐level lawmaking processes as well as federal
policymaking. In Utah, the same coalition of religious organizations that propelled passage of
city‐ and county‐level ordinances also provided the public pressure for several state‐level
reforms, including those in 2014 and 2016.455 In California, state‐level efforts by anti‐payday
advocates have been particularly energetic. For example, representatives from the Center for
Responsible Lending (CRL), California Reinvestment Coalition (CRC), and Public Interest Law
Firm of the Silicon Valley (PILF) spoke at a Banking and Finance Committee Hearing of the
California Legislature held on January 11, 2016.456 The hearing included testimony about why
efforts to curb payday loan abuses were necessary on the state level, plus favorable comments
on the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (CFPB) proposed payday loan regulations.457 In
2013, PILF, CRC, La Raza, and the Silicon Valley Community Foundation (SVCF) supported a
California Senate bill that would have increased the minimum duration of payday loans;
required lenders to underwrite loans; capped the maximum number of loans per customer at
four per year; and required the Commissioner of Corporations to develop and implement a
database to help enforce the law.458 These and other advocates also spoke—this time
successfully—in favor of California SB 318 (2013), which sought to create alternatives to payday
loans, and in opposition to AB 1158 (2011), a bill proposed by lenders that would have raised
the maximum dollar amount of a California payday loan from $300 to $500.459
Advocates who cut their teeth on local ordinances also graduated to federal‐level lobbying as
well. For example, the CRC created a petition on its web site that urged the CFPB to issue strong
consumer protections in its payday loan rules.460 In July, 2016, SVCF advocated for strong
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federal reform at an Oakland town hall meeting with CFPB Director Richard Cordray.461 A year
earlier, SVCF organized a letter from fifty‐seven community foundations addressed to Cordray.
The letter asked him to “enact comprehensive and stringent federal rules to govern payday
lenders.”462 In the Dallas area, advocates made similar efforts to make their voices heard by
the state and federal officials, including public defenses of the CFPB’s payday lending
rulemaking by Reverend Gerald Britt, Jr. and the Dallas Anti‐Poverty Coalition.463
Advocates not only expanded the scope of their efforts from the local to the state and federal;
their campaigns had the same effect on some local officials. Mike Guingona, drawing on his
experience on the Daly City Council, wrote a letter to the CFPB urging payday lending reform.464
Dallas Councilmember Jerry Allen used a guest column in the Dallas Morning News to argue
that the unwillingness of the Texas Legislature to enact meaningful payday reform left the CFPB
as the best alternative for controlling the industry.465
In other instances, the migration of city officials to supporters of state‐ or federal‐level payday
reform might take place in the future. For example, both candidates emerging from the 2016
primary contest for California’s 27th Assembly District—Madison Nguyen and Ash Kalra—went
on record while serving as members of the San Jose City Council as favoring payday lending
reform. 466 Kalra ultimately won the election, meaning the State Assembly will have a new
member with a history of actively opposing payday lenders.467
Public Awareness and Opinion Regarding Payday Lending
City councilmembers, not members of the general public, make the final decision regarding the
enactment of local payday ordinances. Nevertheless, public opinion is an important influence
on the priorities of policy makers. Local anti‐payday advocates have therefore expended
considerable effort to generate public support of their ordinance campaigns as well as use
these campaigns to deepen public awareness and opposition to payday lending. Advocates
employed the following methods of influencing public awareness and opinion regarding payday
lending: contributing quotes to media coverage of payday lending and reform efforts; using
newspaper columns, websites, and blogs to disseminate their views in greater depth; paying for
advertising; and embedding the topic of payday lending in financial education programs.
In Utah, advocates had few resources to measure or influence public sentiment about payday
lending. The one exception was newspaper coverage. Both of the major papers in the Salt Lake
area, The Salt Lake Tribune and the Deseret News, conducted original research on the problems
associated with payday lending and covered the activities of advocates to reform the industry
at the local and state levels. A primary example was a three‐day series published in the Deseret
News in November, 2005—a time when only a few Utah cities had passed payday ordinances.
Linda Hilton of the Coalition of Religious Communities was quoted in each of the articles. In the
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first, she described the industry as “legalized loan sharking.”468 In the second, she decried
Utah’s weak payday lending regulation.469 In the third article, Hilton enumerated the many
obstacles to payday reform at the state level, including a powerful financial services lobby.470
The willingness of journalists to cover the payday industry was virtually the only method
available to advocates in Utah to influence public awareness and opinion. In the Dallas area,
advocates also enjoyed favorable news coverage from the Dallas Morning News and they were
invited regularly to contribute guest opinion columns. In addition, Dallas advocates employed
the internet via blogs and social media. Starting in 2008, Reverend Gerald Britt authored a blog
titled “Change the Wind” in which he tracked the progress of local and state payday reform
efforts. In Dallas and Denton, advocates maintained actively‐used Facebook pages.471
The most extensive effort to measure and influence public sentiment took place in Silicon
Valley. In addition to favorable and extensive media coverage and a Facebook page for the
Coalition Against Payday Predators (CAPP), advocates were able to gauge public opinion via a
professional survey, buy advertising on the sides of San Jose buses, and embed the subject of
payday lending in financial education programs. In November, 2010, Goodwin Simon
conducted a telephone survey of 400 registered voters living in San Jose.472 The survey,
commissioned by the Center for Responsible Lending and paid for by a grant from the Silicon
Valley Community Foundation, examined attitudes about payday lending and levels of support
for tighter regulation of the industry, including local zoning restrictions. Responding to the
survey results, San Jose City Councilmember Ash Kalra observed: “Payday loans are harmful
products, and this poll demonstrates that San Jose voters know it.”473 At a smaller scale and less
professional level than in San Jose, the Youth Leadership Institute conducted a face‐to‐face
survey about payday lending with a non‐random sample of Daly City residents. Again, the
survey was used to make the case for a local ordinance.474
Silicon Valley advocates did more than gauge public opinion; they tried to change it. In mid‐
2012, shortly after passage of the San Jose ordinance but before enactment of several others in
the Silicon Valley, CAPP purchased advertisements on the sides of buses that circulated
throughout Santa Clara County.475 A more personal and individualized effort to influence public
opinion regarding payday lending was via financial education classes. SVCF and other Silicon
Valley ordinance supporters considered financial literacy and asset building keys to making
payday loans unnecessary. SVCF’s chief executive, Emmet D. Carson, said: “The financial
literacy piece of this is the core. I can’t stress that enough.”476
Putting financial literacy into action, Community Legal Services of East Palo Alto (CLESPA),
Nuestra Casa, and the entrepreneurship‐oriented Renaissance Mid‐Peninsula offered consumer
education classes to help people develop financial skills sufficient to free them from at least
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some payday loans. Nuestra Casa also incorporated education about payday lending into a
class for undocumented residents seeking a driver’s license under a new California law. The
theory behind including payday lending education was that getting a license involves buying a
car, and buying a car entails understanding credit, and understanding credit includes avoiding
high‐cost forms of borrowing such as payday loans.477 In Pacifica, an SVCF‐grantee developed a
small‐scale program to help borrowers pay off payday loans and then learn to build assets
capable of covering an emergency.478
Ordinance advocates did not have the capability of measuring the impact of particular activities
on specific aspects of public awareness and opinion regarding the payday lending industry, but
several advocates believed that their efforts contributed to a cultural shift in the way payday
lending is viewed by society. As Reverend Britt of Dallas CitySquare stated:
We have been a significant voice bringing payday lending to the public consciousness,
and we've actually changed the conversation about payday lending and about financial
literacy and the need for financial literacy, not just among lower to middle class people,
but for everybody. I don't think that that would have happened if we hadn't done this.
In California, James Zahradka, formerly of the Law Foundation of Silicon Valley, thought his
coalition’s efforts created a cultural sea change in which lenders were associated with societal
ills. Zahradka explained the importance of getting city after city on record saying that payday
loans are toxic products, and while legal, they are “a noxious land use, like an adult bookstore
or a liquor store or whatever. We're regulating them like that. That's a very powerful message
that it is getting into the national culture more and more.”479
Impact on Community Cohesion, Organizational Capacity, and Individual Development
In all three study locations, advocates worked in coalitions and drew together numerous and
sometimes quite disparate groups. In Utah, the Coalition of Religious Communities (CORC) was
the major voice for payday reform. In the Silicon Valley, SVCF used the grant‐making process to
draw together groups already engaged in payday loan reform with additional organizations that
had a broad commitment to fair lending but limited direct experience with payday advocacy.
In Santa Clara County, the Coalition Against Payday Predators (CAPP) was chiefly responsible for
promoting local payday ordinances. With help of SVCF funding, CAPP had the advantage of
professional leadership from Kyra Kazantzis of the Law Foundation of Silicon Valley and Liana
Molina of the California Reinvestment Coalition. CAPP brought together social service,
religious, labor, and community empowerment organizations, and it was formally endorsed by
representatives of the Asian‐American, Mexican‐American, Native‐American, and African‐
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American communities. In San Mateo County, alliances were more informal, but a common
relationship to SVCF provided a network for sharing ideas and experiences.
The most broad‐based coalition emerged in Dallas. The Anti‐Poverty Coalition of Greater Dallas
(APC) was extraordinary in the extent that it crossed boundaries of religious, race, and social
class. Even more remarkable is that APC functioned without generous financial resources. In
this sense, it was more “organic” than the coalitions in Silicon Valley. Reverend Britt, one of
APC’s leaders, described it as the most resilient and nimble coalition with which he had ever
been involved.480
The various coalitions flourished, in part, because their leaders purposefully made group
members responsible for prioritizing efforts. In both the Silicon Valley and in Dallas, coalition
leaders allowed members of the group to set their own priorities in choosing to organize
around payday lending. No one was asked to take on a cause about which he or she did not feel
passionate. This passion built the buy‐in and perseverance needed to get the job done. When
people from different backgrounds stand together to support payday ordinances, it speaks
loudly about what society wants and needs. Broad‐based support also helps negate lender
arguments that payday loans respond to genuine borrower needs in a community. But beyond
pressuring for local payday ordinances, collective efforts helped build “empathy bridges”
among people from different backgrounds.481 Members of APC, CAPP, as well as advocates in
San Mateo County reported that they now feel more comfortable working within in coalitions
generally, not just those that were used for payday campaigns. For CORC and APC, payday
lending was always part of a much broader social justice agenda, but the continued existence of
CAPP suggests that it too has tapped into a need for community cohesion and progress on
additional issues of community concerns. At a time in this country when divisions of all kinds
are at their deepest in recent history, examples of communities coming together are precious.
Helping Organizations and Individuals Find Voice in Policy‐Making
One of the most powerful human skills is the ability to “speak in one’s own voice with full
authority.”482 Working on a campaign that achieves its goal of passing a local ordinance can
help advocates, including payday loan customers who share their stories publicly, to find voice,
power, and purpose. In Utah, advocate Art Sutherland was transformed by his experience
working for payday reform. As a semi‐retired engineer, he was looking for a way to use his
talents to help society.483 As a result of his anti‐payday efforts, Sutherland became a nationally‐
honored consumer advocate.484 Another example involving much younger people comes from
Silicon Valley where the anti‐payday lending movement included two organizations that
develop the leadership skills of youth.485 Through their campaigns against payday lending, the
young people organized by the Youth Leadership Institute (YLI) and its partner Mission SF (now
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MyPath) learned to identify social problems, find their own voice in community, and navigate
the political process.
In another example of empowerment, Danielle Ayers, Minister of Justice of Friendship‐West
Baptist Church, explained that after passing an ordinance, church members “felt good, felt that
that they had succeeded at something, that there was good news.”486 Several years later, the
congregation remained mobilized. A plant nursery located near the church closed and was
replaced by a title lender.487 Through the church’s advocacy, the lender was forced to leave
after it had gone through the expense of opening for business. Subsequently, the restaurant
chain Raising Cane’s Chicken Fingers moved in, creating a huge, visible victory for the
community. Ayers commented:
When that title loan store closed, we announced it [in church]. People were
excited. . . . Even if they didn’t march [in a particular payday loan protest], they
were happy. . . . And the ones who did march, this was a way for them to sharpen
their advocacy skills and also to see that, in the end, we can win. But it takes us
doing our part.488
Some campaigns taught payday loan borrowers how to become advocates. For example, Silicon
Valley direct service providers, Sacred Heart Community Services and Somos Mayfair, helped
identify payday borrowers to get specific stories about the harms of payday lending for the
cause. Sacred Heart went one step further and convinced borrowers to speak publicly about
their experiences with payday loans. Christian Luna, a program manager at Sacred Heart,
explained how the method of finding victims and empowering them to speak helped borrowers
grow as individuals and feel part of something meaningful. Developing these skills is now part
of Sacred Heart’s standard operating procedure.
Helping individuals find their voice was not limited to members of non‐profits, religious
congregants, or payday loan borrowers. Stephanie Mace of the United Way of Metropolitan
Dallas (Dallas United Way) explained how the United Way took wealthy United Way donors and
educated them about how payday loans worked, how little protection the law provided, and
then encouraged them to go to state or local politicians and talk to them about changing the
law to help serve people, not payday lenders. The United Way trained, with the help of Ann
Baddour of Texas Appleseed, some of these high‐end donors to pose as borrowers and to go
into stores and do secret shopper experiments. The donors asked for a loan of say $500 and
asked questions to see not only what it felt like to borrow in this way, but also what terms were
offered and how much information one could glean before taking out the loan.489
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As a result of direct exposure to payday lending, several major donors of the Dallas United Way
learned that their voice could complement their money in seeking to change in the world. Mace
explained:
At United Way, our mission is to change lives forever. And we encourage
people to do that by giving, by volunteering, and by advocating. So, this is
kind of that third pillar, by advocating. And one of the things that I think is
very unique to United Way is that it's not just United Way staff or the
organization that advocates. We actually train our major donors to go out
and to visit—to go to Austin, we've gone to DC—to visit with elected
officials. To educate them on these issues; how it impacts the community,
see where their money is going—it's their money.490
In addition to helping individuals find voice, organizations themselves were transformed
through the local ordinance movements. Christian Luna, for example, said that as a result of
Sacred Heart’s advocacy work around payday lending, Sacred Heart became an advocacy
organization, in addition to a direct service provider. Similarly, Kyra Kazantzis, lead organizer
for the legal service provider Law Foundation of Silicon Valley, said that as a result of organizing
a payday reform coalition, her organization more strongly embraced policy advocacy as a
complement to legal service provision and litigation. Regarding the Silicon Valley Council of
Nonprofits, Kazantzis said, “Payday lending really solidified, in that entity's mind, that
nonprofits should absolutely be doing policy advocacy.”491
Faith Development
In all three case studies, religious organizations played an important, and often crucial, role.
While religious convictions often motivated individuals to participate in payday campaigns,
their convictions were reinforced and deepened through participation. This process is what
Josephine Lopez Paul and Walker Moore of the Industrial Areas Foundation called “faith
development.” As Lopez Paul explained:
This work [as a community organizer] is the development of people and helping
them understand their own power in their community. I've organized in El Paso,
and we passed millions of dollars of water infrastructure laws there, people in the
Colonias. . . . It's the same basic principles with payday lending—just listening to
people and teaching them then how to act on what it is that they care about. . . .It's
really about the formation of people and the development of people. So for people
like Father Dan [Kelley of St. Joseph Catholic Church in Arlington] to interact with
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members of the congregation [about payday lending], that's huge. The people in
the congregation who had never been a part of anything like this before can
suddenly say, “I can do something. And I'm a pretty effective speaker in front of the
city council. I can make something happen. And this is a way for me to live out my
faith.”492
Danielle Ayers called the same process "faith formation” and described connecting what is
heard in church on a Sunday morning and
how we govern ourselves between Sundays. What does God have to say about our
existential situation? What is going on? He cares. God cares about children who were
impoverished and don’t have food to eat. So, we try to connect those dots, and Dr.
Haynes [Senior Pastor of Friendship‐West Baptist Church] does an excellent job at
opening up the text and giving it some original context.493
Finally, while developing their faith and their voice, people learned about the political process
and how to hold politicians accountable. As Walker Moore explained, at St. Joseph’s, a 5,000‐
member church in Arlington, Father Dan Kelley threw himself into the payday loan cause and
was a role model for constituents. A week before the Arlington City Council was scheduled to
consider the payday ordinance, Kelley and other ordinance supporters were invited to address
the Arlington Chamber of Commerce. As Moore recalls the event, Kelley entered the room and
saw that one of his congregants was chairing the meeting. The councilmember was a “pro‐
business, anti‐regulation guy.”494 But the chairperson was now conflicted because “he’s heard
about all the anti‐payday activity that has been going on at St. Joseph’s, and he knows what
faith says.” Perhaps as a result of Father Dan’s presence, the Chamber of Commerce took no
position on the proposed ordinance rather than oppose it.495
Moore and Lopez Paul helped organize people to go and testify at the crucial November 10,
2015 City Council meeting in Arlington. Father Kelley was only one of ten people who spoke in
favor of the ordinance. 496 Moore noted that after Kelley spoke, members of the city council
repeatedly quoted him when speaking in favor of the ordinance.497 In Arlington as in Denton
and Dallas before them, members of religious communities found an opportunity to unite their
faith and their politics.

Concluding Thoughts on Campaign Impacts
Any global assessment of what the local ordinance campaigns accomplished depends on the
standard of success one uses. Few advocates operated under the illusion that local zoning
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ordinances, or even the business regulation ordinances possible in Texas, would put the payday
lending industry out of business or even noticeably reduce the amount of payday borrowing.
Reflecting on local ordinances, Professor Christopher Peterson, who had once encouraged his
mother as a member of the West Valley City Council to pass an anti‐payday zoning ordinance,
expressed frustration at how little he thought local ordinances had accomplished. He said that
local efforts, “instead of being a stepping stone in building more sustaining and more
meaningful change, became a false lead in the maze that became a dead end.”498 Peterson
currently believes that the best possibility for lasting reform lies with federal action, as
represented by Military Lending Act and, perhaps, the rules proposed by the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau.
Peterson was the lone voice of disillusionment among the people we interviewed. Dallas City
Councilmember Jerry Allen was more representative and more modest in his expectations. He
said: “I’m just a lil’ ol’ guy in Dallas, Texas. I can only punch them [the payday lenders] the way I
can punch them.”499 Most of the advocates of local ordinances felt compelled to “do
something, do anything” about what they perceived as a financial practice that devastated the
lives of their co‐religionists, social service clients, or fellow citizens. They succeeded in their
primary goal—to put in place local ordinances that, at a minimum, made a strong statement in
opposition to the payday industry. But their actions appear also to have had numerous indirect
and less readily measurable impacts. The advocates helped build a climate for further reforms
at the state and federal levels by providing a new narrative. Rather than the payday industry’s
claim that their loans, while expensive, meet an urgent need when no other options are
available, the new narrative defined payday loans are “debt traps” to which society has an
obligation to build better alternatives.
Beyond any impact on payday lending itself, the campaigners changed others and themselves.
In the process of opposing payday lending, campaigning organizations discovered that policy
advocacy was consistent with other missions, such as providing services to low‐income people.
These organizations also came to realize the power of coalitions and developed trust in other
organizations. Finally, individuals found their voice as active members of their communities
and experienced the sense of empowerment that comes with matching beliefs with action.
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Exhibit A: Study Interviewees*
Utah Interviewees
Nicole Cottle, Assistant Manager, West Valley City
Lee Davidson, Reporter, The Salt Lake Tribune
Phillip Hill, Community Development Director, Midvale City Council
Linda Hilton, formerly of Crossroads Urban Center
Christopher Peterson, University of Utah School of Law (by phone)
Margaret Peterson, former member of the West Valley City Council
Art Sutherland, Coalition of Religious Communities
California Interviewees
Eleanor Clement Glass, Silicon Valley Community Foundation (by phone)
Mike Guingona, Daly City Council (by phone)
Kyra Kazantzis, Law Foundation of Silicon Valley
Paul Leonard, formerly of the Center for Responsible Lending
Tim Lohrenz, formerly of the Insight Center for Community Economic Development
Christian Luna, Sacred Heart Community Service (by phone)
Liana Molina, California Reinvestment Coalition
Rafael Morales, formerly of Silicon Valley Community Foundation
Keith Ogden, Community Legal Services of East Palo Alto
Fahad Qurashi, Youth Leadership Institute
Erica Wood, Silicon Valley Community Foundation
James Zahradka, Law Foundation of Silicon Valley
Texas Interviewees
Jerry Allen, former member of the Dallas City Council
Danielle Ayers, Friendship‐West Baptist Church
Anne Baddour, Texas Appleseed (by phone)
Gerald Britt, CitySquare
Marc Jacobson, Jewish Community Relations Council of the Jewish Federation of Greater Dallas
Josephine Lopez Paul, Dallas Area Interfaith, of the Industrial Areas Foundation
Stephanie Mace, United Way of Metropolitan Dallas
Jim Mitchell, Reporter, the Dallas Morning News
Walker Moore, Dallas Area Interfaith, of the Industrial Areas Foundation
Katie Murray, Wilshire Baptist Church
Pat Smith, Serve Denton
Kayce Strader, formerly of Serve Denton
Susan Williams, AARP Texas
*All interviews were conducted in person unless otherwise indicated.
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Exhibit B
Anti‐Poverty Coalition of Greater Dallas: Meeting Minutes
Minutes from Meeting Held on Thursday, January 6, 2011 at 1:30pm
In Attendance:
1. Gerald Britt: CitySquare (formerly Central Dallas Ministries)
2. Jessica Davila: CitySquare (formerly Central Dallas Ministries)
3. Rachel Lamb: CitySquare (formerly Central Dallas Ministries)
4. Dr. Tim Bray: University of Texas at Dallas
5. Stephanie Werner: United Way of Metropolitan Dallas
6. Marlene Cohen: National Council of Jewish Women
7. Bob Cook: HUD
8. Jacqueline West (On behalf of Martha Blaine), Community Council of Greater Dallas
9. Susan Williams: AARP
10. Erma Saracho: City of Dallas Office of Economic Development
11. Marc Jacobson: Jewish Community Relations Council
12. Marlene Gorin: Jewish Community Relations Council
13. Kay Barger: Prestige Community Credit Union
14. Christie Myers: Dallas Regional Chamber
15. Lynn Rossol: Catholic Diocese of Dallas
16. Jim Reid: Momentum Texas (Bank on Dallas)
17. Catarina Torres (Representative for Sister Mary Anne Owens): Catholic Charities
18. Monica Egert‐Smith: Communities Foundation of Texas
19. Victor Garza: Consumer Credit Counseling Service of Greater Dallas
20. Gerald Davis: Baptist General Convention of Texas
Agenda
1. Welcome and Introductions Rev. Gerald Britt, CitySquare
2. Sub‐Committee Reports
 Financial Literacy - Christie Myers, Dallas Regional Chamber
 Target group: families
 Next phase: looking into other organizations like Headstart and reviewing their research.
 Idea of polling people in community to find out what they know and don’t know.
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 Possible town hall meetings
 Getting this in school curriculum – reviewing groups already doing this.
 Will choose a small area of Dallas as an initial focus area.
2
 Educating and Lobbying Elected Officials – Rev. Gerald Britt, CitySquare
 December 13, 2010: AARP, UWMD, CitySquare appeared to the City of Dallas Quality of
Life Committee to draft and adopt a resolution to go to state legislature to close the CSO
loophole
 All partners in this coalition need to meet with City Council Member Jerry Allen. He is very
passionate in advocating this cause.
 F.I.C.A. South Dallas Church community plans to also meet with city council – they will
need critical mass of people.
 Planning a “Day at the Capitol”.
 One pager: We need organizations to give permission to list their organization name on a
one-page fact sheet to show support. This one-pager will be given to legislators, and possibly the
media. The one-pager will be circulated via e-mail.


Key officials in Dallas region:

 Rep. Vickie Truitt, Chair, House Committee on Pensions, Investments and Financial
Services
 Vice-Chair, Rep. Rafael Anchia, Vice-Chair, House Committee on Pensions, Investments
and Financial Services
 Rep. Burt Solomons
 Sen. John Carona, Chair, Senate Committee on Business and Commerce
 As people are setting up meetings, please let Stephanie Werner know and please also share
information on the meeting outcomes. Keep meeting with legislators even if others have already
done so.


Creating Public Awareness – Ralph Adams, Urban League

Ralph Adams could not be present; but here are the goals that the sub‐committee set at the
last Coalition meeting:
1. Collaborative communication outreach among agencies.
2. Public awareness of alternative resources to payday loans.
3. Educate coalition organizations’ employees and volunteers about predatory lending. We can
fight money with heart and word of mouth.
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There was discussion about these points, including the following questions and feedback:
 Is there a PowerPoint available to the public that we can use to train our staff?
 Nothing specific but coalition members will share anything that they are already using with
other members of the coalition.
3
 We need to build an infrastructure for all organizations to share contacts, handouts, etc.
Victor Garza will look into creating a YahooGroups site that will allow us to share documents
more easily.
 We’re hitting this in tax season. People are already getting refund anticipation loans. We
need to create more public awareness of VITA sites.
3. Coalition Action Planning Facilitated By Dr. Tim Bray
A lot of this is a great opportunity for us to not re‐invent the wheel. Dr. Bray reviewed a work
plan template that was developed by the Vera Institute.
Dr. Bray discussed the importance of the Coalition clarifying communications processes,
including: What’s the policy or procedure for developing and approving a public document?
Who can speak for the Coalition and what approval do they need?
Dr. Bray encouraged all sub‐committees to use the work plan template to turn their objectives
into attainable action plans, with a particular focus on who will do what by when.
Time Sensitive Items:
 Connecting others interested in this and similar issues who are not at the table today. This
includes other coalitions in the Dallas area.
 Need to clearly define the Coalition’s mission statement in a way that shows that the
Coalition is not a single-issue group.
Potential Barriers:
 Concerned about what is deliverable and can bring some relief. Town hall at churches and
parishioners want to know what the alternative is to payday lending. We need to identify lending
institutions we feel comfortable in referring as well as financial literacy courses available in the
community. In short, what is going to take payday lending’s place?
 Are there non-CSO lenders who provide short term solutions? Can we identify them? This
could be a legitimate step in the right direction.
 Can we as a coalition put out a 1 pager of alternatives?
 We have a simple grid of “Where do you start when you need money?”
 We might not refer people to a particular credit union, but to the credit union association.
 The challenge of engaging people on the issue of payday lending:
 “Why should I care?” How do we get people engaged in this issue even if they don’t feel this
issue affects them?
 Complexity of the issue makes people lose interest: people have no understanding of interest
or APR, how do we tell it in a simple and engaging way?
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 What is the capacity and quality of various financial literacy education programs?
4
Potential Resources
 Where can we get data on CSO locations geo-mapped on city areas?
 A stronger social justice message being shared with our congregations and all places of
worship. This would make the field more fertile.
 It helps that the subject of payday lending has become something nationally known and
generally more recognizable than it was a year ago.
 What role, if any, will the development of the new federal Consumer Protection Bureau have
in the effort to regulate payday lenders?
4. Review and Next Steps Rev. Gerald Britt, CitySquare
 General Coalition e-mail list is maintained by Marc Jacobson. Contact him if you would like
to be on that list and are not already on it.
 YahooGroup will be developed by Victor Garza.
 Stephanie Werner will finalize the Payday Lending one-pager and email it by January 10th;
organizations need to provide Stephanie permission to include their organizational names by Jan
14.
 Sub-Committees need to meet and create a “Work Plan” on how they will reach their
objectives.
 It was agreed that the Coalition will meet every 6 weeks, on Thursdays from 2pm-4pm.
 Next Meeting: Thursday, February 17, 2-4pm, United Way
 Let us know if your organization is interested in hosting a meeting in the future. After the
February 17th meeting, we will likely have rotating meeting sites.
5. Adjourn
Next Meeting: February 17, 2011 2:00‐4:00pm
United Way of Metropolitan Dallas
1800 N. Lamar, Dallas 75202
For more information and to RSVP, contact Marc Jacobson at MJacobson@jfgd.org
Anti‐Poverty Coalition of Greater Dallas : Meeting Minutes
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Thursday, February 17, 2011 at 2:00pm
In attendance
1. Gerald Britt, CitySquare
2. Jessica Davila, CitySquare
3. Rachel Lamb, CitySquare
4. Denise Gomez, CitySquare
5. Lynn Rossol, Catholic Diocese of Dallas
6. Katie Dickinson, Senior Source
7. Ralph Adams, Urban League
8. Marlene Cohen, National Council of Jewish Women
9. Stephanie Werner, UWMD
10. Marc Jacobson, Jewish Community Relations Council
11. Jim Reid, Momentum
12. Bob Cook, HUD
13. Jenny Stewart, CCCS
14. Dr. Darlene Williams. HUD
15. Kay Barger, Prestige Community Credit Union
16. Christie Myers, Dallas Regional Chamber
Agenda
1. Welcome and Introductions Stephanie Werner, UWMD
2. Sub‐Committee Reports


Educating and Lobbying Elected Officials – Rev. Gerald Britt, CitySquare

 Rev. Britt reported that a resolution calling for regulating payday lenders passed in the Dallas
City Council – although it was fairly weak in its wording.
 There is momentum at the Texas legislature for closing the loophole, but continued advocacy
is needed.
 A one-page handout was distributed with calling information for the Senate Business and
Commerce Committee.
 The Senate Business and Commerce Committee will be holding a hearing on Tuesday,
February 22, 2011.





Financial Literacy -- Christie Myers, Dallas Regional Chamber
Kay Barger presented the Financial Literacy sub-committee report.
The sub-committee has established a Yahoogroup for communicating.
Plan to utilize surveys from UWMD VITA sites to establish needs and wants of community.
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 Plan to gather a list of resources and services providing financial literacy education. Possibly
review the curriculum and requirements to attend.
 Creating Public Awareness – Ralph Adams, Urban League
 Planning a campaign soon to get information out to the community.
 Jim Reid added that the Bank on Dallas program is interested in working with the AntiPoverty Coalition on this effort because it is limited in its public .awareness budget and he sees
outreach through community organizations as the best approach.
 There are several alternatives being looked at to payday lenders:
o Progresso Financio, a California company making small dollar loans at 36% APR
o FDIC had model program in 2008 with 31 financial institutions on how to carry out successful
small dollar loan programs
o “Bank on San Francisco” established a fair small dollar loan program.
3. Discussion on Ways to Enhance Coalition Efforts Marc Jacobson, JCRC
Overview:
 We are tweaking the way the Coalition is lead. The coalition was originally started by JCRC,
UWMD, and CitySquare, which continued leading through an interim steering committee. The
steering committee will now be expanded to include the sub-committee chairs.
 The steering committee has met to address issues of coalition communication and
cohesiveness.
 Victor Garza set up a Yahoo Groups account for the Coalition as a whole. This tool is
particularly for coalition-wide access to documents. A one-page handout with instructions for
joining was distributed.
 If a sub-committee has a document they want to put out under the Coalition’s name, they
should send it to Marc Jacobson to be distributed to the Coalition listserv in advance of the next
meeting, at which the content will be discussed and voted on.
 Messaging: We want to make sure every organization is in accord in their message of what
the Coalition does and who we are as an organization. On the flip-side of the payday lending
one-page fact sheet is a paragraph-long description of the Anti-Poverty Coalition that should be
used as a model of how to describe the coalition.
Discussion:
 There was some discussion about the need to keep in mind other issues for reducing poverty,
including job creation and developing job skills, with the understanding that the payday lending
and financial literacy focus is just the initial agenda item of the Coalition.
 There was discussion about the need to invite other groups to the table to continue to expand
participation in the coalition, including reaching back out to those groups have participated
previously.
 Christie Myers discussed the questions the Financial Literacy sub-committee is struggling
with in terms of focus -- knowing what resources are available and how the Coalition can best
make a positive impact.
 Dr. Williams with HUD described their successful partnership with the Federal Reserve and
FDIC to establish a financial literacy curriculum at Paul Quinn College. She emphasized the
need to actually get the curriculum’s utilized by the community.
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 Rev. Britt suggested the financial literacy sub-committee could look at what a model
financial literacy program would look like, consist of, and then find out who’s doing that sort of
program. Then you figure out how to open the door the get more people in poverty to the really
good financial literacy programs.
 Marc Jacobson suggested that the Anti-Poverty Coalition can most have an impact by
utilizing the fact that we are an umbrella organization and can bring lots of people, organizations
and resources together.
 There was some discussion about the need to ensure that we pay attention to the need to
measure the impact of our efforts towards reducing poverty, and Stephanie Werner mentioned
that UWMD is currently contracting with UTD to do an general data collection effort to see what
progress is being made to move people out of poverty in the Dallas area.
4. Review and Next Steps Stephanie Werner, UWMD
We’ve had a good discussion and we look forward to seeing you at the next meeting to
continue this conversation. The next meeting will be on Thursday, March 31, 2011 from 2pm‐
4pm at the Urban League of Greater Dallas.
5. Adjourn
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Exhibit C

“Fair Lending Campaign” Binder
Table of Contents








Alternatives Do Exist
o Options
o Small‐dollar loans in Dallas
Density Maps
o District
o City
Letters of Support
o Rep Eric Johnson and Senator Royce West
o AARP
o CitySquare
o First Unitarian Church of Dallas
o Friendship West Baptist Church
o Jewish Community Relations Council of Greater Dallas
o Jewish Family Services
o National Council of Jewish Women
o Temple Emanu‐El
o United Way of Metropolitan Dallas
o Wilshire Baptist Church
Media
o http://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/editorials/20110428‐editorial‐local‐and‐
state‐officials‐must‐act‐now‐to‐fix‐payday‐lending.ece
o http://www.mysanantonio.com/default/article/Cinderella‐ending‐but‐no‐
solution‐1388986.php
o http://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/editorials/20110204‐editorial‐it‐is‐time‐to‐
close‐the‐payday‐lending‐loophole.ece
o http://www.texasobserver.org/cover‐story/taking‐an‐interest
Resources
o Closing the CSO Loophole
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Exhibit D

June 23, 2011
The Honorable Mayor Caraway and Dallas City Council
Dallas City Hall
1500 Marilla St.
Dallas, Texas 75201
Dear Mayor Caraway and City Council Members,
The Anti‐Poverty Coalition of Greater Dallas applauds the Dallas City Council’s passage of a
land‐use zoning ordinance on May 25, 2011 that will reduce the proliferation of payday and
auto title lenders in our City.
Today, we applaud you again for proposing a realistic and substantive policy change, and hope
it will once again result in a unanimous passage of this ordinance. We understand that some
families need short‐term loans during an emergency and believe this ordinance is a fair
compromise that would not prohibit access to these services.
The proposed ordinance places reasonable limitations on the number of installment payment,
the number of renewals, and on the amount borrowed; and is consistent with the information
and standards reported by the industry. The industry states that more than 90 percent of their
customers who are facing financial difficulties use their short‐term products wisely.
Furthermore, they already work with customers that need extra time by arranging up to four
extensions and, to a small percentage, they offer an extended payment plan at no additional
charge.
We appreciate you listening to our concerns and thank you in advance for supporting this
ordinance. We look forward to continuing to collaborate together to reduce poverty in the
Dallas area.
Sincerely,
The Anti‐Poverty Coalition of Greater Dallas
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